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OUTLINE 
This report considers the participation of P – an individual who is alleged to lack mental capacity – 
in proceedings concerning his health, welfare or deprivation of liberty in the Court of Protection 
(CoP) under the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (MCA).  We argue that the CoP was established on a 
model of ‘low participation’ that is no longer compatible with developments in international human 
rights law under the European Convention on Human Rights and the UN Convention on the Rights 
of Persons with Disabilities.  The European Court of Human Rights has developed a threefold ‘right 
to participate’ in proceedings concerning deprivation of liberty and deprivation of legal capacity, 
emphasising individual dignity, and adversarial and evidential principles.  Support for, and 
participation in, decision making are also central elements of the MCA. 
We consider different elements of participation in the CoP in turn, and highlight particular concerns 
in relation to:  
 difficulties experienced by P in accessing the CoP to challenge a decision made under the 
MCA or to review a deprivation of liberty;  
 resource constraints on making P a party to the proceedings;  
 the serious detriment to the fairness of proceedings done by a decision not to notify P about 
the case;  
 uncertainty about whether and how judges should take evidence from P and form their own 
view as to P’s mental capacity;  
 the limited resources available for representation of P within the proceedings – either via a 
legal representative or, in some cases, even a lay representative; 
 difficulties reconciling the ‘best interests’ model of representation currently adopted by 
litigation friends with recent human rights authorities on deprivation of legal capacity and 
deprivation of liberty proceedings; 
 a lack of recognition of the centrality of P’s ‘personal presence’ in proceedings in the CoP’s 
rules and guidance; 
 a lack of provision for special measures and reasonable adjustments in the CoP’s rules, as 
well as no specific allocation of resources for this purpose; 
 inadequate training of legal representatives and judges on disability and access to justice 
matters; 
 a lack of accessible information about the CoP for those who are subject to its jurisdiction. 
We contrast the CoP with the Mental Health Tribunals, which in many respects outperform the 
court in relation to these matters of participation.  We conclude that there is an urgent need to 
address the model of participation of P in the CoP.  This will require revisions to the rules and 
practice directions, through increased resources for various elements of participation, and by 
addressing the question of when and how cases should come to the CoP. We make 20 specific 
recommendations for the CoP, the court service and the government to enhance the participation 
of P. 
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ABBREVIATIONS 
ALRs Accredited Legal Representatives (under Rule 3A) 
CoP Court of Protection  
COPR Court of Protection Rules 2007 
CRPD United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
DoLS  Mental Capacity Act 2005 Deprivation of liberty safeguards  
ECHR European Convention on Human Rights 
ECtHR  European Court of Human Rights  
MCA Mental Capacity Act 2005 
MHA Mental Health Act 1983 
MHTs Mental Health Tribunals (including both the Mental Health Review Tribunals in 
Wales and the First Tier Tribunal (Mental Health) in England) 
P A person who lacks, or is alleged to lack, mental capacity in relation to a 
particular matter and who is the subject of CoP proceedings (defined in Rule 6 
of the COPR) 
Rule 3A The newly introduced Rule 3A, inserted into the COPR in amendments in 2015.  
This requires the CoP to consider how P should participate in the proceedings 
from a menu of options. 
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SUMMARY 
The Court of Protection (CoP) was established to make decisions under the Mental Capacity Act 
2005 (MCA) including determining whether a person has the mental capacity to make a decision for 
themselves, and, if not, determining what course of action is in their best interests.  The CoP can 
also authorize detention and hear appeals against detention under the MCA deprivation of liberty 
safeguards (DoLS).  Support for, and participation in, decision making are central elements of the 
MCA.  This report considers how effectively the person who is alleged to lack mental capacity – 
known as ‘P’ – can participate in court proceedings which are about their health, welfare or 
deprivation of liberty.  We base our analysis on European and domestic case law, court rules, 
practice directions and practice guidance, academic commentaries, and key issues identified at a 
roundtable discussion of experts on the CoP held at the Nuffield Foundation in 2015.   
This report is part of a wider project on accessibility, efficiency and transparency in welfare cases in 
the CoP, funded by the Nuffield Foundation.  You can read our other reports on our project 
website: http://sites.cardiff.ac.uk/wccop/ 
The CoP was created in 2007 and based on the practices of the ‘old’ CoP which dealt with people’s 
property and affairs, and the practices of the Family Division of the High Court, which had already 
started to address questions about health and welfare before the MCA was created.  The Court of 
Protection Rules (COPR) are highly flexible, and proceedings can be ‘formal’ or ‘informal’ depending 
on the kind of case.  When the court was set up, the participation of P received very little attention; 
the assumption appeared to be that where P participated it would only be indirectly through a 
representative of some kind.  This was similar in many ways to practices relating to children in the 
family courts at that time.  Recent amendments to the COPR have introduced new rules to promote 
P’s participation, including a new Rule 3A which requires the CoP to consider and select from a 
menu of options for P’s participation and representation in the proceedings. 
The CoP’s jurisdiction includes cases concerning property and affairs, and cases concerning health, 
welfare and deprivation of liberty.  The CoP’s jurisdiction over health, welfare and deprivation of 
liberty is the focus of this report.  Cases can be contentious or non-contentious.  We describe the 
CoP as comprising several ‘courts within a court’, each of which is subject to different processes 
and case management approaches.   
One important focus for this report is the availability of resources to facilitate the participation of P 
in proceedings concerning his or her legal capacity or liberty.  Enhancing P’s direct participation in 
the proceedings will often require special measures or reasonable adjustments, such as funding for 
intermediaries to assist with putting questions to P during a hearing.  Many kinds of case require 
some form of legal or lay representation for P, which again will often require resources in the form 
of legal aid or provision of some form of independent advocacy.  This report describes several 
situations where a shortfall of resources means that P cannot participate fully in the proceedings, 
or where it is unclear how the additional costs incurred by P’s representation or participation 
should be met.  We recognise that in the current climate additional resources for representation or 
other measures to support participation are unlikely to be easily found.  However, we conclude that 
such resources are essential to achieve  compliance with international human rights and common 
law obligations. . 
The question of resources for participation has become especially acute in the wake of the 
Supreme Court’s ruling in P v Cheshire West and Chester Council and another; P and Q v Surrey 
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County Council2, which defined deprivation of liberty in such a way that hundreds of thousands of 
people with mental disabilities are eligible for safeguards under Article 5 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).  In particular, this means that many more people in care 
homes and also quasi-domestic settings such as supported living will now be considered to be 
deprived of their liberty and require safeguards to protect their Article 5 rights.  Outside of care 
homes and hospitals the DoLS procedures are unavailable and the only way to comply with Article 5 
ECHR is for the CoP to directly authorise the detention.  The majority of these cases are non-
contentious, that is, neither P nor P’s family object to the arrangements.  In a sequence of litigation 
beginning with X & Ors (Deprivation of Liberty)3 the CoP (and the Court of Appeal) have grappled 
with the question of how to balance P’s rights to participate in proceedings concerning his liberty, 
with the reality that very limited resources are available to facilitate this.  Following a critical report 
by the House of Lords Committee on the MCA, and the Supreme Court’s ruling in Cheshire West, 
the Law Commission has undertaken a review of the DoLS and is developing a replacement 
framework.  They have proposed that for matters relating to deprivation of liberty, a tribunal may 
be a more appropriate destination for appeals than the CoP. 
THE RIGHT TO PARTICIPATE AND THE ‘RULE OF PERSONAL PRESENCE’ 
After the CoP was established, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) heard in increasing 
number of cases about proceedings concerning the legal capacity and deprivation of liberty of 
people with mental disabilities.  Its case law was influenced by the recently adopted United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) and by Recommendation No. R(99)4 of 
the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on principles concerning the legal protection of 
incapable adults.4 Recommendation 99(4) emphasises procedural fairness and a right to be heard in 
person in any proceedings which could affect a person’s legal capacity. This report particularly focuses on 
the requirements of the ECHR, as this is directly incorporated into UK law5, but we also highlight the 
significance of the CRPD’s provisions in relation to legal capacity, access to justice and accessibility.   
Starting with the case of Shtukaturov v Russia6 in 2008, the ECtHR began to build on older case law 
concerning Article 5 ECHR, and drawing on the principles in Recommendation R 99(4), developed a 
right to participate in proceedings and what came to be known as the ‘rule of personal presence’ 
for proceedings concerning legal capacity and deprivation of liberty.  The right to participate and 
the rule of personal presence contain three key elements: 
1. The ‘dignity principle’: the idea that the person has a fundamental right to participate in 
proceedings that will have serious consequences for their lives, including meeting the judge 
in person; 
2. The ‘evidential principle’: the idea that the person themselves is an importance source of 
evidence about their capacity and the proportionality of any measures proposed in relation 
to them.  Judges must form their own opinions, and not simply rely on expert opinion; 
                                                     
2 [2014] UKSC 19 
3 [2014] EWCOP 25 
4 Council of Europe Committee of Ministers, ‘Recommendation No. R(99)4 on principles concerning the legal protection 
of incapable adults’ (Adopted on 23 February 1999). 
5 Human Rights Act 1998 
6 (App no 44009/05) [2008] ECHR 223 
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3. The ‘adversarial principle’: the person is the subject of the proceedings and their 
participation may be necessary to help them present his case, refute evidence and counter 
arguments recommending any measures that the person opposes. 
In our report we assess different elements of participation in the CoP against these principles, 
based on our analysis of case law, rules, guidance and the academic literature.  Our conclusion is 
that despite the best efforts of the judges and lawyers working in the CoP, the CoP system was not 
set up with these principles in mind and cannot satisfy the requirements of the ECHR for the large 
volume of cases that it increasingly hears.  For this reason, and because of the Law Commission’s 
proposals, we also consider the approach taken by the Mental Health Tribunals, which built in 
direct participation of patients from the outset, and discuss whether this model better satisfies the 
requirements of rights to participate and the ‘rule of personal presence’. 
The ‘right to participate’ in legal capacity and deprivation of liberty proceedings spans a range of 
specific issues, such as how a case gets to court, and what rights a person has to be told about the 
case or to put their views to the court, which we address in turn. 
Access to a court 
The ECtHR has established that people deprived of legal capacity have a fundamental and 
unqualified right of access to a court to challenge a deprivation of liberty, loss of their legal capacity 
or to adjudicate serious disputes between them and their guardian.  This right must not depend on 
the views of the parties as to their prospects of success.  Although the CoP establishes no formal 
barriers to P if s/he wishes to challenge a deprivation of liberty under the DoLS or best interests 
decision under the MCA, in practice P faces a number of obstacles in applying to the CoP.   
Foremost among these obstacles to accessing the CoP is P’s awareness of the right to challenge, 
and securing assistance in making the application.  The forms for personal welfare applications are 
highly complex and not designed for challenging findings of incapacity; the forms relating to 
deprivation of liberty are more concise and better adapted to be used by P to challenge.7  If the 
person is deprived of their liberty by court order, outside of the DoLS, P is unlikely to be able to 
secure funding for legal representation, which is a major barrier to challenging deprivation of 
liberty or best interests decisions.  The non-availability of litigation friends also poses a barrier to 
some seeking to access the CoP, although this situation may improve when an Accredited Legal 
Representative scheme comes into force which permits accredited legal representatives to 
represent P in certain types of case without taking instruction from a litigation friend. 
Because of the obstacles that P and P’s family face in bringing a dispute to the attention of the 
courts, the ECtHR and the CoP have increasingly required public authorities themselves to make an 
application.  These developments have occurred through case law, and there is still considerable 
uncertainty about whether certain issues – such as restrictions on contact or forced treatment – 
require judicial sanction.  We believe that because of the fundamental human rights questions, and 
potential for public controversy raised by the possibility of restrictions on contact with loved ones 
and forcible treatment without judicial sanction, that these matters should be settled by way of a 
policy consultation rather than piecemeal through case law.  Revised guidance or regulations on 
                                                     
7 HM Courts & Tribunals Service, ‘Court and tribunal form finder’, 
<http://hmctsformfinder.justice.gov.uk/HMCTS/FormFinder.do> accessed 14 February 2017. 
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this matter would also offer professionals greater clarity regarding the limits of their powers under 
the general defence of s 5 and s 6 MCA. 
Where P is subject to a DoLS authorisation a number of ‘special procedural safeguards’ – including 
the appointment of the relevant person’s representative (RPR) and Independent Mental Capacity 
Advocates (IMCAs) – operate in theory to assist P in accessing the CoP to challenge detention.  
Public funding is available for this purpose.  In practice these safeguards are not operating as 
anticipated, but recent guidance for RPRs and IMCAs may improve this situation. 
Where P is de facto detained without the protection of the DoLS or a court order, the protection of 
his Article 5 rights is seriously deficient.  We express particular concern about situations where P or 
those close to them object to the detention, as the costs of such a challenge could significantly 
deplete their personal financial resources.  In situations where no application has been made to the 
CoP, no ‘special procedural safeguards’ apply and there is a clear violation of their Article 5 rights.  
Until the Law Commission’s replacement to the DoLS is enacted, this situation applies to tens of 
thousands of individuals. 
Our recommendations on access to the CoP are as follows: 
Recommendation 1: In situations where P objects to a best interests decision that 
constitutes a serious interference with his or her human rights, s/he should be informed of 
her/his right to challenge best interests decisions in the CoP and assisted to access legal 
advice if they wish to do so.  This would operate in a similar way to requirements that 
already operate under Article 5(2) for deprivation of liberty to notify a person of their right 
of appeal against detention. 
Recommendation 2: The duty upon advocates to assist P in challenging a best interests 
decision to which P objects should be clarified. 
Recommendation 3: There should be a review of the CoP’s application forms and guidance 
to facilitate ease of completion by a person wishing to challenge any deprivation of legal 
capacity. 
Recommendation 4: The availability of public funding for legal representation in CoP 
proceedings, and for litigation friends where appropriate, should be reviewed in the light of 
the requirements of the ECHR for access to a court to challenge loss of legal capacity and 
deprivation of liberty (including outside of the DoLS). 
Recommendation 5: When the government considers the final proposals of the Law 
Commission regarding amendments to the MCA DoLS it should also undertake a policy 
review of which matters under the MCA require an application to the CoP, or whether 
alternative procedural safeguards might suffice. 
Party status 
Ordinarily in civil litigation those whose rights and interests will be primarily affected are given 
‘party status’.  This enables them to submit evidence and arguments to the court and to respond to 
the evidence and arguments put forward by the other parties.  Party status has symbolic 
importance as it recognises the significance of the proceedings for the rights and interests of P, and 
may also be essential under the adversarial principle to safeguard P’s rights in certain cases.   
 12 
 
Under the CoP rules, P is not joined as a party to CoP proceedings unless the court directs 
otherwise.  Established practice and guidance in this area mean that P will generally be joined as a 
party in health and welfare cases, and cases under the DoLS.  In property and affairs and 
deprivation of liberty cases that are not part of the DoLS scheme, P will generally be joined as a 
party only if the matters are contentious. 
Party status will generally mean that P needs some form of representation; in general this means 
legal representation with a litigation friend.  Whilst party status has been viewed as an important 
protection for P’s rights, in reality the absence of resources for representation means that the CoP 
has had to balance competing considerations of resources and procedural protections for P.  This 
has been especially acute for those who are deprived of their liberty but not subject to the DoLS.  In 
circumstances where party status is not realistically possible because of the lack of funds for legal 
representation, the CoP has made creative use of new forms of representation under Rule 3A to try 
to offer similar protections for P’s rights.  In some cases the practical inability to join P as a party 
means that the adversarial principle under the ECHR is violated.  Our recommendations in relation 
to party status are thus linked to our recommendations regarding public funding and 
representation. 
Notification 
Notifying a person of CoP proceedings concerning them is an important element of respect for their 
dignity.  Notification also engages the adversarial and evidential principles of participation. If a 
person is not informed of the existence of the proceedings it becomes impossible for them to meet 
with their lawyer, to meet with the judge directly, to know the case against them, to advance their 
case, to rebut evidence and arguments, or even to engage independent experts to furnish the court 
with reports.  Without notification, none of these rights to participate can be exercised. Non-
notification is thus ‘at the outer reaches’ of what is compatible with the ECHR and common law 
rules of natural justice.8  In some cases CoP judgments do not appear to recognise or address the 
significant human rights concerns raised by a decision not to notify P of the proceedings9, but more 
recent authorities increasingly address this question10.  Proper consideration of these matters will 
require applications to be brought well ahead of the proposed interventions. 
The manner of notification can also be a matter of concern in some cases.  In some cases it would 
be appropriate to seek further guidance on the best way to notify P.  Insofar as the purpose of 
notification is – in accordance with the adversarial principle – to advise P that he can seek advice 
and assistance in relation to the proceedings, the COPR should be revised to require that those 
effecting notification must also themselves assist P in securing advice and assistance if they wish to 
do so. 
In relation to notification, our recommendations are: 
Recommendation 6: The COPR should be amended to require explicit recorded 
consideration by the CoP of the reasons for non-notification of P of any matter regarding 
                                                     
8 Ridge v Baldwin [1964] AC 40  
9 Re AA [2012] EWHC 4378 (COP 
10 NHS Trust & Ors v FG (Rev 1) [2014] EWCOP 30 
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the proceedings, and in particular consideration of whether non-notification is necessary 
and proportionate in pursuit of a legitimate aim, and supported by objective evidence. 
Recommendation 7: The COPR should be updated to place those notifying P of P’s right to 
advice and assistance in relation to the proceedings under a duty to help P secure this 
advice if that is P’s wish. 
Evidence and information before the court 
In most civil or criminal court proceedings, those giving witness evidence to the court must swear 
an oath or ‘affirm’ to the court that they will tell the truth.  A person must be ‘competent’ to make 
this oath.  In many cases P would not be regarded as ‘competent’ to give evidence under oath 
before a court.  This means that anything they say before the CoP counts as ‘hearsay’.  Under the 
amended rules, P can now provide ‘information’ to the CoP other than on oath.  Uncertainty 
remains, however, as to how they should do this and the significance of this source of evidence for 
determining different kinds of issues.   
The ECtHR authorities are unequivocal that judges should meet directly with P as an ‘object’ of the 
proceedings and an important source of evidence in their own right, and form their own view as to 
his capacity and the proportionality of any proposed measures.  This is viewed by the ECtHR as a 
vital safeguard against arbitrariness and over-reliance on expert evidence.  Although there are a 
growing number of examples of CoP judges doing just this, there is concern about the idea of 
judges assessing mental capacity, in or out of the courtroom, especially if this is not in the presence 
of the other parties.   
We argue that whilst judges may use an encounter with P to rebut expert evidence of mental 
incapacity, they cannot make a finding of mental incapacity without supporting expert evidence in 
this regard.  We also maintain, contra recent authorities, that the CoP must come to its own view as 
to whether P should supply information or evidence to the court rather than delegating this 
decision to litigation friends.  This is because the new Rule 3A, which was introduced to promote 
P’s participation in CoP proceedings, requires the CoP to come to its own view on what directions it 
should give about P’s participation. 
In relation to evidence, our recommendations are: 
Recommendation 8: A working group should be established to consider: those cases in which 
the evidential principle requires that the judge meet P to form their own view as to their 
capacity and the proportionality of any proposed measure; the best way to facilitate P giving 
evidence to the CoP for different kinds of matters; and how to address questions of fairness to 
P and the other parties in providing evidence or information directly to the judge.  The 
recommendations of this group should be given force of law in the COPR, rather than non-
binding guidance, to clarify P’s rights in this regard. 
Recommendation 9: The working group should include, in addition to legal and other experts, 
members of organisations representing disabled people to comply with the CRPD principle that 
those developing policies and legislation affecting disabled people should consult with them 
through their representative organisations.   
 14 
 
Representation in proceeding 
Legal representation is important to ensure ‘effective access to a court’ for P, and several ECtHR 
authorities regard it as essential in deprivation of legal capacity proceedings.11   The ECtHR has 
emphasised the importance of legal representatives meeting with the person and actively pursuing 
their claims.   
Under the COPR there are several possibilities for P’s representation: 
- P may not be represented at all, especially if they are not joined as a party; 
- they may be represented by lawyers taking instruction from a litigation friend;  
- they may now be represented by an Accredited Legal Representative who is not required to 
take instructions from a litigation friend;  
- they may have ‘lay’ representation by a litigation friend who does not act through a lawyer; 
or 
- they may have a lay Rule 3A representative.   
The availability of funding for legal representation and the availability of individuals who are willing 
and appropriate to act as litigation friends or Rule 3A representatives are critical determinants of 
how P will be represented in practice.  In some circumstances because of resource limitations there 
may be nobody available to represent P; in such circumstances the risk of violations of the ECHR are 
high, especially where P is deprived of their liberty. 
Litigation friends, and increasingly Rule 3A representatives, are viewed as representing P’s best 
interests to the court.  This means they can decline to pursue the outcome that P wants or even 
advance arguments in support of outcomes that P objects to.  We argue, on the basis of the 
Strasbourg authorities reviewed in this report, that this ‘best interests’ approach to representation 
violates the adversarial principle of participation in legal capacity and deprivation of liberty 
proceedings: P’s representatives should advance the evidence and arguments that support the 
outcome that P would be most likely to choose.  We also argue that it is important for those 
representing P to ensure that he is supported and enabled to take decisions for himself about his 
participation and representation in the proceedings wherever possible 
We recommend: 
Recommendation 10: Funding for legal representation and Rule 3A representatives for capacity 
and deprivation of liberty cases must be reviewed by the government as a matter of urgency. 
Recommendation 11: The CoP should reconsider the approach to representation taken by 
litigation friends and Rule 3A representatives to take into account the ‘active representation’ 
approach based on the person’s wishes and feelings increasingly advocated under human rights 
law, and requirements under the MCA to support P in making decisions about participation and 
representation for himself wherever possible. 
Attending court and personal contact with judges 
Several ECtHR and common law authorities support the view that P has a right to a direct meeting 
with a judge as a matter of principle, in order to respect his dignity within the proceedings, and to 
                                                     
11 Ivinović v Croatia (App no 13006/13) [2014] ECHR 964; MS v Croatia (No 2) [2015] ECHR 196 
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attend court.  This right is especially important where P is able to express a view and wishes to 
meet the judge, or where P objects to the proposed measures. 
This presents a problem for the CoP, where the vast majority of cases are decided ‘on the papers’ 
without a hearing.  Although these is some evidence of past judicial reluctance to meet with P, 
there are encouraging developments in this area with a growing number of cases where judges 
enthusiastically embrace opportunities to meet P and encourage others to do so.  Nevertheless, 
judges face considerable systemic practical challenges in meeting P or if P attends court, as the CoP 
system was simply not set up to facilitate this on a regular basis, unlike the Mental Health 
Tribunals.  The recent case of A County Council v AB & Ors (Participation of P in Proceedings)12 
highlights the challenges in this regard. 
Our recommendations in connection to P meeting judges or attending court are: 
Recommendation 12: Consideration should be given to whether the CoP can facilitate a process 
where the court ‘goes to the person’, like the tribunals, where P wishes to participate in a 
hearing. 
Recommendation 13: Practice directions on Rule 3A on the participation of P should emphasise 
the requirements of the ECHR’s rule of personal presence and the limited circumstances in 
which judges may depart from this rule. 
Special measures and reasonable adjustments 
Under the ECHR, the CRPD and domestic equalities laws – as well as common law doctrines of 
fairness – courts are required to take into account the specific needs for support and modification 
of processes and procedures to facilitate the participation of disabled people in court proceedings.  
In the criminal courts, and potentially in the family courts, there are systems in place to provide 
‘special measures’ to assist the participation of people with disabilities and other vulnerable parties 
or witnesses.  For example, special measures might enable people to give evidence or ‘attend’ a 
hearing via a video link, or to respond to questions from the parties through an intermediary who 
can help them to break the question down in a more understandable way. 
Surprisingly given it is a jurisdiction wholly devoted to matters concerning people with mental 
disabilities, the CoP has until recently given no systematic consideration to the special measures 
and reasonable adjustments that would be needed to facilitate the participation of P.  Recent (non-
binding) guidance encourages judges and parties to consider these matters, but there is no 
provision in the COPR or practice directions in relation to this matter, and questions remain as to 
how such measures would be funded. 
Our recommendations in relation to special measures and reasonable adjustments are: 
Recommendation 14: The COPR and practice directions should be amended to include specific 
recognition of the need for the court to consider special measures and reasonable 
accommodations to facilitate P’s participation. 
Recommendation 15: The government should provide additional funding for special measures – 
either through the court service, or by means of legal aid - to ensure compliance with human 
                                                     
12 [2016] EWCOP 41 
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rights and common law obligations to ensure effective participation in CoP proceedings for 
disabled people. 
Training of judges and legal representatives 
Article 13 of the CRPD on access to justice calls for training on disability issues to be provided to all 
of those working within the justice system.  The domestic courts have also highlighted inadequacies 
of training where courts have failed to identify that special measures and reasonable adjustments 
should have been adopted but were not. 
Disability training is critical for judges in the CoP and legal practitioners and barristers working in 
the CoP.  We found no evidence of systematic provision of training on these matters by the Judicial 
College for the general judiciary, or for those taking qualifying legal practice courses or as part of 
their continuing professional development. 
Our recommendations on training are as follows: 
Recommendation 16: The Judicial College should introduce training on disability as it concerns 
access to justice. 
Recommendation 17: The CoP should review whether there is a need to introduce special 
training for its nominated judges on facilitating the participation of P, with particular regard to 
the growing human rights jurisprudence and the practical considerations this may entail. 
Recommendation 18: The Bar Standards Board and the Solicitors Regulatory Authority should 
introduce requirements for qualifying training courses and continuing professional 
development for practising solicitors and barristers on their specific obligations in respect of 
disabled clients. 
Accessibility measures in the Court of Protection system 
Under the CRPD and domestic law, the court service has obligations to anticipate the general needs 
of disabled people in relation to accessing information, buildings, services and public functions.  We 
draw particular attention to the unavailability of any information or guidance published by the CoP 
for people who may have communication impairments or print disabilities, informing them about 
the court, their rights and specific matters such as attending hearings or the role of different kinds 
of representatives.  We contrast this with the guidance available for those using the Mental Health 
Tribunals. 
Our recommendations in relation to accessibility are as follows: 
Recommendation 19: The central London and regional courts housing the CoP should consider 
their accessibility obligations to disabled litigants seeking to attend court, with a particular focus 
on the kinds of support needs that Ps may have. 
Recommendation 20: The courts service as a whole should consider the introduction of an 
‘accessible information standard’ comparable to that recently adopted within the NHS and the 
CoP should produce accessible guidance and information for those involved in CoP proceedings. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
We conclude that the human rights approach to participation, which developed after the CoP was 
established, poses a fundamental challenge to the CoP system.  Many conceptual matters need to 
be addressed, such as what is happening in evidential and adversarial terms when P meets a judge, 
and the most appropriate model of representing P.  Perhaps even more challenging are the 
practical questions that ensue from increasing rights to participation: how is P’s representation to 
be funded? how can P’s specific needs be addressed in giving evidence, meeting the judge or 
attending hearings?  How are these special measures to be funded?  We observe that many – but 
not all – of these practical issues could be resolved by a court or tribunal that ‘went to the person’, 
although this would raise further practical questions about accommodating the hearing if a person 
was not resident in a hospital setting. This is being achieved in the Mental Health Tribunal and the 
Mental Health Review Tribunal in Wales, which increasingly are holding hearings in community 
settings convenient to the patient, for patients seeking review of their community treatment order.  
Resources remain a major limitation on P’s rights to participation.  The government must urgently 
address the funding of legal representation and special measures to ensure compliance with 
international human rights law. 
Our overarching conclusion is that the Law Commission’s review of the DoLS presents an 
opportunity to introduce a new approach to jurisdiction over people alleged to lack decision-
making capacity based on a human rights approach to participation. We outline the key elements in 
a human rights approach, and set out several important respects in which the CoP’s processes 
require reconsideration, both in the context of detention but also wider issues of health and 
welfare. We have also highlighted the important steps that need to be taken by government to 
ensure the entire system operates in a way that respects, protects and upholds the rights of those 
subject to substitute decision making under the MCA. Our report is intended to contribute to the 
policy debate about the appropriate forum for disputes about deprivation of liberty, and we hope 
that it may inspire policy makers and those responsible for review of the CoP’s processes for health 
and welfare, to consider a new approach. 
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KEY RECOMMENDATIONS 
ON ACCESS TO A COURT 
Recommendation 1: In situations where P objects to a best interests decision that constitutes a 
serious interference with his or her human rights, s/he should be informed of her/his right to 
challenge best interests decisions in the CoP and assisted to access legal advice if they wish to 
do so.  This would operate in a similar way to requirements that already operate under Article 
5(2) for deprivation of liberty to notify a person of their right of appeal against detention. 
Recommendation 2: The duty upon advocates to assist P in challenging a best interests decision 
to which P objects should be clarified. 
Recommendation 3: There should be a review of the CoP’s application forms and guidance to 
facilitate ease of completion by a person wishing to challenge any deprivation of legal capacity. 
Recommendation 4: The availability of public funding for legal representation in CoP 
proceedings, and for litigation friends where appropriate, should be reviewed in the light of the 
requirements of the ECHR for access to a court to challenge loss of legal capacity and 
deprivation of liberty (including outside of the DoLS). 
Recommendation 5: When the government considers the final proposals of the Law 
Commission regarding amendments to the MCA DoLS it should also undertake a policy review 
of which matters under the MCA require an application to the CoP, or whether alternative 
procedural safeguards might suffice. 
ON NOTIFICATION 
Recommendation 6: The COPR should be amended to require explicit recorded consideration 
by the CoP of the reasons for non-notification of P of any matter regarding the proceedings, and 
in particular consideration of whether non-notification is necessary and proportionate in 
pursuit of a legitimate aim, and supported by objective evidence. 
Recommendation 7: The COPR should be updated to place those notifying P of P’s right to 
advice and assistance in relation to the proceedings under a duty to help P secure this advice if 
that is P’s wish. 
ON EVIDENCE 
Recommendation 8: A working group should be established to consider: those cases in which 
the evidential principle requires that the judge meet P to form their own view as to their 
capacity and the proportionality of any proposed measure; the best way to facilitate P giving 
evidence to the CoP for different kinds of matters; and how to address questions of fairness to 
P and the other parties in providing evidence or information directly to the judge.  The 
recommendations of this group should be given force of law in the COPR, rather than non-
binding guidance, to clarify P’s rights in this regard. 
Recommendation 9: The working group should include, in addition to legal and other experts, 
members of organisations representing disabled people to comply with the CRPD principle that 
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those developing policies and legislation affecting disabled people should consult with them 
through their representative organisations.   
ON REPRESENTATION 
Recommendation 10: Funding for legal representation and Rule 3A representatives for capacity 
and deprivation of liberty cases must be reviewed by the government as a matter of urgency. 
Recommendation 11: The CoP should reconsider the approach to representation taken by 
litigation friends and Rule 3A representatives to take into account the ‘active representation’ 
approach based on the person’s wishes and feelings increasingly advocated under human rights 
law, and requirements under the MCA to support P in making decisions about participation and 
representation for himself wherever possible. 
ON MEETING JUDGES AND ATTENDING COURT 
Recommendation 12: Consideration should be given to whether the CoP can facilitate a process 
where the court ‘goes to the person’, like the tribunals, where P wishes to participate in a 
hearing. 
Recommendation 13: Practice directions on Rule 3A on the participation of P should emphasise 
the requirements of the ECHR’s rule of personal presence and the limited circumstances in 
which judges may depart from this rule. 
ON SPECIAL MEASURES AND REASONABLE ADJUSTMENTS 
Recommendation 14: The COPR and practice directions should be amended to include specific 
recognition of the need for the court to consider special measures and reasonable adjustments 
to facilitate P’s participation. 
Recommendation 15: The government should provide additional funding for special measures – 
either through the court service, or by means of legal aid - to ensure compliance with human 
rights and common law obligations to ensure effective participation in CoP proceedings for 
disabled people. 
ON TRAINING  
Recommendation 16: The Judicial College should introduce training on disability as it concerns 
access to justice. 
Recommendation 17: The CoP should review whether there is a need to introduce special 
training for its nominated judges on facilitating the participation of P, with particular regard to 
the growing human rights jurisprudence and the practical considerations this may entail. 
Recommendation 18: The Bar Standards Board and the Solicitors Regulatory Authority should 
introduce requirements for qualifying training courses and continuing professional 
development for practising solicitors and barristers on their specific obligations in respect of 
disabled clients. 
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ON ACCESSIBILITY 
Recommendation 19: The central London and regional courts housing the CoP should consider 
their accessibility obligations to disabled litigants seeking to attend court, with a particular focus 
on the kinds of support needs that P may have. 
Recommendation 20: The courts service as a whole should consider the introduction of an 
‘accessible information standard’ comparable to that recently adopted within the NHS, and the 
CoP should produce accessible guidance and information for those involved in CoP proceedings. 
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ABOUT THIS REPORT 
This report is part of a research project on welfare cases in the Court of Protection (CoP)13 which is 
funded by the Nuffield Foundation. The aim of the project is to gather high quality information to 
contribute to policy discussions about transparency, efficiency and accessibility in the Court of 
Protection’s welfare jurisdiction. The study comprises several strands of research, including a 
systematic quantitative analysis of court files, and gathering qualitative data from a range of 
stakeholders using focus groups, surveys and interviews.  
The Court of Protection was established under the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (MCA) to adjudicate 
on matters relating to an individual’s mental capacity and best interests.  It also plays an important 
role in relation to deprivation of liberty under the MCA. This report considers how effectively those 
who are the subject of welfare proceedings in the CoP can participate in them. This individual is 
referred to as ‘P’ in this report.14  
The participation of P in Court of Protection welfare proceedings is an increasingly important issue 
due to recent developments in international human rights law, domestic changes relating to 
deprivation of liberty under the MCA and recent changes to the CoP Rules. In this report ‘welfare 
proceedings’ refers both to cases concerning the individual’s health and welfare, as well as matters 
relating to deprivation of liberty. It excludes cases concerning the individual’s property and affairs.  
STRUCTURE OF THE REPORT 
This report is designed so that it can either be read in full, by those with a keen interest in questions 
of participation, or so that readers can dip into individual sections about either the history of the 
court, the development of human rights relating to participation in general, specific elements of 
participation, or the approach taken by the tribunal. 
Part 1 of this report describes the background that has prompted the recent focus on participation 
in the CoP. It describes how the CoP’s current framework for participation evolved out of the ‘old’ 
CoP and was heavily influenced by the procedures of the Family Division of the High Court. It 
considers how recent changes relating to deprivation of liberty under the MCA, and in particular 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Cheshire West, have prompted renewed reflection on matters of 
participation.  
Part 2 of the report discusses the international human rights framework for participation under the 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) and the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). It describes how case law that developed after the CoP was 
already established has placed a much greater emphasis on participation in legal capacity and 
deprivation of liberty proceedings. We extract three key principles for compliance with 
international human rights norms on matters of participation: the dignity principle; the evidential 
principle, and the adversarial principle. 
Part 3 of this report reviews key elements of participation in CoP welfare proceedings against the 
international human rights standards described in Part 2. These are: 
 Access to a court 
                                                     
13 More information is available on the project website: http://sites.cardiff.ac.uk/wccop 
14 As defined in r 6 Court of Protection Rules 2007 and Schedule A1 Mental Capacity Act 2005 
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 Party status 
 Notification of P 
 Giving evidence, or being a source of information 
 Representation in proceedings 
 Special measures and reasonable adjustments 
 Training of judges and representatives 
 Accessibility measures in the Court of Protection 
Part 4 of the report considers an alternative model of participation offered by the Mental Health 
Tribunals in England and Wales. The tribunal model is considered in detail here because in many 
ways it has developed a more satisfactory approach to satisfying international human rights norms 
relating to participation for people with mental disabilities than the model that developed for CoP 
welfare proceedings. A tribunal has consistently been mooted as an alternative adjudication 
mechanism under the MCA, including – most recently – as a possible venue for appeals under the 
DoLS. The tribunal approach is considered for each of the elements of participation discussed in 
Part 3. 
Part 5 of the report discusses the key findings of the research and makes recommendations.  
ROUNDTABLE ON PARTICIPATION 
This report is primarily based on doctrinal and policy research. However, to support this research 
the researchers also held a policy roundtable15, bringing together key experts on the CoP and 
participation in proceedings to discuss these key issues. The report also draws from discussions at 
the roundtable event.  
The roundtable was held at the Nuffield Foundation’s Headquarters on 20 March 2015. It was 
attended by 21 participants with experience of CoP welfare proceedings from a range of 
backgrounds, including the judiciary, solicitors and barristers, litigation friends, expert witnesses, 
local authority social care practitioners, advocates, disability rights experts, academics and civil 
servants. It was structured so that participants heard short presentations by experts on a range of 
topics, followed by chaired discussions. Presentation topics included the international human rights 
framework for participation in court proceedings concerning legal capacity and deprivation of 
liberty, practice and procedure in the CoP, the experiences of P of CoP litigation, and consideration 
of participation issues in other courts – including the Family Court, the Mental Health Tribunals 
(MHTs), and the criminal courts. 
Attendance at the roundtable and the discussions were held under the Chatham House Rule16, a 
system named after the headquarters of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, which is 
designed to facilitate full and frank discussion whilst protecting anonymity.17 Roundtables held 
under the Chatham House Rule have been very effective in promoting discussion of key policy 
                                                     
15 The researchers have used roundtables to explore specific policy issues with experts, such as transparency in the CoP: 
Lucy Series, Phil Fennell, Julie Doughty and Luke Clements, ‘Transparency in the Court of Protection: Report on a 
Roundtable’ (Cardiff University School of Law and Politics 2015). <http://sites.cardiff.ac.uk/wccop/transparency-in-the-
court-of-protection-report-on-a-roundtable/> accessed 14 February 2017. 
16 See: http://www.chathamhouse.org/about/chatham-house-rule 
17 Under the rules, participants are free to use the information from the roundtable and any points made, but are asked 
not to identify other participants or their affiliations when discussing any comments they have made.  
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issues relating to the MCA.18 The comments and questions raised by the participants were 
immensely useful in preparing this report. However the opinions expressed here – and 
responsibility for any errors – remain the authors’ alone. 
  
                                                     
18 The Essex Autonomy Project at the University of Essex has made particularly strong use of this method, for examples 
see: Anselm Szerletics and Tom O’Shea, ‘Deprivation of Liberty and DoLS: An AHRC Public Policy Roundtable’ (Essex 
Autonomy Project, Ministry of Justice, Arts and Humanities Research Council 2012); Wayne Martin, ‘Mental Capacity 
Law Discussion Paper: Consensus Emerges in Consultation Roundtables: The MCA is Not Compliant with the CRPD’ (39 
Essex St Mental Capacity Law Newsletter, Issue 49, August 2014). These reports are available on the project website: 
http://autonomy.essex.ac.uk/ 
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1. BACKGROUND 
The Mental Capacity Act 2005 (MCA) established a legal framework for making decisions in the best 
interests of people who lack mental capacity. It is estimated to affect around two million people in 
England and Wales with conditions such as dementia, learning disabilities, brain injuries and mental 
health problems19, which we refer to collectively as ‘mental disabilities’ in this report.  
The Court of Protection (CoP) was created by the MCA20 to adjudicate on a range of matters 
relating to mental capacity and best interests.  The MCA was amended in 2009 to include a 
framework for detention in care homes and hospitals known as the deprivation of liberty 
safeguards (DoLS).21 The CoP also exercises jurisdiction over deprivation of liberty under the MCA. 
Support for, and participation in, decision making are central elements of the MCA.  Under the MCA 
a person is not to be regarded as unable to make a decision for themselves ‘unless all practicable 
steps to help him to do so have been taken without success’22, and ‘A person is not to be regarded 
as unable to understand the information relevant to a decision if he is able to understand an 
explanation of it given to him in a way that is appropriate to his circumstances (using simple 
language, visual aids or any other means).’23  If it is concluded that the person lacks the mental 
capacity to make a decision for themselves, those taking decisions in P’s best interests must ‘so far 
as reasonably practicable, permit and encourage the person to participate, or to improve his ability 
to participate, as fully as possible in any act done for him and any decision affecting him.’24  These 
provisions apply not only to those providing care and treatment for P, but also to the CoP25 and any 
persons under a duty to act in P’s best interests in relation to the proceedings. 
The CoP has powers under s15 MCA to make declarations regarding P’s mental capacity and the 
lawfulness of acts done (or yet to be done) to the person.26 Section 16 MCA created powers to 
make orders relating to P’s welfare or property and affairs, and to appoint deputies to make 
decisions on P’s behalf.27 The CoP can also rule on issues arising from legal instruments created 
                                                     
19 Ministry of Justice, Memorandum to the Justice Select Committee: Post-Legislative Assessment of the Mental Capacity 
Act 2005 (Cm 7955, 2010). 
20 MCA 2005, Part 2. 
21 See Schedules A1 and 1A of the MCA and Ministry of Justice, Mental Capacity Act 2005: Deprivation of Liberty 
Safeguards Code of Practice (Department for Constitutional Affairs 2007). 
22 MCA 2005, s1(3) 
23 MCA 2005, s3(2) 
24 MCA 2005, s4(4) 
25 MCA 2005, s16(3) 
26 MCA 2005, s 15 
27 MCA 2005, s 16 
 25 
 
under the MCA, such as advance decisions refusing treatment28 and lasting powers of attorney29 
(LPAs). It can rule on the lawfulness of detention authorised by supervisory bodies under s 21A of 
the MCA 2005, and as well as authorising detention in its own right. 
The vast majority of applications to the CoP concern property and affairs, but a growing number 
relate to health and welfare matters.30 The CoP's welfare jurisdiction has attracted considerable 
interest from the media and academics, as it encompasses a range of socially and politically 
sensitive issues. These include serious medical treatment decisions such as the withdrawal or 
withholding of life sustaining treatment, forced medical treatment and non-therapeutic 
sterilisation. The CoP also considers wider welfare questions such as where a person should live, 
and matters connected with relationships such as limiting contact with third parties, and whether 
or not someone has the mental capacity to consent to sexual relations or marriage. Section 1.2 
below describes how the CoP came to assume its current structure and rules of procedure. It 
discusses some recent changes to the court’s practices and procedures which have attempted to 
enhance the participation of P. 
When the CoP was established, less attention was paid to questions of participation, which are 
increasingly important today, such as when P should be supported to attend court or meet the 
judge in person. This means that the CoP’s original practices and procedures were not built upon 
the presumption that P would routinely participate directly in cases that are about them. In recent 
years, questions of participation have come increasingly to the fore as a result of the disability 
rights movement and their success in developing an international human rights instrument – the 
UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) 31 – that harnesses the spirit of the 
disability rights motto ‘Nothing about us without us’. This spirit has increasingly influenced the case 
law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) on the European Convention on Human 
Rights32 (ECHR) on participation in deprivation of liberty hearings and what in international 
parlance would be referred to as adult guardianship or legal capacity proceedings. These 
developments are discussed in Section 2 below.  
Issues of participation have an additional urgency as a result of debates about the role of the CoP in 
reviewing detention under the MCA. Section 1.4 below will outline how the CoP came to assume its 
current role in reviewing and authorising deprivation of liberty under the MCA. It will describe how 
the landmark ruling of the Supreme Court in P v Cheshire West and Chester Council and P and Q v 
                                                     
28 These are legal instruments which allow a person who has mental capacity to specify circumstances in which they 
would like to refuse specific treatments, in the event that they did not have the mental capacity to refuse that 
treatment at the requisite time. See MCA 2005, ss 24-26. 
29 Lasting Powers of Attorney (LPA) allow a person who has mental capacity to specify named individuals who they 
would like to make decisions on their behalf about either property and affairs, or health and welfare matters in the 
event that they lose mental capacity (or immediately, in the case of property and affairs LPAs) MCA 2005, s 9. 
30 Ministry of Justice, Court Statistics Quarterly October to December 2015, (Ministry of Justice Statistics Bulletin, 31 
March 2016) <https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/family-court-statistics-quarterly-october-to-december-2015> 
accessed 14 February 2017). 
31 United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (adopted 13 December 2006, entered into force 
3 May 2008) 2515 UNTS 3 (CRPD) 
32 Council of Europe (1950) Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (adopted 4 
November 1950, entered into force 3 September 1953) (ECHR) 
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Surrey County Council33, which expanded the meaning of ‘deprivation of liberty’ to include 
hundreds of thousands of disabled people in health and social care settings, has led to a crisis in the 
legitimacy of the DoLS themselves and the court’s jurisdiction over deprivation of liberty. This 
section will describe the litigation that has ensued as the court has attempted to grapple with a 
potentially huge influx of applications to authorise deprivation of liberty, and the current review by 
the Law Commission to replace the DoLS framework, including potentially replacing the court’s 
deprivation of liberty jurisdiction with a tribunal system. 
1.2 THE ORIGINS AND STRUCTURE OF THE COURT OF PROTECTION 
The provisions of the MCA establishing the CoP34 came into force in 2007. The new court was based 
on on two separate antecedent jurisdictions: the ‘old’ CoP, which was an office of the Supreme 
Court35 that had jurisdiction over property and affairs, and the ‘declaratory’ jurisdiction of the 
Family Division of the High Court, which had developed rapidly after the House of Lords decision in 
Re F36 and was concerned with health and welfare matters.37  
These two jurisdictions had distinct practices and cultures. The general conduct of property and 
affairs cases in the old CoP has been described as ‘relatively informal’, ‘inquisitorial’ and ‘non-
adversarial’.38 Typically, the patient39 was not made a party to the case and neither they nor their 
relatives would attend court because applications were generally uncontested. Where the patient 
or their family did attend court, they often did not instruct solicitors, except in contentious or 
complex cases, and hearings tended to be informal. By contrast, the procedure to seek a 
declaration in the High Court for a health or welfare matter was more formal. P would always be 
made a party to the case. If the person was considered to lack litigation capacity – as most, but not 
all40, were - they would normally be represented by a lawyer who would be instructed by a 
litigation friend on their behalf, acting in their best interests.  
                                                     
33 [2014] UKSC 19. 
34 MCA Part 2 
35 This was a different body to the current Supreme Court of the United Kingdom. The Constitutional Reform Act 2005 
established new appellate court of last resort, the Supreme Court, to replace the judicial functions of the House of 
Lords. Confusingly, prior to the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 another body was also known as the Supreme Court of 
England and Wales (and was known before that as the Supreme Court of Judicature). This was renamed by the 
Constitutional Reform Act as the “Senior Courts of England and Wales”, and it comprises the Court of Appeal, the High 
Court and the Crown Court. 
36 Re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1; [1991] UKHL 1 
37 For a review of developments under the declaratory jurisdiction, see: Phil Fennell, 'Chapter 4: Mental Capacity' in L. 
O. Gostin, P. Fennell, J. McHale, D. McKay and P. Bartlett, (eds) Principles of Mental Health Law (Oxford University Press 
2010); Peter Bartlett, Blackstone's Guide to The Mental Capacity Act 2005 (Second ed., OUP 2008). 
38 Department for Constitutional Affairs, Draft Court Rules: Mental Capacity Act 2005 Court of Protection Rules, (CP 
10/06, 2006). p. 19 
39 The person who was the subject of proceedings in the ‘old’ CoP was known as the ‘patient’. 
40 It seems that in the cases of Re C (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment) [1994] 1 WLR 290 and Ms B v An NHS Hospital 
Trust [2002] EWHC 429 (Fam) the individuals whom the cases concerned were treated as having the capacity to litigate 
as there is no indication they were represented by a litigation friend. 
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These distinct origins can still be discerned today in what Rees and Ruck Keene describe as ‘a 
fundamental difference in cultures’ between the lawyers who deal with property and affairs, and 
health and welfare cases.41 They identify cost as a key issue: 
Underlying the thinking of property and affairs lawyers will always be the question of 
who is paying the costs of the proceedings. Clients funding the litigation from their 
own pocket do not want to spend two days in court arguing about legal issues if 
matters can be short-circuited. This issue is particularly acute in Court of Protection 
cases where P may be footing the entire bill.42 
Increasing P’s participation often increases the costs and duration of the litigation because of the 
additional efforts that must be made by lawyers and experts to consider and facilitate their 
participation, so the property and affairs cases that make up the majority of the CoP’s work are 
based on a low participation model. Conversely, many lawyers in welfare cases come from a public 
or family law background, where litigation is often publicly funded. Such lawyers have a greater 
desire, Rees and Ruck-Keene argue, ‘to explore issues of principle’ and ‘engage with human rights 
jurisprudence’.43 Participation raises many human rights issues and matters of principle, and these 
are increasingly being argued by lawyers working in the CoP’s welfare jurisdiction.44 
The CoP as established by the MCA has several tiers of judges.45 The majority of cases are heard by 
District Judges, but more controversial or serious cases – such as serious medical treatment cases – 
must be heard by High Court judges (although some have been heard by Circuit Court judges). 
Many nominated High Court judges who sit in the CoP also sit in the Family Court.  
The President of the CoP is Sir James Munby. He is also the President of the Family Division. The 
Vice President of the CoP is Mr Justice Charles. He has also sat in the Family Division and is the 
President of the Administrative Appeals Chamber of the Upper Tribunal. Until his retirement in July 
2016, the CoP also had a Senior Judge – Denzil Lush – who was formerly the Master of the ‘old’ CoP. 
A new Senior Judge has yet to be announced.  
The CoP is legally and structurally distinct from the Family Division of the High Court, but many of 
its senior judges and practising lawyers work in both courts. Hence practice and procedure in the 
family courts have a significant influence on some of the CoP’s practices. As HH Mark Rogers 
recently put it, ‘just as the role of the child in Family proceedings is under constant re-evaluation, 
so is P's role and his ability to participate in CoP proceedings likewise.’46 
During 2013-14 the House of Lords Select Committee on the MCA heard evidence from a wide 
range of sources on the performance of the CoP. Its report praised the CoP for its expertise, but it 
                                                     
41 David Rees and Alex Ruck Keene, 'Property and Affairs Lawyers are from Mars, Health and Welfare Lawyers from 
Venus' (2014) 4(3) Elder Law Journal 285, p286. 
42 Ibid., p287 
43 Ibid 
44 Although, this is not to suggest that property and affairs lawyers are not exercised about matters of participation, 
see: Sarah Green, 'Sarah’s story: being ‘P’– the importance of rule 3A', (2016) 6(2) Elder Law Journal  
45 MCA 2005, s 46(2). 
46 A County Council v AB & Ors (Participation of P in Proceedings) [2016] EWCOP 41, Para 6. 
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raised concerns about its accessibility, costs and delays.47 Members of the judiciary have also raised 
concerns about the cost and duration of CoP proceedings48, and we have reported on their cost, 
duration and accessibility elsewhere.49 
The Court of Protection Rules 2007 and the 2015 amendments 
The CoP has its own rules of procedure: the Court of Protection Rules 2007 (COPR).50 The COPR 
were designed to be sufficiently flexible to combine the informal approach of the ‘old’ CoP, and the 
more formal approach of the declaratory jurisdiction of the High Court, which was regarded as 
offering a higher level of protection for P and their interests.51 Thus different models of 
participation are possible within the court’s practices, and vary according to the type of case.  
The consultation on the Draft Court Rules in 2006 considered some aspects of the participation of 
P.52 The approach taken towards children in family proceedings was seen to be a helpful model, as 
it provided for ‘a range of different ways in which children can become involved in cases such as 
care proceedings’.53 However, this range was not further explored as a basis for future 
arrangements. No reference was made at the time to developments in the criminal courts 
facilitating vulnerable witnesses in giving evidence, which might have addressed specific issues 
around the accessibility of proceedings for disabled adults.54 Nor was any reference made to the 
need to provide reasonable adjustments for disabled litigants, or the government’s obligations 
under the recently ratified UN CRPD. Consequently, the initial COPR consultation did not discuss a 
number of matters that would be considered important today, especially in light of the important 
developments in international human rights law discussed below in Section 2.  
For example, the COPR consultation did not discuss whether judges should have some direct 
contact with P, whether P should be supported to attend hearings, and whether they could give 
evidence other than on oath. Nor was there any discussion of how litigation friends should 
represent the person. Because there was no attention to these matters, there was little discussion 
of the practical arrangements that might be required to facilitate P’s participation – for example 
where the court should sit, whether judges and lawyers might require specialist training to work 
                                                     
47 House of Lords Select Committee on the Mental Capacity Act 2005, Mental Capacity Act 2005: post-legislative 
scrutiny (HL Paper 139, 2014). Chapter 6. 
48 A Local Authority v ED & Ors [2013] EWHC 3069 (CoP) and A & B (Court of Protection: Delay and Costs) [2014] EWCOP 
48; N (Deprivation of Liberty Challenge) [2016] EWCOP 47 
49 Lucy Series, Adam Mercer, Abigail Walbridge, Katie Mobbs, Phil Fennell, Julie Doughty and Luke Clements, Use of the 
Court of Protection’s welfare jurisdiction by supervisory bodies in England and Wales (Cardiff University School of Law 
and Politics 2015). 
50 Court of Protection Rules SI 2007 No 1744. 
51 Department for Constitutional Affairs, Consultation Paper: Draft Court Rules: Mental Capacity Act 2005 Court of 
Protection Rules, (CP 10/06, 2006). p 20. 
52 Consultation Paper: Draft Court Rules: Mental Capacity Act 2005 Court of Protection Rules, n 52; Department for 
Constitutional Affairs, Draft Court Rules: Mental Capacity Act 2005. Court of Protection Rules: Response to a 
Consultation Carried out by the Department for Constitutional Affairs. (CP 10/06, 2007). 
53 Ibid 
54 Specifically, to the kinds of special measures permitted by the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999, which 
are discussed in more detail below. 
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more effectively with disabled litigants, and whether any special measures might be required to 
facilitate P’s participation. These issues are increasingly coming under the spotlight today. 
Although there is not a standing rules committee in the CoP, over the period since the COPR were 
originally drafted in 2007 they have been reviewed by ad hoc committees55 and amended.56 In 
response to concerns raised by the House of Lords Select Committee on the MCA, and to 
accommodate changes to the procedure for handling deprivation of liberty applications and the 
challenge of responding to the Cheshire West decision (discussed in Section 1.4, below), a new ad 
hoc committee was convened to consider reforms to rules.57 The committee’s first tranche of 
proposed amendments came into force in April and July 2015.58 The 2015 amendments introduced 
new provisions for P’s participation in CoP proceedings, and were accompanied by new practice 
directions.  
Most notably for this report, the new Rule 3A on Participation of P requires the CoP to consider, in 
each case, what directions it should make in relation to the participation of P (reproduced for 
reference in Appendix A). This was introduced in response to recent Strasbourg case law that 
required a much greater judicial focus on how P is to participate in the proceedings.59 In the words 
of one roundtable participant, Rule 3A was very deliberately ‘put up front’ in recognition of the 
importance of this. Indeed new forms of representation created by Rule 3A have assumed a central 
role in the CoP’s efforts to secure compliance with the requirements of Article 5 ECHR and the 
common law in deprivation of liberty cases. This is discussed in more detail in Sections 1.4 and 3.5 
below. 
Rule 3A was accompanied by Practice Direction 2A on the Participation of P.60 This states that ECtHR 
and domestic case law has highlighted the importance of ensuring that P ‘takes an appropriate part 
in the proceedings and the court is properly informed about P’. However, it also acknowledges the 
difficulties of ensuring that this occurs in a way that is proportionate to the nature of the issues, 
whilst avoiding excessive cost and delay.61 It distinguishes between non-contentious property and 
affairs cases which ‘experience has shown’ can be dealt with on the papers without making P a 
party to proceedings or appointing anyone to represent them62 and other cases that ‘may call for a 
                                                     
55 Court of Protection Rules Committee, ‘Report of the ad hoc Court of Protection Rules Committee’ (Judiciary of 
England and Wales 2010). 
56 The Court of Protection (Amendment) Rules 2009 SI 2009/582 (amendments to provide supporting rules for the new 
deprivation of liberty jurisdiction); The Court of Protection (Amendment) Rules 2011 SI No. 2753 (L.19) (amendments to 
enable authorised court officers to exercise the court’s jurisdiction in relation to certain property and affairs cases, to 
alleviate the burden of work on District Judges). 
57 Alex Ruck Keene, 'The next stage of the journey: The Court of Protection (Amendment) Rules 2015' (2015) 5(2) Elder 
Law Journal, p150. 
58 The Court of Protection (Amendment) Rules 2015 SI 2015 No 549 (L6) 
59 Alex Ruck Keene, 'The next stage of the journey: The Court of Protection (Amendment) Rules 2015', n 57. 
60 Court of Protection, Practice Direction 2A - Participation of P (2015). P is defined in the Court of Protection Rules SI 
2007 No 1744 r 6. ‘P’ is the term used to denote the person who is alleged to lack mental capacity and is the subject of 
CoP proceedings). 
61 Practice Direction 2A, para 1 
62 Ibid, para 3 
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higher level of participation’.63 The Practice Direction goes on to outline the provisions of Rule 3A, 
and the different mechanisms whereby P’s participation may be supported. These are discussed in 
more detail below. 
The 2015 amendments to the rules also made provision for pilot schemes to assess the use of new 
practices and procedures.64 To date, this has been used to establish pilot schemes increasing 
transparency in the CoP65, testing out new case management procedures66 and procedures for 
expert reports by the NHS and local authorities.67 These pilot schemes have some limited direct or 
indirect impact upon questions of participation, as discussed in Section 3 below.  
In November 2016 Mr Justice Charles, the Vice President of the CoP, introduced practice guidance 
on ‘Facilitating the participation of P and vulnerable persons in CoP proceedings’.68 This guidance 
referenced a recent practice note for solicitors issued by the Law Society on meeting the needs of 
vulnerable clients69 and resources from the Advocate’s Gateway.70 These sources of guidance are 
also discussed in more detail in Section 3 below. 
1.3 COURTS WITHIN A COURT? 
The CoP has many different functions, each with different practices and procedures. One 
participant at the roundtable described it as comprising several different courts. The concept of 
‘courts within a court’ may be useful for analyzing their distinct participatory practices, cultures, 
and human rights obligations. Any guidance or reforms on participation must take account of the 
diverse and distinct functions of the CoP and the fact that it exercises jurisdiction over property and 
affairs, health and personal welfare decisions, and deprivation of liberty. The case management 
pilot referred to above recognizes the different demands made in each of the different areas of 
jurisdiction by allocating different types of case to one of three case management pathways: the 
personal welfare pathway; the property and affairs pathway; and the mixed welfare and property 
pathway. 
A property and affairs court 
The property and affairs court, the successor to the ‘old’ CoP, processes applications relating to a 
person’s property and affairs, resolves issues concerning deputyships and LPAs for property and 
affairs, and performs functions like the making of statutory wills. More than 20,000 applications 
                                                     
63 Ibid, para. 4 
64 COPR Rule 9A, as amended 
65 'Transparency Pilot: Court of Protection' (Judiciary of England and Wales, 2015), 
<https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/publications/transparency-pilot-court-of-protection/> accessed 9 November 2016. 
66 Court of Protection, Practice Direction - Case Management Pilot (2016) 
67 Court of Protection, Practice Direction – Section 49 Reports Pilot (2016) 
68 Mr Justice Charles, ‘Facilitating participation of ‘P’ and vulnerable persons in Court of Protection proceedings’ (2016) 
< http://www.familylaw.co.uk/system/froala_assets/documents/1245/Practice_Guidance_Vulnerable_Persons.pdf> 
accessed 16 November 2016. 
69 Law Society, ‘Meeting the needs of vulnerable clients’ (2016). < http://www.lawsociety.org.uk/support-
services/advice/practice-notes/meeting-the-needs-of-vulnerable-clients-july-2015/> accessed 16 November 2016. 
70 Advocate’s Gateway, http://www.theadvocatesgateway.org/ 
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during 2015 fell into this category.71 These cases are largely uncontested, and are dealt with ‘on the 
papers’ without any oral hearing by District Judges or – increasingly – by authorised court officers.72 
Property and affairs cases typically use a model of very low participation by P – they are generally 
not made a party to the proceedings. In terms of costs they are distinct from welfare cases - the 
general rule is that P pays the costs of all the parties,73 and there is virtually no legal aid available.74 
One corollary of this is that increasing P’s level of participation, for example through joining them 
as a party and ensuring they have independent legal representation, may significantly inflate the 
costs they will incur. 
Personal welfare court 
The second ‘court within the CoP’ is the successor to the declaratory jurisdiction of the High Court, 
which was used prior to the MCA to make declarations as to the lawfulness of serious medical 
treatments and a small number of other personal welfare matters relating to persons considered to 
lack the mental capacity to consent to them.75 Since the passage of the MCA, the CoP has heard a 
number of serious medical treatment applications, but there has also been a large growth in the 
number of personal welfare applications from local authorities.76 Many of these are ‘adult 
safeguarding’ matters comparable in some respects to public law family proceedings; one 
roundtable participant referred to this function as an ‘adult protection court’. In a small number of 
cases the CoP can also appoint welfare deputies, although this power is comparatively rarely 
used.77 Some applications to the CoP may also invoke the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court as 
an alternative remedy where a person might be deemed to have capacity yet remain vulnerable 
because of their wider circumstances.78 
                                                     
71 Ministry of Justice, Court Statistics Quarterly, n 30. 
72 The Court of Protection (Amendment) Rules 2011 SI No. 2753 (L.19) amended the Court of Protection Rules 2007 to 
permit the Senior Judge or the President of the CoP to nominate a court officer to exercise the jurisdiction of the CoP in 
accordance with Practice Direction 3A: Authorised Court Officers (2011). 
73 Court of Protection Rules 2007, SI 2007 No 1744, r 156. NB: the court is preparing a public consultation on costs 
which may provide judges with greater discretion to award costs to parties other than P. 
74 Legal aid in proceedings in the CoP is only available to the extent that they concern a person’s right to life, their right 
to liberty or physical safety, their medical treatment, their capacity to marry, enter into a civil partnership or enter into 
sexual relations, or their right to family life. See Legal Aid, Sentencing, and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012, Schedule 
1 Part 3. 
75 For a description of the history of this jurisdiction, and key cases, see: Peter Bartlett, Blackstone's Guide to The 
Mental Capacity Act 2005 and Phil Fennell, 'Chapter 4: Mental Capacity', both n 37. 
76 Lucy Series et al, Use of the Court of Protection’s welfare jurisdiction by supervisory bodies in England and Wales, n 
49. 
77 In 2015 446 applications were made for welfare deputyships, and 621 applications for ‘hybrid’ property and affairs 
and welfare deputyships. Ministry of Justice, Court Statistics Quarterly, n 30, Table 17. 
78 The Family Division has developed the inherent jurisdiction to provide remedies for the protection of vulnerable but 
not legally incapable adults developed by Singer J in Re SK [2004] EWHC 3202 (Fam), where he said this: I believe that 
the inherent jurisdiction now, like wardship has been, is a sufficiently flexible remedy to evolve in accordance with 
social needs and social values. As Peter Jackson J put it in Spencer v Anderson [2016] EWHC 851 (Fam) para 56, ‘That 
manifestation of the jurisdiction was cemented by Munby J in Re SA [2005] EWHC 2942 (Fam) and the Court of Appeal 
has confirmed that it has survived the enactment of the Mental Capacity Act 2005: see DL v A Local Authority [2012] 
EWCA Civ 253.’  
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The CoP’s health and welfare jurisdiction uses a very formal model of proceedings and the person is 
more likely to participate in them than in property cases. Nevertheless, even where an individual is 
fully represented, welfare cases can involve relatively low levels of direct participation by P. An 
extreme example of this was the case of Alessandra Pacchieri, who, despite the fact that she was 
independently represented in proceedings brought by an NHS Trust for a declaration that it would 
be lawful to deliver her child by caesarean without her consent, she herself was not notified of the 
proceedings until afterwards.79 Section 3 of this report will describe more fully key elements of the 
CoP’s model of participation in welfare cases. 
As to the all-important issue of costs, for health and welfare cases the general rule is that the 
parties pay their own costs.80 This means that P may have to pay his or her own costs, even if s/he 
did not bring the proceedings. An important exception to this rule is serious medical treatment 
cases, where by convention the public body making the application will pay half of the Official 
Solicitor’s costs. In some, but not all, welfare cases, P’s legal costs may be met by legal aid, subject 
to a stringent means test.   
Jurisdiction over Deprivation of Liberty 
The CoP has two roles in relation to deprivation of liberty. The first is to review the lawfulness of 
deprivations of liberty carried out in hospitals and care homes under the deprivation of liberty 
procedures in Schedules A1 and 1A to the Mental Capacity Act (known as the ‘deprivation of liberty 
safeguards’, or DoLS). The court’s powers in this regard are set out in s21A MCA. The second role is 
where the CoP actually authorizes and provides for the continuing review of deprivations of liberty 
by making a welfare order.81 This function is primarily used in settings other than residential care 
homes or hospitals where there is as yet no administrative framework for detention. However, the 
CoP may also authorise detention in hospitals or care homes by making a welfare order in 
exceptional circumstances when the powers contained within Schedules A1 and 1A are insufficient 
or inappropriate.82 The CoP’s jurisdiction over deprivation of liberty is explained and discussed in 
more detail in Section 1.4 below. Although CoP deprivation of liberty functions are intimately 
involved in welfare matters, they use different participatory models to other kinds of welfare case 
and as they involve Article 5 ECHR and have distinct human rights implications. 
1.4 THE COURT OF PROTECTION AND THE MENTAL CAPACITY ACT 2005 DEPRIVATION 
OF LIBERTY SAFEGUARDS 
This section gives an overview of the CoP’s jurisdiction over Article 5 ECHR matters connected with 
the MCA. It describes the insertion of the DoLS into the Act, through Schedules A1 and 1A. The 
CoP’s jurisdiction over deprivation of liberty derives both from the requirement under Article 5(1) 
ECHR for a procedure prescribed by law to authorise deprivation of liberty, and the requirement 
under Article 5(4) ECHR for a competent court or tribunal to review the lawfulness of detention. 
The evolution of these ECHR rights in relation to persons with mental disabilities, and their 
relevance to matters of participation, are described more fully in Section 2 below.  
                                                     
79 Re AA [2012] EWHC 4378 (COP); the decision not to notify Ms Pachierri until after the operation is detailed in the 
transcript of the hearing and the order itself. 
80 Court of Protection Rules 2007, SI 2007 No 1744, r 157 
81 MCA 2005, s 4A(3) and s 16(2)(a). 
82 A NHS Trust v Dr. A [2013] EWHC 2442 (COP) 
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This section explains how the Supreme Court’s decision in Cheshire West and the report of the 
House of Lords Select Committee on the MCA have led to a crisis in the CoP over its management of 
deprivation of liberty cases, and the possibility that these functions might be revoked or reduced 
and transferred to a tribunal. It explores how questions as to whether and how P participates in 
CoP proceedings concerning Article 5 ECHR have been at the heart of these dilemmas. A more 
detailed account of the history and development of the MCA DoLS can be found elsewhere.83 
Overview of the MCA deprivation of liberty safeguards 
The Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards (DoLS) constitute an administrative framework for 
authorizing detention in care homes and hospitals. The DoLS were inserted into the MCA by 
amendment under the Mental Health Act 2007 in response to the ruling of the ECtHR in HL v United 
Kingdom.84 HL, a man with autism, had been informally admitted under the common law doctrine 
of necessity to Bournewood Hospital in his ‘best interests’. He was found by the Strasbourg Court 
to have been unlawfully deprived of his liberty because a procedure prescribed by law had not 
been followed as required by Article 5(1). The failure to apply procedural safeguards and to provide 
access to a court to review detention breached Articles 5(1) and 5(4) ECHR. 
Under the DoLS, if the managers of a care home or hospital consider that they are depriving a 
person of his or her liberty, they must seek authorisation from a supervisory body85. The 
supervisory body directs assessments to be carried out of whether the person is over 18, of the 
person’s mental health, of their capacity to decide where to live, whether care in circumstances 
amounting to a deprivation of liberty is in the person’s best interests, whether the person is eligible 
for deprivation of liberty under the MCA86, and whether there are any objections from a person 
who has the power to decide where the person is to live under a Lasting Power of Attorney, a 
welfare deputyship granted by the CoP or any advance refusal of treatment pertinent to the 
detention.  
If detention is authorised, the supervisory body must appoint a ‘Relevant Person’s Representative’ 
(RPR) to assist the person in understanding and exercising their rights. The detained person and the 
RPR may also be supported by an Independent Mental Capacity Advocate (IMCA). P or their RPR 
may at any time ask the supervisory body to review whether the criteria for a deprivation of liberty 
continue to be met.87 P or their RPR may also ‘appeal’ against the detention by making an 
application for review to the CoP under s21A MCA. Non-means tested legal aid is available for this 
purpose.88  
                                                     
83 Paul Bowen, Blackstone's Guide to The Mental Health Act 2007, (OUP 2007); Peter Bartlett, Blackstone's Guide to The 
Mental Capacity Act 2005, n 37. 
84 (App no 45508/990) [2004] 40 EHRR 761 
85 In England, local authorities are the supervisory body for the DoLS, in Wales, local authorities perform this function in 
respect of care homes and Local Health Boards in respect of hospitals. 
86 ‘Eligibility’ is determined by reference to Schedule 1A MCA and is a fiendishly complicated and rapidly evolving area 
of law, that will not be addressed here. It relates to the interface between the MCA and the MHA, and the choice of 
which framework should be used to authorise detention or whether both regimes might coexist in some circumstances. 
87 MCA 2005, Schedule A1, Part 8, para 95. 
88 The Civil Legal Aid (Financial Resources and Payment for Services) Regulations SI 2013 No. 480 
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These provisions are intended to give effect to P’s right under Article 5(4) of the ECHR ‘to take 
proceedings by which the lawfulness of … detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his 
release ordered if the detention is not lawful’. In Section 3.1 we discuss issues surrounding access 
to the CoP for the purpose of exercising Article 5(4) rights; Section 4.4 discusses a contrasting 
procedure for the satisfaction of these rights that is adopted by the Mental Health Tribunals. 
The DoLS procedure is only available for deprivations of liberty in hospitals or care homes. Where 
people are deprived of their liberty in settings other than in care homes or hospitals, however, the 
DoLS do not apply and detention must be authorised by a welfare order granted by the CoP. Legal 
aid for this authorisation process or any challenge to such a deprivation of liberty is subject to a 
stringent means test. This was subject to criticism by the House of Lords Select Committee,89 but 
the government has rejected proposals for reform in this area.90 
The House of Lords report and the Law Commission review 
The DoLS have been widely criticised as being too complex and bureaucratic, whilst offering 
insufficient protection for human rights.91 In 2014, the House of Lords Select Committee on the 
MCA conducted detailed and wide-ranging post-legislative scrutiny of the MCA. In its final report, it 
recommended that the government undertake a fundamental review of the safeguards with a view 
to their replacement.92 The government has instructed the Law Commission to undertake this 
review; a final report with proposals for a replacement statutory framework is currently scheduled 
for March 2017. 93 The Law Commission’s proposed replacement framework would cover a wider 
range of settings than the DoLS, including supported living and possibly domestic settings. The 
Commission has also proposed that a tribunal system might be preferable to a court for reviewing 
the lawfulness of detention under Article 5(4), partly because tribunals are regarded as more 
accessible and better placed to facilitate participation than courts.94  
The Supreme Court Ruling in P v Cheshire West 
Ever since the DoLS came into force, doubt and uncertainty prevailed as to the meaning of 
‘deprivation of liberty’. One week after the House of Lords Select Committee published its report 
on the MCA, the Supreme Court handed down its landmark ruling in P v Cheshire West and Chester 
Council and another; P and Q v Surrey County Council95 (‘Cheshire West’). This decision, drawing on 
                                                     
89 House of Lords Select Committee on the Mental Capacity Act 2005, n 21. Recommendation 71. 
90 HM Government, Valuing every voice, respecting every right: Making the case for the Mental Capacity Act. The 
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implementation’ (2010). 
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cursorily at paras 11.19 ad 11.20. 
93 Law Commission, Mental Capacity and Detention, <http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/areas/capacity-and-
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94 Law Commission, Mental Capacity and Deprivation of Liberty: a Consultation Paper (Law Com No 222, 2015), Chapter 
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the Strasbourg Court’s judgment in HL v United Kingdom96 and the guardianship cases discussed in 
Section 2 below, laid down the ‘acid test’ for deprivation of liberty: a person is deprived of liberty if 
he or she is subject to continuous or constant supervision and control and is not free to leave. The 
result of the ruling was that many more people than before had to be treated as deprived of their 
liberty and in need of detention safeguards. Following the ruling there was a tenfold increase in the 
number of applications for authorisation received by supervisory bodies, which are currently 
struggling with significant backlogs.97 
The Cheshire West decision also had significant consequences for settings, such as supported living, 
which, not being hospitals or care homes, fall outside the scope of the DOLS.  Deprivation of liberty 
can only be authorised in accordance with Article 5(1) ECHR by a welfare order of the CoP98 or the 
High Court99 because the DoLS procedures in Schedule A1 do not apply. Welfare orders authorizing 
deprivation of liberty must be reviewed at least annually.100 Following the ruling in Cheshire West it 
was estimated that as many as 31,000 such cases might require court authorisation.101 If costs 
remain at present levels, each such application may cost public authority applicants around 
£11,000102. The projected number of applications would more than double the overall number of 
applications received by the CoP in 2013, and would increase the reported number of applications 
relating to deprivation of liberty by a factor of more than 200.103 New judges were recruited from 
the social entitlement chamber of the First Tier Tribunal to receive these applications. Yet multiple 
sources confirm that the anticipated flood of applications has not materialised.104  
                                                     
96 (App no 45508/990) [2004] 40 EHRR 761. The court said at para 91 that ‘HL’s concrete situation was that he was 
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102 Based on estimates provided to us under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 by local authorities for 2013-14. See 
Lucy Series and colleagues, n 49. 
103 Statistics published by the Ministry of Justice report that the CoP received, in total, 24923 applications in 2013, of 
which 109 related to deprivation of liberty and 166 related to a ‘one off’ welfare order. In our research, local authorities 
reported 109 cases where the person was deprived of their liberty but was not subject to the DoLS; presumably these 
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104 Re MOD (Deprivation of Liberty) [2015] EWCOP 47, para 17; Re the Mental Capacity Act 2005 JM and others [2016] 
EWCOP 15; Ministry of Justice, Court Statistics Quarterly n 30; Andy McNicoll, 'Councils’ failure to make court 
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The Re X ‘streamlined’ procedure 
This anticipated flood of applications presented a difficulty for the CoP: there simply weren’t the 
resources available to hear the expected volume of applications using the existing formal processes 
reserved for deprivation of liberty welfare order applications. The Law Commission estimated that 
if the anticipated flood of applications had materialised, and full procedural rights were afforded to 
all parties, it would cost in excess of one billion pounds.105 Pending the introduction of a 
replacement framework for DoLS, the court looked to modify its formal procedures for applications 
for welfare orders to authorize deprivation of liberty. Tensions arose between responding to such a 
high volume of applications and guaranteeing procedural protections and participatory rights in 
accordance with the ECHR and the common law without the system collapsing under its own 
weight. 
In the immediate aftermath of the Cheshire West judgment, the President of the CoP, Sir James 
Munby, handed down two judgments establishing a ‘streamlined’ procedure for hearing 
applications for the authorisation of a deprivation of liberty: Re X & Ors (Deprivation of Liberty)106 
and Re X and others (Deprivation of Liberty) (Number 2)107. Under the ‘streamlined’ procedure, a 
person could be deprived of their liberty by order of the CoP without being made a party to the 
case. If certain ‘triggers’ were identified – such as a person objecting to the detention – there would 
be an oral hearing, but otherwise the authorisation could be ‘dealt with on the papers’.  
Following the Re X decisions, Practice Direction 10AA108 was updated to provide further guidance 
on this streamlined procedure, and new forms were issued109. Practice Direction 10AA required the 
applicant, before submitting the application, to arrange for P to be informed of the following 
matters: the nature of the application, that they are entitled to participate in the proceedings – 
including through being joined as a party – and that the person undertaking the consultation can 
help them to obtain advice and assistance if they do not agree to the proposed arrangements. 110 
Form COP DOL 10, on which applications to authorize deprivation of liberty under the streamlined 
procedure are to be made stated that: 
The person this application is about must be consulted about the application and the 
person undertaking this consultation must take all reasonable steps to assist the 
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person to make a decision. If the person the application is about does not have 
capacity to consent to being deprived of their liberty, they must be given the 
opportunity to be involved in the proceedings, and to express their wishes and 
views, to help the court reach a decision about whether the proposed deprivation of 
liberty would be in their best interests. 
The person carrying out this consultation ‘should be someone who knows the person the 
application is about, and who is best placed to express their wishes and views’, such as a relative or 
close friend, or someone the person has previously chosen to act on their behalf such as an 
attorney under an LPA. If no suitable person is available, then an IMCA or another similar 
independent advocate should be appointed to perform the role. That person must then complete 
Annex C to the application form, which also asked whether the person has expressed ‘any views, 
wishes or feelings in relation to the application and the proposed/actual deprivation of liberty’, and 
whether they wish to take part in the proceedings. 
The streamlined procedure proposed in the Re X judgments raised a number of questions about 
how people could participate and be represented in judicial decisions concerning deprivation of 
liberty. A central question was whether P should be made a party.  
The judgments in Re X Nos 1 and 2 were appealed by the two detained parties to the proceedings 
and by the Law Society.111 In the Court of Appeal, Black, Moore-Bick, and Gloucester LLJ were 
sympathetic to the President’s purpose in providing a ‘streamlined’ procedure for hearing these 
applications, but held that ‘the particular course he adopted was not one that was open to him’ and 
that the procedure should have been established by a practice direction, not via judgments.112 The 
Court of Appeal ruled that, because the Re X judgments dealt with ‘generic academic issues’ rather 
than determining particular disputes arising in the cases before him, the President had no 
jurisdiction to rule as he had and that, consequently, the Court of Appeal had no jurisdiction to hear 
the appeal.113 Nevertheless, Black LJ went on to set out what she would have decided if the Court 
of Appeal had jurisdiction to hear the appeal, remarking that the procedures set out in the first 
instance judgments did not satisfy the requirements of Article 5 ECHR.114 The Court of Appeal’s 
obiter remarks suggested that under the present system party status was essential to satisfying the 
requirements of Article 5; this issue is explored at greater length in Section 3.2 below. 
In July 2015, in MOD and Others (Deprivation of Liberty)115 District Judge Marin considered nine 
applications using the Re X procedure in relation to adults ranging in age from 19 to 87, living in 
different placements. In none of the nine cases was there a challenge to the appropriateness of the 
placement or the restrictions on P’s liberty. Bearing in mind the words of Black LJ in Re X, DJ Marin 
                                                     
111 Re X (Court of Protection Practice) [2015] EWCA Civ 599 
112 Ibid, para. 58 
113 Ibid, para.127 
114 These remarks are obiter dicta, therefore not essential to the decision and not binding precedent on other courts, 
but are likely to have persuasive authority. However, see now the judgment of Charles J in In the Matter of the Mental 
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cases in which there is every reason to trust the judgment of family members, P need not therefore be joined as a party 
to proceedings. This would add no protection and would potentially cause detriment  
115 [2015] EWCOP 47. 
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joined all nine as parties and then in the case of eight of them, invited the Official Solicitor to act as 
litigation friend. The Official Solicitor wrote to the judge declining to act, stating:  
I am not currently in a position to accept the invitations to act as litigation friend in 
the referrals in these cases; and, I am most unlikely, on my current understanding of 
my budgetary position, to be able, even when I have established a light touch 
process, which is nevertheless consistent with my duties as litigation friend, and the 
external outsourcing to which have I referred above, to be able to accept invitations 
to act in more than a relatively small proportion of the total expected numbers of 
these former streamlined procedure cases.116  
Since in all but one of these nine cases there was no one to act as litigation friend to P, this brought 
matters to a standstill. DJ Marin transferred the proceedings to Charles J, the Vice-President of the 
CoP, where they were heard under the name In the Matter of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 Re: 
NRA, HR, ML, MJW, VS, EJG, MT, DPW, NR, and LM117 (hereafter Re NRA and others).  
Charles J considered the ‘Procedural Balance’ to be struck between satisfying the procedural and 
substantive requirements of Article 5 and the common law, without a procedure so costly it 
diverted resources away from care provision, caused unnecessary intrusions into private lives, and 
without incurring such delays that it did not provide an effective procedural safeguard. Charles J 
considered whether P must be made a party in cases involving a deprivation of liberty, what role 
could be played by Rule 3A representatives, whether family could act as litigation friends, and what 
should happen when no suitable litigation friend was available and the Official Solicitor could not 
perform this function.  
Charles J’s decision revived and adapted the streamlined procedure proposed by Munby P in Re X. 
It afforded family and friends a central function in safeguarding P’s rights, acting in the role of 
litigation friend or Rule 3A representative. This role, and Charles J’s ruling on party status and 
litigation friends, are considered in more detail in Section 3.2 (on party status) and Section 3.5 (on 
representation in proceedings) below. 
In Re NRA and Others, family or friends were available to act as Rule 3A representatives for all the 
parties. In obiter remarks Charles J considered that should a case arise where P had no family or 
friends available to perform this function, one way for the CoP to obtain further information and 
secure P’s participation was to exercise its investigatory jurisdiction by requiring reports from 
health or social care bodies under s49 MCA118, although he felt that a ‘much better solution’ would 
be the appointment of a Rule 3A representative.119 Within 3 months a test case addressing this 
situation was heard by Charles J: In the Matter of the Mental Capacity Act 2005: Re JM, AMY, JG, 
MM and VE 120 (hereafter Re JM and Others).  
                                                     
116 Ibid, para 23.  
117 In the Matter of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 Re: NRA, HR, ML, MJW, VS, EJG, MT, DPW, NR, and LM [2015] EWCOP 
59 
118 Provided the report’s authors were ‘not involved professionally or for remuneration in the provision or 
commissioning of the care package’, see Re NRA & Ors [2015] EWCOP 59 para 260. 
119 Re NRA & Ors [2015] EWCOP 59, para 244. See also paragraphs 263 – 267. 
120 [2016] EWCOP 15 
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The five cases in Re JM and Others were chosen because they fell within ‘the class where the 
applicant (usually a public authority) is of the view that the application is not controversial and 
there is no family member or friend who the COP can appoint as a Rule 3A(2)(c) representative.’121 
Again Charles J applied the logic behind his decision in the NRA case. Although the Re X streamlined 
procedure does not meet the minimum procedural requirements of Article 5, a procedure in which 
P was not joined as a party and there was no hearing would do so if a Rule 3A representative is 
appointed for P.122 The lack of capacity and vulnerability of the person deprived of his liberty 
pointed towards him having someone ‘in his corner’ to carry out an independent review of whether 
the application for a deprivation of liberty is justified and represents the least restrictive available 
option. Charles J said this: 
Without some assistance from someone on the ground who considers the care 
package through P's eyes and so provides the independent evidence to the COP that 
a family member or friend can provide, the procedure will not provide an 
independent check that meets the minimum procedural safeguards required by 
Article 5 and the common law.123 
In one of the five test cases there was someone who could be appointed under Rule 3A. In the 
other four cases where there was no appropriate family member or friend who could be appointed 
as a Rule 3A representative. Charles J made an order joining both the Ministry of Justice and the 
Department of Health as parties and inviting the parties to take steps to either ‘identify a suitable 
person who is ready, willing and able to accept immediate appointment as P’s Rule 3A 
representative, or identify an alternative procedure that is actually available to the COP to take to 
meet the minimum procedural requirements in the case.’ In the meantime the applications would 
be stayed ‘pending the identification of a practically available procedure that enables the COP to 
adopt a procedure that meets the minimum procedural requirements in that case.124 Although the 
judgment in Re JM was handed down in March 2016, at the time of writing this report, the cases 
still appear to be stayed. 
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2. THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS FRAMEWORK FOR 
PARTICIPATION IN LEGAL CAPACITY AND DEPRIVATION 
OF LIBERTY PROCEEDINGS 
Since the CoP was established there have been very important developments in the human rights 
framework relating to the participation of disabled people in decisions on their legal capacity and 
deprivation of liberty. An overview is given here, with further detailed discussion for each of the 
key participation issues in Section 3 below.125 
2.1 EARLY RULINGS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS ON PARTICIPATION 
UNDER ARTICLE 5 ECHR 
Article 5 formed the basis of much of 
the court’s early jurisprudence 
concerning legal capacity, mental 
disability and participation in 
proceedings. There is an important 
connection between the participatory 
guarantees of the ECHR for 
deprivation of liberty and legal 
capacity proceedings. In its recent 
decision in AN v Lithuania126, the 
ECtHR stated that the guarantees of 
Article 5 ECHR are broadly similar to 
Article 6, and in its decisions 
concerning legal capacity and 
guardianship it will have regard to its 
case law under Article 5.127 
The first case to consider legal 
capacity, deprivation of liberty and 
rights of access to a court for a person 
with mental disabilities was 
Winterwerp v the Netherlands128 in 
1979. In Winterwerp the Court held 
that detention must be reviewed at 
                                                     
125 See also: Lucy Series, The participation of the relevant person in proceedings in the Court of Protection: A briefing 
paper on international human rights requirements, (Version 1.3, School of Law and Politics, Cardiff University 2015); 
Lucy Series, 'Legal capacity and participation in litigation: Recent developments in the European Court of Human Rights' 
in Gerard Quinn, Lisa Waddington and Eilionoir Flynn, (eds) European Yearbook of Disability Law, (Martinus Nijhoff 
2015) 
126 (App No. 17280/08) [2016] ECHR 462 (31 May 2016)  
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128 (App no 6301/73) [1979] 2 EHRR 387 
Article 5 ECHR: Liberty and Security of the Person 
1) Everyone has the right to liberty and security of 
person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in 
the following cases and in accordance with a 
procedure prescribed by law: 
(e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention 
of the spreading of infectious diseases, of persons of 
unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants 
[…] 
2) Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, 
in a language which he understands, of the reasons for 
his arrest and of any charge against him. 
[…] 
4) Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or 
detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by 
which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided 
speedily by a court and his release ordered if the 
detention is not lawful. 
5) Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or 
detention in contravention of the provisions of this 
Article shall have an enforceable right to 
compensation. 
 41 
 
regular intervals129 and found a breach of Article 5(4) in that Mr Winterwerp had not been given 
the right to be heard by the court renewing his detention. The Court said this: 
The judicial proceedings referred to in Article 5(4) need not, it is true, always be 
attended by the same guarantees as those required under Article 6(1) para. 1 for 
civil or criminal litigation... Nonetheless, it is essential that the person concerned 
should have access to a court and the opportunity to be heard either in person or, 
where necessary, through some form of representation, failing which he will not 
have been afforded "the fundamental guarantees of procedure applied in matters of 
deprivation of liberty". Mental illness may entail restricting or modifying the manner 
of exercise of such a right but it cannot justify impairing the very essence of the 
right. Indeed, special procedural safeguards may prove called for in order to protect 
the interests of persons who, on account of their mental disabilities, are not fully 
capable of acting for themselves.130 
The Court found that Mr Winterwerp was ‘never associated, either personally or through a 
representative, in the proceedings leading to the various detention orders made against him: he 
was never notified of the proceedings or of their outcome; neither was he heard by the courts or 
given the opportunity to argue his case.’131 
The case also considered legal capacity matters independently of Article 5. Mr Winterwerp had 
been automatically deprived of the right to administer his property and affairs by virtue of his 
detention. The Court held that this breached Article 6(1) affirming that ‘Whatever the justification 
for depriving a person of unsound mind of the capacity to administer his property, the guarantees 
laid down in Article 6(1) must nevertheless be respected’.132 
The next significant case to develop the participation rights of disabled people was X v United 
Kingdom133 (1981), a test case brought by Larry Gostin at MIND134 on the right to seek review of the 
lawfulness of psychiatric detention. It produced far reaching effects in the campaign to reform the 
Mental Health Review Tribunal and increase patients’ rights to participate effectively in reviews of 
the lawfulness of their detention. Mr X had been recalled to Broadmoor High Security Hospital 
without being promptly informed of the reasons for his recall in breach of Article 5(2). X v United 
Kingdom also established the important principle in relation to review of detention pursuant to 
Article 5(4) that the detained person must be entitled to call in question the lawfulness of 
detention before a court or tribunal, which must have the power to order discharge. The case 
brought about an increase in patients’ rights to apply for a tribunal hearing as well as rights to be 
informed of the fact of detention and rights of challenge under the Mental Health Act 1983.  
Van der Leer v the Netherlands135 (1990) was a key Article 5 case in relation to participation, rights 
to challenge detention, and the right to be heard in court where the initial detention is authorised 
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134 At that time known as The National Association for Mental Health. 
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by a court. Mrs Van der Leer had been detained by court order on 18 November 1983 and only 
found out that she was a detained rather than a voluntary patient, when she was placed in isolation 
on 28 November.136 Mrs Van der Leer had not been heard by the court ordering her detention, 
even though Dutch law required that she be given the opportunity to be heard. Article 5(1)(e) had 
been breached because the procedure prescribed by domestic law had not been followed. Nor was 
she informed promptly of the fact that a court had ordered her detention, which amounted to a 
breach of Article 5(2), the right to be given reasons for arrest and information about the right to 
challenge under Article 5(4). Arrest was held to include detention on grounds of unsound mind and 
detained patients were to be told that they were detained, the reasons for their detention and 
their rights to challenge. The Court furthermore held that there had been a breach of the right to 
speedy review of the lawfulness of detention under Article 5(4), partly occasioned by the fact that 
Ms Van der Leer had not even been informed of the fact that she was detained, let alone of her 
right to challenge. Van der Leer is one of the key ECtHR precedents on the right to be notified.   
In Hutchison Reid v United Kingdom137 the ECtHR again elaborated on the features of a competent 
court for the purposes of reviewing the lawfulness of detention under Article 5(4), holding that it 
need not necessarily be a court of law of the ‘classic kind’, but it should provide guarantees 
‘appropriate to the kind of deprivation of liberty in question’ and ‘of a judicial procedure’, with the 
competence to decide the ‘lawfulness’ of the detention and to order release if not lawful.138 The 
Court also held that the burden of proof for making the case for detention rested with the 
detaining authorities and not the patient,139 as was the case at that time under the MHA 1983 – 
which was subsequently amended.140 This case reiterates the importance of access to a court 
rather than a non-judicial form of review of detention for compliance with Article 5(4). This is 
significant as it confirms that procedures for the review of detention by a supervisory body under 
the DoLS141 do not provide an alternative means of satisfying the requirements of the ECHR 
because they are not a ‘judicial procedure’. 
The role of the ECtHR’s ruling in HL v United Kingdom142 in prompting the government to amend 
the MCA and insert the DoLS was discussed above in Section 1.4. Its significance for matters of 
participation lay in requiring the guarantees of Article 5 – including rights of appeal – for 
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incapacitated adults who may not be objecting to their detention. In England and Wales, since the 
Mental Health Act 1959, compliant incapacitated patients could be admitted to hospital informally 
without any formal detention procedure. Compulsory powers of detention were used if the patient 
objected to admission or, if they were already an inpatient, made ‘persistent and purposeful 
attempts to leave hospital’.143 Detained patients who objected to admission had the right to seek 
review of their detention before the tribunal. Patients who lacked capacity and were not actively 
resisting admission were often prevented from leaving hospital, or care homes even though they 
were not formally detained. These patients were sometimes referred to as ‘de facto detained’: 
detained in fact, but with no mechanism to seek review of that detention even if they were 
objecting.144 
Following HL v UK, the difficult aspect in relation to participation was how might a person who lacks 
capacity to decide where to live and who is not necessarily resisting being in the hospital or care 
home be enabled to participate in a decision reviewing the lawfulness of that placement carried out 
to satisfy the requirements of Article 5(4). The Strasbourg Court suggested a vital role for patient 
representatives, akin to the role of the nearest relative under mental health legislation: 
The appointment of a representative of a patient who could make certain objections 
and applications on his or her behalf is a procedural protection accorded to those 
committed involuntarily under the 1983 Act and which would be of equal 
importance for patients who are legally incapacitated and have, as in the present 
case, extremely limited communication abilities.145  
The role of representatives in deprivation of liberty cases where P is not objecting is pivotal to the 
Re X ‘streamlined’ procedure for authorising a deprivation of liberty, and will be considered under 
Section 3.5 below. 
In 2005 the Court’s ruling in Storck v Germany146 effectively extended the reach of Article 5 even 
into private care arrangements. Ms Storck was a patient who had been detained and treated 
without consent in a private hospital. The ECtHR declared that Article 5 places states under a 
positive duty to exercise effective supervision and review of decisions by private parties to deprive 
people of their liberty and to treat them against their will. The positive duty under Storck applies 
not only to decisions to detain, but also to decisions to interfere with people's rights of self-
determination under Article 8 by treating them without their consent.147 Citing this ruling, Charles J 
recently held that local authorities and the CoP had obligations to ensure that even a deprivation of 
liberty arranged by a person’s deputy, using their personal financial resources, required safeguards 
in accordance with Article 5 ECHR – in that case by way of a welfare order authorising the 
detention.148 This decision was appealed by the Secretary of State for Justice on the grounds that 
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such ‘private’ detentions were not ‘imputable to the state’; the Court of Appeal rejected the appeal 
and upheld Charles J’s decision.149 
Hence, by 2005 there was a comprehensive system of enforcement of Article 5 rights via positive 
and negative obligations on states to protect against arbitrary detention on grounds of 
unsoundness of mind. States had a ‘negative’ obligation not to detain without due process as set 
out in Winterwerp. Moreover, they had a positive obligation to ensure that there was effective 
supervision and review of decisions to detain in private and public institutions and even quasi-
domestic settings, and to ensure that those who lack capacity to decide where to live have access 
to effective supervision and review of decisions to detain them, even though they may be 
compliant.  
2.2 UN CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES 
The adoption by the United Nations of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
(CRPD) has brought an even greater focus on participation in proceedings by people alleged to lack 
decision-making capacity, which has infused the later rulings of the ECtHR on legal capacity 
proceedings, a topic we return to below. Although the main focus of this report is on compliance of 
the CoP with the human rights paradigm of the ECHR, rather than the ‘new paradigm’ of the 
CRPD,150 we highlight the significance of the CRPD for its approach to participation and accessibility, 
and its influence on Strasbourg case law. 
The CRPD was adopted by the UN in 2006 and ratified by the UK in 2009. It has been described as a 
‘paradigm shift’ in approach to disability, from welfare policies and charity to an approach based on 
human rights and equality.151 It is based on a social model of disability, which emphasises that 
disability arises from the interaction between a person’s impairment and the barriers they 
encounter in their environment and society.152 This approach shifts the emphasis from diagnosis 
and cure towards addressing social and environmental barriers to full inclusion and participation in 
society.153 Thus, the CRPD shifts models of participation away from disability justifying exclusion 
from participating in court proceedings, towards ensuring that court and tribunal proceedings are 
suitably adapted to facilitate inclusion on an equal basis with others.  
The CRPD has not been directly incorporated into UK law, and thus cannot be enforced within the 
domestic courts. However signatory states are obliged to ensure and promote the full realization of 
all rights contained within the CRPD for disabled people, to refrain from engaging in acts or 
practices that are inconsistent with it, and modify legislation, customs and practices that constitute 
discrimination (Article 4). States’ implementation of the CRPD is subject to a monitoring 
framework154 and the UK is a signatory to an Optional Protocol that permits individuals to complain 
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to the UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities if their rights under the CRPD have 
been violated.155 Although the CRPD is not directly binding upon the courts, it is a source of 
persuasive authority156 and has influenced to varying degrees many domestic rulings and 
judgments of the ECtHR, particularly those concerning independent living, deprivation of capacity 
and deprivation of liberty. 157  
Articles 5, 12, 13 and 14 CRPD have had an especially important influence on subsequent ECtHR 
authorities relating to the rights of disabled people who are challenging their detention in court or 
who are subject to legal capacity proceedings. Thus although not directly enforceable by individuals 
in the UK, the CRPD is an important source of law, which cannot be disregarded. 
Because this report makes several policy recommendations for changes to the MCA, COPR or 
guidance, which will have an impact on disabled users of the court, we also draw attention to 
Article 4(3) of the CRPD: 
In the development and implementation of legislation and policies to implement the 
present Convention, and in other decision-making processes concerning issues 
relating to persons with disabilities, States Parties shall closely consult with and 
actively involve persons with disabilities, including children with disabilities, through 
their representative organizations. 
Article 5 CRPD: Equality and non-discrimination 
Article 5 CRPD prohibits all forms of discrimination on the basis of disability and requires states to 
take all appropriate steps to ensure that reasonable accommodations are provided. Reasonable 
accommodations158 are defined in Article 2 CRPD as: 
necessary and appropriate modification and adjustments not imposing a 
disproportionate or undue burden, where needed in a particular case, to ensure to 
persons with disabilities the enjoyment or exercise on an equal basis with others of 
all human rights and fundamental freedoms. 
Domestically the Equality Act 2010 also makes provision for a right to reasonable adjustments for 
disabled people.159 This right applies not only to the provision, criteria and practices of HM Courts 
and Tribunals Service but also to any legal services disabled people may use in accessing justice. It is 
unclear, however, whether the Equality Act 2010 applies to the conduct of a case within the courts, 
since judicial functions160 are exempt from the s29 Equality Act 2010 duty prohibiting 
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discrimination.161 Nevertheless, in J W Rackham v NHS Professionals Ltd162 the Employment Appeal 
Tribunal accepted that it could not ‘sensibly be disputed that a Tribunal has a duty as an organ of 
the state, as a public body, to make reasonable adjustments to accommodate the disabilities of 
Claimants’.163 The ‘particular route by which the obligation rests upon the Tribunal is unimportant’, 
but might be through the operation of the UN CRPD or common law fairness.164 The case law of the 
ECtHR has also found some limited rights to reasonable adjustment by the courts within Articles 6 
and 8 ECHR, and a more expansive approach to reasonable adjustments within these ECHR rights 
has been taken in domestic jurisprudence.165 
Article 9 CRPD: Accessibility 
Article 9 CRPD requires states to ensure that public facilities and services are made accessible to 
disabled people, including providing ‘training for stakeholders on accessibility issues’ and ensuring 
that ‘forms of live assistance and intermediaries’ are available for facilities open to the public. A 
General Comment by the UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities on accessibility 
states that: 
There can be no effective access to justice if the buildings in which law-enforcement 
agencies and the judiciary are located are not physically accessible, or if the services, 
information and communication they provide are not accessible to persons with 
disabilities.166 
Accessibility duties are anticipatory and apply to groups, whereas rights to reasonable 
accommodation apply to individuals. The accessibility of services should be considered prior to any 
individual requesting reasonable accommodation.167 Domestically, the Equality Act 2010 contains 
several provisions, framed as anticipatory reasonable adjustment duties, which are relevant to the 
accessibility of court and tribunal services.168 Accessibility issues for the CoP are considered in more 
detail in Section 3.9, below. 
Article 12 CRPD: Equal recognition before the law 
Article 12 CRPD confers the right to equal recognition before the law. This article has provoked 
considerable discussion and controversy, as it is increasingly widely regarded as prohibiting 
‘substitute decisions’ imposed on a person in their ‘best interests’, calling into question the 
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compatibility of legislation like the MCA with the CRPD.169 The recent General Comment on Article 
12 adopted by the UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities adopts this analysis.170  
This report does not consider the compatibility of the MCA with Article 12 CRPD. Because the CoP 
adjudicates on the MCA, which permits substituted decision making, we have primarily assessed 
the compliance of the CoP with ‘old paradigm’ approaches to human rights under the ECHR. 
However, whatever interpretation of Article 12 CRPD is accepted, it is clear that it places a much 
stronger emphasis on ensuring equal rights in exercising legal capacity for disabled people (Article 
12(2) CRPD), putting in place any supports that are required to enable people to exercise legal 
capacity (Article 12(3) CRPD) and ensuring that such measures respect the person’s ‘rights, will and 
preferences’ (Article 12(4) CRPD). We consider this issue throughout the report in relation to 
contrasting models of participation based on the ‘best interests’ or the ‘will and preferences’ of the 
person.  
Echoing this provision, Article 14 CRPD states that if disabled people are deprived of their liberty, 
they must be ‘entitled to guarantees in accordance with international human rights law’ on an 
equal basis with others. Several other rights contained within the CRPD closely connected to 
Articles 12 and 14 sit in tension with the MCA and its provision for detention and treatment 
without consent; however as these are not directly related to matters of participation in court 
proceedings themselves they are not discussed here.171  
Article 13 CRPD: Access to justice 
Article 13 CRPD requires states to: 
ensure effective access to justice for persons with disabilities on an equal basis with 
others, including through the provision of procedural and age-appropriate 
accommodations, in order to facilitate their effective role as direct and indirect 
participants, including as witnesses, in all legal proceedings, including at investigative 
and other preliminary stages. 
This article has been heavily relied upon in the recent ECtHR authorities emphasising participation 
in proceedings, discussed in Section 2.4 below. Article 13 CRPD also requires States to ‘promote 
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appropriate training for those working in the field of administration of justice’ in order to help 
ensure effective access to justice. Training is discussed in Section 3.8, below. 
There is a growing literature exploring the diverse ‘access to justice’ measures that may be required 
by the CRPD.172 In her comprehensive analysis of access to justice and disability rights, Flynn argues 
that Article 13 encompasses wide ranging aspects of the justice system, including access to 
information and advice, representation in proceedings, the accessibility of court buildings and 
information, and the kinds of special measures and reasonable adjustments discussed in this 
report.173 
2.3 THE FLOURISHING OF LEGAL CAPACITY JURISPRUDENCE IN THE EUROPEAN COURT OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS 
The former President of the ECtHR, Sir Nicholas Bratza, has written that the jurisprudence of the 
ECtHR in the two decades following Winterwerp was ‘notable for the almost complete dearth of 
judicial decisions in this vitally important area.’174 As noted above, several cases did expand the 
ECtHR’s jurisprudence on Article 5 ECHR, but few addressed the restrictions on participation in 
court proceedings faced by individuals who are deprived of legal capacity. Yet starting with the case 
of Shtukaturov v Russia175 in 2008, the ECtHR has rapidly developed its jurisprudence on mental 
disability in general, and on participation in legal capacity and deprivation of liberty proceedings in 
particular. In many of these cases the ECtHR has cited the CRPD. 
Many of these cases originated in Central and Eastern Europe, often brought with the assistance of 
strategic litigation organizations such as the Mental Disability Advocacy Centre176. In these 
countries there has been a widespread practice of using adult guardianship laws to deprive people 
of liberty, to make decisions about their treatment, and indeed to restrict all aspects of their rights 
as citizens. Under these traditional guardianship regimes a person is formally declared legally 
‘incapable’ by a court and typically stripped of all rights to make legally recognized decisions 
(‘plenary guardianship’), although in some cases courts may have powers to only deprive a person 
of limited decision making rights (‘partial guardianship’). The courts then appoint a guardian, often 
a relative or a social welfare officer, who can make a wide range of decisions on their behalf, 
including deciding to admit them to a psychiatric hospital or social care home without their 
agreement, or to consent to treatment on their behalf. Critically, under many of these regimes a 
person has no right to bring legal proceedings of any kind without the consent of their guardian – 
including proceedings to restore their legal capacity, to challenge the appointment or decisions, of 
their guardian, or appeal against detention.  This effectively deprived people of all their Convention 
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rights to challenge loss of legal capacity, deprivation of liberty, or treatment without consent, since 
the guardian could consent to detention and treatment and in many cases only the guardian could 
challenge these interventions.  
Shtukaturov is a typical example. Mr Shtukaturov had been placed in hospital by his mother, who 
was his guardian, despite his objections, and without the use of any formal detention safeguards. 
He did not take part in the court proceedings to appoint his mother as guardian, as he was not 
made aware that they were taking place. He was not examined by the judge in person, and was 
unable to challenge the judgment, since the City Court refused to examine his appeal. The ECtHR 
compared the significance of deprivation of legal capacity proceedings to deprivation of liberty, as 
‘personal autonomy in almost all areas of life’ is at issue, including rights to liberty.177 Four years 
later, in Stanev v Bulgaria178  the Strasbourg Court went on to hold that: 
The right to ask a court to review a declaration of incapacity is one of the most 
important rights for the person concerned, since such a procedure, once initiated, 
will be decisive for the exercise of all the rights and freedoms affected by the 
declaration of incapacity, not least in relation to any restrictions that may be placed 
on the person’s liberty.179  
The string of guardianship cases following Shtukaturov also included the first examples of the ECtHR 
recognizing that individuals with mental disabilities could be deprived of their liberty in social care 
homes, as well as psychiatric hospitals;180 jurisprudence that ultimately inspired the ‘acid test’ of 
deprivation of liberty identified by the UK Supreme Court in Cheshire West. 
It is important to note that these formal guardianship regimes differ in important respects from the 
legal capacity regime of the MCA, which is unusually ‘informal’ in international terms. The MCA is 
not a plenary guardianship regime, but considers an individual’s ability to make specific decisions at 
a specific point in time.181 Although ‘deputies’ may be appointed by a court to manage a person’s 
properties and affairs, formal declarations of incapacity and the appointment of a deputy to make 
health and welfare decisions such as admission to a hospital or care home, or consenting to medical 
treatments, are extremely rare.182 Even when a deputy is appointed, there is no formal bar to a 
person bringing proceedings in the CoP to challenge their appointment or any decision they have 
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made. There may, however, be significant practical barriers to access to justice of a nature 
discussed in Section 3.1 and Section 3.5 below.  
Whereas the formal guardianship regimes considered by the ECtHR appoint a single decision maker 
to make most, or all, decisions concerning a person’s health and welfare, the MCA takes a more 
‘informal’ approach to health and welfare matters. In most cases health and welfare decisions are 
made on behalf of adults deemed ‘incapable’ informally, where carers and health and social care 
professionals rely upon a general defence against liability for acts of care and treatment in the best 
interests of adults whom they reasonably believe lack the mental capacity to decide for 
themselves.183 In theory this permits far more flexible, proportionate and tailored loss or ‘denial’ of 
legal capacity without the cost, bureaucracy and possible stigma of a formal declaration of 
incapacity by a court or tribunal.184  
The limits of this informal procedure are unclear, and some suggest that in practice it operates as a 
de facto power for health and social care professionals making major life changing decisions.185 We 
return to this point in Section 3.1 and Section 5 below. 
The informal nature of the MCA’s main provisions for health and welfare are significant to matters 
of participation, because they prompt the question of whether, when and how an individual might 
be able to access court proceedings to contest decisions that may have significant consequences for 
their legal capacity and human rights, considered in Section 3.1. Thus, although it might be argued 
that ECtHR cases concerning Central and Eastern European plenary guardianship regimes have little 
bearing on matters of access to a court and participation under the MCA 2005, we suggest that 
insofar as decisions made under the MCA touch upon a person’s capacity to exercise fundamental 
rights and challenge decisions concerning liberty, privacy, home, family life, and bodily integrity, 
they will engage the same issues as these authorities.186  
2.4 THE RIGHT TO PARTICIPATE AND THE ‘RULE OF PERSONAL PRESENCE’ 
Within this recent tranche of authorities concerning legal capacity and deprivation of liberty, the 
ECtHR has developed and refined its jurisprudence on the right to participate in legal capacity and 
deprivation of liberty proceedings and established the ‘rule of personal presence’. The rule of 
personal presence reflects Principle 13 of Recommendation (99) 4 on principles concerning the legal 
protection of incapable adults from the Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers: ‘The person 
concerned should have the right to be heard in' person in any proceedings which could affect his or 
her legal capacity.’187 Although Recommendation 99 is non-binding, it is frequently cited by the 
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ECtHR as of great persuasive force in relation to the Court’s interpretation of Articles 3, 5, 6 and 8 
ECHR. This rule of personal presence echoes the longstanding common law rules of natural justice, 
most notably the principle of audi alteram partem, that the person should be able to be heard and 
to challenge the case against him. 188 
The ECtHR’s right to participate and the rule of personal presence has a threefold rationale: 
1. The dignity principle: the fundamental right to meet judges taking decisions with serious 
consequences for a person’s life.  
2. The evidential principle: a person is an important source of evidence before the court for 
legal capacity, guardianship and deprivation of liberty proceedings.  
3. The adversarial principle: Participation may be necessary to help a person to present his 
case and to refute expert evidence or arguments recommending measures that a person 
opposes. 
These principles for participation in proceedings have chiefly been read into Articles 6 and 8 ECHR. 
In Matter v Slovakia (1999) the ECtHR held that proceedings depriving a person of legal capacity or 
restoring it were directly decisive for the determination of the applicant’s civil rights and 
obligations and therefore engaged Article 6.189 In Shtukaturov the ECtHR found a violation of Article 
6 ECHR because Mr Shtukaturov was unable to participate and present his own case, in violation of 
the ‘adversarial principle’. In Shtukaturov the ECtHR also went on to find a violation of Article 8 
ECHR on procedural grounds. Holding that ‘A stricter scrutiny is called for in respect of very serious 
limitations in the sphere of private life’190, the ECtHR found that whilst Article 8 of the Convention 
contains no explicit procedural requirements, ‘the decision-making process involved in measures of 
interference must be fair and such as to ensure due respect of the interests safeguarded by Article 
8.’191 In Mr Shtukaturov’s case, the decisions had very serious consequences for his private life – 
rendering him dependent upon his guardian in almost all areas of his life - and ‘his participation in 
the decision-making process was reduced to zero.’192  
As will be considered in more detail in Section 3, Article 5 also contains procedural obligations 
connected with participation that have become especially salient in light of the Cheshire West and 
Re X decisions. Here, we rehearse the rationale of the principles underpinning participation in both 
legal capacity and deprivation of liberty proceedings. In Section 3, we consider in more detail how 
these might be interpreted in light of specific aspects of participation. 
The dignity principle 
This first principle suggests that even if the evidence and arguments for intervention without 
consent are sufficiently robust, there may still be grounds for ensuring the person has an 
opportunity to participate in the case and have direct contact with the judge simply by virtue of the 
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consequences of the decision for that person. The right to meet the judge deciding one’s case was 
succinctly expressed by the Court in X and Y v Croatia193:  
judges adopting decisions with serious consequences for a person’s private life, such 
as those entailed by divesting someone of legal capacity, should in principle also 
have personal contact with those persons.194  
It is important, however, to distinguish between the ECtHR jurisprudence that a person has a 
fundamental right to meet the judge and the right to be present throughout some or all of a 
hearing. This important distinction is considered under Section 3.6 below. Developments in the CoP 
in this regard have taken place in parallel to the development of policies for young people who wish 
to meet the judge in family proceedings.195 
A similar principle can also be found under the common law. In Osborn v The Parole Board196 the 
Supreme Court held that the common law affords a prisoner the right to an oral hearing, deriving 
this from his ‘legitimate interest in being able to participate in a decision with important 
implications for him’197 and respecting his dignity.198 The Supreme Court cited the 18th century 
authority, Dr Bentley’s case, which draws on the biblical account of the judgement of God on Adam 
and Eve199: ‘Adam was allowed a hearing notwithstanding that God, being omniscient, did not 
require to hear him in order to improve the quality of His decision-making’.200 The principled basis 
of the rule of natural justice conferring the right to be heard is the dignity of the individual and the 
potential impact of the decision on individual rights, not the improvement of the quality of the 
decision. The court cited in support of its approach Jeremy Waldron’s thesis that dignity entails 
‘paying attention to a point of view and respecting the personality of the entity one is dealing 
with’.201  
The evidential principle 
The second principle is connected with improving the quality of the evidence available to the judge, 
and with the idea of the person as the object of the proceedings. The evidential principle recognizes 
that a person is an important source of evidence before the court for legal capacity, guardianship 
and deprivation of liberty proceedings. As the Court put it in Shtukaturov, they are the ‘object of 
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the proceedings’ and their participation is therefore necessary ‘to allow the judge to form his 
personal opinion about the applicant’s mental capacity’.202  
In X and Y v Croatia203, the ECtHR reiterated that although decisions regarding legal capacity should 
be based on medical evidence, ‘at the end of the day, it is the judge and not a physician, albeit a 
psychiatrist, who is to assess all relevant facts concerning the person in question and his or her 
personal circumstances’.204 Hearing from other witnesses, including the person themselves, is thus 
an important procedural safeguard against any arbitrariness that could result from over-reliance on 
expert evidence, and to consider the proportionality of any measures imposed.205 This principle was 
reiterated in Ivinović v Croatia206, where the European Court was critical of the ‘decisive’ reliance of 
domestic courts on medical evidence in deprivation of legal capacity proceedings.207 This criticism 
of reliance on medical evidence, and the expectation that judges will come to an independent view 
on legal capacity, raises fundamental questions about the CoP’s approach to evidence and 
participation, discussed in Section 3.4 below. 
This approach builds upon earlier ECtHR jurisprudence that guarantees a right for a litigant to be 
physically present in court proceedings in cases involving the assessment of a person’s state of 
health and character, or of ‘emotional suffering’208, or where the subject of proceedings is 
themselves a source of factual evidence209. 
The adversarial principle 
The third rationale is connected with the principle of fairness and the common law rules of natural 
justice, most notably the principle of audi alteram partem, that the person should be able to be 
heard and to challenge the case against him. It echoes Lon Fuller’s contention that ‘the essence of 
the rule of law lies in the fact that men affected by the decisions which emerge from social 
processes should have some formally guaranteed opportunity to affect those decisions’.210 
The adversarial principle is relevant not only to whether a person attends court or meets the judge, 
but also to the conduct of the proceedings by any representative. This is an especially important 
principle when considering the role of litigation friends, accredited legal representatives or Rule 3A 
representatives (Section 3.5, below). 
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In Shtukaturov the Court found that in proceedings to deprive someone of legal capacity they play a 
‘double role’: they are the ‘object of proceedings’, as considered under the evidential principle, but 
they are also ‘the subject’ of proceedings and therefor an interested party. Their participation may 
therefore be necessary to help a person to present his case211, or to refute expert evidence or 
arguments recommending measures that a person opposes.212  
In Shtukaturov the Court held that the ‘decision to decide the case on the basis of documentary 
evidence, without seeing or hearing the applicant, was unreasonable and in breach of the principle 
of adversarial proceedings enshrined in Article 6.’213 The presence of a representative of the 
hospital and a public prosecutor was not sufficient to satisfy Article 6.214 In the later case of 
Salontaji-Drobnjak v Serbia215, neither was the appointment of a temporary guardian to represent 
the applicant’s interests where that guardian did not oppose the measure in question – deprivation 
of legal capacity.216 
In Ivinović v Croatia217 the applicant had been partially deprived of her legal capacity in proceedings 
where she had been represented by a ‘legal guardian’ who had worked for the same Social Welfare 
Centre that had instituted the guardianship proceedings. The ECtHR found that this process had 
violated her Article 8 rights, noting ‘that national law does not provide for obligatory 
representation of the person concerned by an independent lawyer, despite the very serious nature 
of the issues concerned and the possible consequences of such proceedings’.218 The ECtHR went on 
to say that ‘in cases of mentally disabled persons the States have an obligation to ensure that they 
are afforded independent representation, enabling them to have their Convention complaints 
examined before a court or other independent body’.219  
In MS v Croatia (No 2)220, MS had been deprived of her liberty in hospital by a judicial order. The 
judge had visited MS in person, and a legal representative had been appointed for her, funded by 
legal aid. Nevertheless, the ECtHR found that these measures did not offer sufficient procedural 
guarantees under the adversarial principle. Although MS had a legal representative, that 
representative had never met with her and so ‘did not have the benefit of hearing her arguments 
concerning the involuntary internment in order to understand and effectively represent her 
position.’ Moreover, he had not advised her of the legal procedure and the most appropriate 
course of action. This was held to be particularly significant given her opposition to her detention 
and complaints about her care.221 Contact between legal representative and the person was held to 
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be ‘necessary or even crucial in order to ensure that the proceedings would be really adversarial 
and the applicant’s legitimate interests protected’.222 
Moreover, although the judge had met with MS in person in hospital, the meeting had only lasted 
for five minutes and the judge made no ‘appropriate accommodations to secure her effective 
access to justice’: he did not inform MS of her rights or give ‘any consideration to the possibility for 
her to participate in the hearing’.223 MS did not attend the hearing and was given no opportunity to 
comment on the expert reports that the court relied upon; given her objections, the ECtHR held 
that her ‘right to be heard was ever more pressing’.224 MS’s lawyer did attend the hearing, but he 
acted as ‘a passive observer’ and made no submissions on MS’s behalf. The ECtHR held that the 
court itself should have reacted to this and secured for MS ‘effective legal representation’.225  
In AN v Lithuania226 the ECtHR once again highlighted the importance of independent 
representation of the individual, of their having contact with their legal representative and the 
importance of participation in the proceedings in order to ‘present his own case’.227 
In Section 3.5 and in the discussion of this report we consider whether the adversarial principle 
being developed by the ECtHR increasingly requires a model of representation based on the ‘will 
and preferences’ of the person (in the parlance of Article 12 CRPD) rather than their ‘best interests’. 
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3. KEY ISSUES FOR PARTICIPATION IN THE COURT OF 
PROTECTION 
Section 3 of this report considers different strands of participation in the CoP in light of the 
foregoing discussion of the Court’s history, the growing pressures it faces and the rapidly evolving 
human rights standards for personal participation in legal capacity and deprivation of liberty 
proceedings. The following key issues are considered individually under the following headings: 
3.1 Access to a court;  
3.2 Party status; 
3.3 Notification;  
3.4 Evidence and information before the Court; 
3.5 Representation in proceedings; 
3.6 Attending court and personal contact with judges; 
3.7 Special measures and reasonable adjustments; 
3.8 Training of judges and representatives; 
3.9 Accessibility measures in the wider Court of Protection system. 
Under each heading we first describe the international and domestic legal framework, and then 
consider how these relate to the CoP’s current practice and procedure. For purposes of 
comparison, a similar exercise is repeated in Section 4 on the Mental Health Tribunals, to illustrate 
a very different model of participation which is of increasing interest given the Law Commission’s 
proposals for a tribunal to replace the CoP as the destination for ‘appeals’ against detention under 
the MCA. 
3.1 ACCESS TO A COURT 
Direct rights of access to a court under the European Convention on Human Rights 
Access to a court is a defining feature of the ideal of the rule of law that underpins the ECHR.228 Yet 
in many countries, people who are deprived of their legal capacity on disability related grounds are 
not permitted to initiate legal proceedings except through their guardian.229 The ECtHR has held 
since Winterwerp that whilst mental disabilities can render legitimate limitations on rights of access 
to a court, ‘it cannot warrant the total absence of that right’.230 In its more recent case law, the 
ECtHR has held that people with mental disabilities, including those with limited legal capacity, 
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must enjoy certain direct rights of access to a court that are not conditional upon securing the 
consent of a guardian, or upon the discretion or goodwill of other third parties: 
1. A person must have standing to seek a court review of any deprivation of liberty in 
accordance with Article 5(4) ECHR, regardless of whether their guardian consents to such 
action. 231 Special procedural safeguards must be available to assist a person in bringing an 
appeal under Article 5(4).232 This right of access to a court must not be dependent upon the 
exercise of discretion or goodwill by a third party233 - even if their decisions are justified by 
the person’s prospects of success.234 A person’s right of appeal against detention does not 
depend upon them demonstrating any particular prospect of success.235 
2. In Stanev v Bulgaria, the ECtHR affirmed that a person who seeks restoration of their legal 
capacity must have direct access to a court.236 As discussed in Section 2.3 above, because 
the MCA does not, for the most part, operate like a formal guardianship system - especially 
for health and welfare decisions - this principle is difficult to translate to the domestic 
context. 237 However, it is notable that many of these ECtHR cases were about placement in 
a social care facility or hospital by a person’s guardian against their will. Arguably, similar 
direct rights of access to a court will apply to challenge ‘informal’ decisions under the MCA 
that engage fundamental ECHR rights such as respect for family, home and private life 
under Article 8.  
3. In DD v Lithuania, the ECtHR held that where a person is in conflict with their guardian, and 
‘the conflict potential has a major impact on the person’s legal situation’ it is essential 
that the person concerned must have access to the court.238 Again, it is difficult to translate 
this into the informal framework for health and welfare decision-making under the MCA 
where formal guardians (deputies) are rarely appointed. It suggests that where a person is 
in conflict with those making best interests decisions having a major impact upon their ECHR 
rights, that they should have direct access to a court. In other words, there should be a right 
to challenge best interests decisions engaging fundamental rights, even if a person does not 
seek to assert their ‘capacity’ to make the decision themselves. 
4. Outside the context of guardianship and legal capacity cases, the ECtHR has also 
emphasised the importance of a person having the possibility of challenging decisions 
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about medical treatments to which they object.239 This supports our analysis that these 
fundamental rights of access to a court are likely to apply to challenge individual decisions 
engaging fundamental human rights, even where a person has not formally been deprived 
of their legal capacity by a court. 
Special procedural safeguards to support the exercise of rights of access to a court 
Many people with mental disabilities may experience difficulties initiating litigation without 
assistance. In its case law on Article 5(4), the ECtHR has emphasized that rights of access to a court 
must be practical and effective240 and accessible to the person.241 Part of the function of Article 5(2) 
is to ensure that a person is aware of their right of appeal, in order that they can exercise it.242 A 
person is not excluded from this protection because of any mental disability, although if they are 
incapable of receiving the information it may need to be communicated to a person who 
represents his interests.243 In ZH v Hungary244 the ECtHR applied the concept of reasonable 
adjustment (which they termed ‘reasonable steps’) to the communication of information under 
Article 5(2) to individuals with communication impairments. 
‘Special procedural safeguards’ may be needed to protect the interests of those unable to act for 
themselves under Article 5(4).245 In MH v UK the ECtHR was reluctant to dictate what special 
procedural safeguards might be required, but went on to say that this goes beyond the 
requirement to remove legal and practical obstacles in exercising appeal rights and may involve 
‘empowering or even requiring some other person or authority to act on the patient’s behalf in that 
regard’.246 There may be a violation of Article 5(4) if a person is unable to secure outside help to 
assist them in bringing an appeal.247 The ECtHR case law has not yet determined the circumstances 
in which a person empowered to act to assist a person in bringing an appeal is required by Article 
5(4) to do so. However, the CoP has been developing its own principles in this regard, which are 
discussed below. 
The ECtHR has not yet elaborated such strong positive obligations to assist a person in accessing a 
court to challenge a deprivation of legal capacity or the decision of a guardian as it has for 
deprivation of liberty. The fact remains however, that the ECtHR has developed similar substantive 
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criteria and procedural safeguards under Article 5 in relation to deprivation of liberty in the line of 
cases following Winterwerp and under Articles 6 and 8 in relation to deprivation of capacity in the 
line of cases post Shtukaturov. Consequently there is a strong argument that similar obligations 
should apply where loss of legal capacity entails serious interferences with fundamental human 
rights. 
Access to the Court of Protection 
There are no formal legal barriers to accessing the CoP under the MCA and the COPR. P is not 
required to seek permission from the court or any other person before commencing 
proceedings.248 Yet, in practice, applications to the CoP are only very rarely made by P – the vast 
majority are made by public authorities, with a smaller number being made by P’s family or 
friends.249 This is likely to be the result of the practical barriers that P may face in making an 
application, in combination with positive obligations on public authorities to refer disputes to court 
by making the application themselves. These are discussed below. 
Practical and procedural barriers to accessing the Court of Protection 
People who lack, or are alleged to lack, mental capacity may face a number of practical or 
procedural barriers which make it difficult to access a court in the event of any dispute about their 
capacity or best interests. One major barrier may be lack of awareness of the MCA and the role of 
the CoP. The House of Lords Committee on the MCA found that a lack of awareness of the MCA 
‘allowed prevailing professional practices to continue unchallenged, and allowed decision-making 
to be dominated by professionals’.250 It is likely that those subject to the MCA 2005, and their 
supporters, may not know of the CoP and its potential role in challenging decisions.  
In Sections 2.1 and 2.3 above we discussed how the ECtHR has often drawn an analogy between 
deprivation of legal capacity and deprivation of liberty proceedings because they can have similar 
significance for a person’s autonomy. It has imported many principles of Article 5 into its case law 
on Article 6 and 8 rights in deprivation of legal capacity proceedings.  Here, we make the argument 
that the principle under Article 5(2) that people should be informed of their right to appeal against 
detention should be transposed to other areas of the MCA where the person objects to a proposed 
decision or action in their best interests, to remedy this lack of understanding about rights to 
challenge decisions made under the MCA. 
Under the Mental Health Act 1983 there has been a duty since 1983 to inform patients of their 
legal rights to challenge detention before a tribunal and treatment without consent. The Mental 
Health Act 2007 introduced new ss 130A-L into the 1983 Act requiring local authorities to make 
available Independent Mental Health Advocates (IMHAs). The help which IMHAs must provide 
includes helping patients to exercise their rights which can include representing them and speaking 
on their behalf. Although there is a duty to inform those detained under the DoLS of their rights of 
appeal, there is no similar statutory duty to tell a person of their right to challenge a decision made 
under ss 5 and 6 of the MCA 2005 that they lack capacity and that an action affecting their rights 
will be carried out as it has been determined to be in their best interests. In an appropriate case the 
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CoP might develop a principle of the right to be informed of the means by which a person can 
challenge a best interests decision affecting an important area of their life. Such a requirement 
could also be inserted into the MCA Code of Practice or it may be felt appropriate for legislation. 
There is no logical reason why serious invasions of physical or psychological integrity or deprivation 
of liberty should carry less effective obligations to provide rights to information and support if 
carried out under the MCA 2005 rather than the MHA 1983.   
People who are alleged to lack mental capacity are likely to require support to challenge decisions 
made under the MCA 2005. Securing this assistance may be especially difficult if they are in conflict 
with those they ordinarily rely upon for support, especially if family and friends are in agreement 
with professionals over the proposed course of action.251 Referrals to Independent Mental Capacity 
Advocates (IMCAs) must be made where best interests decisions regarding serious medical 
treatment, longer term admissions to residential care or hospital, or safeguarding matters are 
made under the MCA for individuals who have no friends or family who are appropriate to consult, 
or for those who are deprived of their liberty under the DoLS.252  
IMCAs for may support a person to challenge decisions in the CoP.253 Unlike advocates under the 
Care Act, however, IMCAs are under no explicit duty to make a formal challenge where the person 
wishes them to do so (except under the DoLS, discussed below) or where they have concerns about 
the decisions being made.254 Most people for whom decisions are made under the Act will not have 
an IMCA referral; those with friends or family to consult are generally ineligible and there are 
concerns about regional disparities in IMCA referral rates.255 Even where IMCA referrals are made, 
official data suggests that IMCAs only very rarely take steps that may result in an application to the 
CoP.256 This suggests that a safeguard that was initially introduced to address access to justice 
concerns is not functioning as it should. 
Identifying a solicitor who specialises in CoP welfare work257 and securing funding for the litigation 
may also be major barriers to making an application. Welfare litigation in the CoP can be very 
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costly. Some, but not all, areas of health and welfare litigation are eligible for public funding, but 
are still subject to a stringent means test, meaning that many will not qualify.258 Only those subject 
to a DoLS authorisation and their RPRs are entitled to non-means tested legal aid, to seek a 
determination in relation to the authorisation itself. Those who are deprived of their liberty but are 
not subject to a DoLS authorisation, for example people who are deprived of their liberty in settings 
such as supported living, are not eligible for non-means tested legal aid.  
The House of Lords Committee on the MCA expressed concern about ‘inconsistent provision of 
non-means tested legal aid for cases concerning a deprivation of liberty’.259 The government has 
indicated that it will not provide non-means tested legal aid for those who are deprived of their 
liberty but not subject to a DoLS authorisation.260 Limitations on legal aid for addressing wider 
welfare issues than deprivation of liberty have led representatives and the CoP itself to make 
creative use of the legal aid that is available for challenging deprivation of liberty under s21A MCA. 
For example, in Briggs v Briggs261, a determination regarding a deprivation of liberty authorisation 
under s21A was said to encompass the substantive dispute about treatment (the withdrawal of 
artificial nutrition and hydration from a person in a minimally conscious state262), rather than a 
strict reading of rights to liberty themselves. Other recent cases concerning end of life decisions 
have also relied upon accessing funding through s21A.263  Perhaps unsurprisingly, the Secretary of 
State for Justice is currently seeking permission to appeal against the decision in Briggs.   
Creative use of the s21A appeal to enable legally aided challenges of medical treatment decisions 
may also be significantly limited following the Court of Appeal’s recent decision in R (Ferreira) v HM 
Senior Coroner for Inner South London.264 In Ferreira Arden LJ, delivering the judgment of the Court 
held that  ‘Any deprivation of liberty resulting from the administration of life-saving treatment to a 
person falls outside Article 5(1) (as it was said in Austin265) “so long as [it is] rendered unavoidable 
as a result of circumstances beyond the control of the authorities and is necessary to avert a real 
risk of serious injury or damage, and [is] kept to the minimum required for that purpose.’266  Arden 
LJ was careful to point out that this ruling does not apply to cases such as the administration of 
obstetric care by force, such as NHS Trust I v G267, where a hospital considered that it might have to 
give obstetric care to a pregnant woman of unsound mind who objected to such treatment.  In such 
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a case authorisation for a deprivation of liberty will be necessary. 268The Court of Appeal decision in 
Ferreira is likely to lead to considerable uncertainty in situations where treatments for physical 
disorders are administered against the wishes of the person or those close to them.  The knock on 
effect will be that fewer P’s and families will be able to afford to challenge medical treatment given 
against their wishes, since without a DOLS authorisation to challenge under s 21A, legal aid funding 
will in many cases not be available. 
Where people are regarded as lacking litigation capacity, they will usually require a litigation friend 
to instruct any legal representatives on their behalf (discussed in more detail in Section 3.5, below). 
Requirements to secure a litigation friend for P may present a practical barrier to initiating 
litigation. Whereas typically in civil litigation a friend or relative might act as litigation friend, the 
view was initially taken that they were unsuitable to do so in the CoP, as they might lack the 
requisite objectivity and independence of the matter in dispute.269 Although this stance was 
abandoned by Charles J in Re: NRA and others270 for non-contentious Re X type cases, which we 
return to in Section 3.5 below, in many cases family or friends will still be considered unsuitable if 
they are involved in a dispute as to P’s capacity or best interests. In such cases, the Official Solicitor 
may act as litigation friend as last resort.  
Some respondents to the House of Lords Committee on the MCA raised concerns about the 
capacity of the Official Solicitor to take on this work.271 These concerns were realized in the cases of 
MOD and others and NRA, where the Official Solicitor wrote to the Court stating that he did not 
have the resources to act as a litigation friend in cases involving authorization of deprivation of 
liberty. The House of Lords Select Committee on the MCA recommended that the government 
should review the resources made available to the Official Solicitor.272  
IMCAs may also act as litigation friends, and guidance has been produced to assist them in doing 
so.273 However, IMCAs are not contractually obliged to act as litigation friends, they may not be 
trained or insured to act in this capacity, and they would need to secure additional resources from 
their commissioning bodies to fund this service – who are likely to be the other parties to the 
dispute. Additionally, whereas the Official Solicitor acts in name as litigation friend, in practice this 
function is fulfilled by experienced case workers under his supervision. Where an IMCA or RPR 
fulfills the role of litigation friend, it is unclear whether it is a ‘corporate appointment’ – which can 
be fulfilled by colleagues in the event of their unavailability – or whether only they as an individual 
can fulfill this role. 
Rule 3A now makes provision for Accredited Legal Representatives (ALRs), ‘a legal representative 
authorised pursuant to a scheme of accreditation approved by the President to represent persons 
meeting the definition of “P” in this rule in proceedings before the court’, who may represent P 
without taking instruction from a litigation friend. The Law Society has been developing a scheme 
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to support practitioners in this special area of practice and intends to have this up and running in 
this first half of 2017. This follows the recent endorsement of the scheme provided by the President 
of the CoP, Sir James Munby, in January 17. 
Under the streamlined procedure for uncontested deprivation of liberty applications, the trend 
following NRA and others and Re JM is to rely instead on lay Rule 3A Representatives where a 
person has no legal aid to instruct a lawyer. However, as the CoP heard in Re JM & Ors, even the 
availability of lay Rule 3A Representatives may be in question in some cases. We return to the 
question of representation under Section 3.5 below, but here note that the inability to fund 
litigation may result in a person being unable to secure the representation of a lawyer, a litigation 
friend or another kind of representative. In circumstances where there is no candidate available 
and willing to act as a litigation friend or Rule 3A representative, even where a person may bring an 
application it is likely to be stayed until a resolution to this impasse is found. 
Forms and guidance 
A further difficulty in accessing the CoP may arise from the design of the CoP forms themselves.274 
The CoP serves the important function of providing a mechanism whereby a person who is deprived 
of legal capacity (formally or informally) or deprived of their liberty may ask a judge to review this 
status, or challenge best interests decisions where the person is in conflict with decision makers. As 
noted in Section 2.3 above, this is an essential function of the CoP under the ECHR. Yet the forms 
and guidance available to applicants do not reflect this purpose; they appear to be oriented 
towards third parties – families or professionals - seeking declarations of incapacity and orders in 
relation to P. For example: 
- Form COP1B is required to start personal welfare proceedings in the CoP (other than s21A 
appeals under the DoLS, or uncontested deprivation of liberty authorisations using the Re X 
‘streamlined’ procedure outlined in Section 1.4 above). Although the parallel COP1 form 
contains the option for the person (P) to make the application (section 2.2), the COP1B form 
is phrased throughout as if the applicant is a person other than P. For example, asking ‘Do 
you personally visit the person to whom the application relates’ (2.7). 
- The guidance notes for all applications (appended to the COP1 form) state that a COP3 
Assessment of capacity form must be completed. There is no guidance suggesting that an 
application may be made without a COP3 form in the event that a declaration that P has 
capacity is sought. Although at law there is a presumption of mental capacity on the part of 
P,275 and therefore it falls to those asserting incapacity to submit evidence to the CoP, if P 
(or a third party on his behalf) did wish to assert and submit evidence that he had mental 
capacity this form would be inappropriate. There is no guidance on the COP1, COP1B or 
COP3 form as to how an application asserting that P has mental capacity should be made. It 
may be obvious to those familiar with the CoP’s workings that a witness statement detailing 
evidence of P’s mental capacity may be appended to this effect, but it cannot be presumed 
that all applications will be made with the assistance of experienced legal practitioners.  
- Turning to the COP3 form itself, it is structured on the assumption that those completing it 
will find that P lacks mental capacity, rather than asking an open question regarding P’s 
mental capacity as a letter of instruction to an expert witness might. Part 7.1 presumes that 
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P will have an impairment of or disturbance in the functioning of the mind or the brain276, 
and that ‘As a result, the person is unable to make a decision for themselves in relation to 
the following matter(s) in question’. Part 7.2 elaborates why P is unable to make the 
relevant decision, and Part 7.3 seeks clarification of what evidence of incapacity this is 
based on. Additionally, the more ‘empowering’ features of the MCA 2005 are not reflected 
in this form. There is, for example, no requirement to describe what support has been 
provided to assist with decision making277, or to indicate what support might assist P in 
making the decision in the future.  
The COP application forms are thus inappropriate for seeking a declaration that P has capacity, they 
are structured in a way that could be regarded as leading to a foregone outcome for those 
providing evidence on capacity, and contain few of the provisions of the MCA 2005 that relate to 
supporting capacity. 
The CoP’s application processes are also complex and difficult to negotiate for those without the 
relevant experience. The forms for a typical personal welfare application278 number at least 24 
pages in length279. If permission to proceed with an application is granted or not required, the 
applicant would also need to share copies of these forms with any respondents or persons whom 
the CoP directs must be notified. This is an onerous bureaucratic undertaking, especially for those 
making an application in person without legal or administrative assistance. Given the difficulties 
securing legal advice and representation discussed above, there may be circumstances in which P 
needs to make the application, perhaps on their own or without specialist assistance. In these 
circumstances, navigating the forms and guidance would pose a significant barrier to accessing the 
CoP.  
It may appear surprising to those familiar with the CoP’s processes to suggest that P might make 
the application without the advice and assistance of a lawyer, yet we note that this is the working 
assumption in the case of the Mental Health Tribunals discussed in Section 4 of this report. By way 
of contrast, the Tribunal forms are simple, short (3 pages), and designed to be completed by 
patients themselves with minimal assistance. The bureaucratic work of notifying the other parties 
and seeking reports is performed by the Tribunal and detaining authorities and not the patient.280 
We have appended a copy of the Tribunal forms for comparison with the CoP forms in Appendix B. 
We return to consider the accessibility of the CoP’s forms and guidance for disabled litigants in 
Section 3.9 below. 
Positive obligations to refer health and welfare disputes to the CoP 
Where disputes arise in relation to health and welfare matters there are many reasons – including 
those rehearsed above - why P or P’s family may be ill-placed to make an application to the CoP. 
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This section considers when public authorities must themselves take the initiative and seek judicial 
sanction for an intervention under the MCA or refer a dispute about capacity or best interests to 
the CoP. The following section then considers similar duties arising in connection with supporting 
individuals to exercise rights of appeal under the MCA DoLS. 
Under the MCA 2005 there is, as Ruck Keene points out, ‘no obvious requirement of law (whether 
by way of a directly imposed duty or sanction for a failure) to seek judicial sanction in respect of any 
act of care or treatment’.281 This is a legacy of the approach adopted by the House of Lords in Re F 
(Adult Mental patient sterilisation)282, the case that established the doctrine of medical necessity, 
subsequently placed in statutory form by s5 of the MCA 2005.283 Re F also established that the High 
Court could grant a declaration that a treatment is lawful, notwithstanding that P lacks capacity to 
consent to it (analogous to a CoP declaration under s15 of the MCA 2005).  Yet such a declaration 
did not ‘make lawful that which would otherwise be unlawful’284.  The lawfulness of the proposed 
intervention turned on necessity – whether the actions were in the best interests of a person who 
lacked the capacity to consent to them - and not the ‘approval or sanction of a court’285.  The role of 
the court was to offer a ‘third opinion’286 on questions of capacity and best interests, clarifying for 
concerned practitioners whether the requirements of the doctrine of necessity were satisfied.   
Yet Re F was a controversial case, involving the non-consensual contraceptive sterilisation of a 
woman with a learning disability. Although the involvement of the court was ‘not strictly necessary 
as a matter of law’ Lord Brandon felt that ‘it is nevertheless highly desirable as a matter of good 
practice’, considering that the risks of wrongly deciding best interests, or of improper reasons or 
motives, might be greater without the involvement of a court.  A court decision ‘should serve to 
protect the doctor or doctors who perform the operation, and any others who may be concerned in 
it, from subsequent adverse criticisms or claims.’287  Whilst the majority took the view that 
although there was no strict legal obligation to come to court it would be good practice to do so, 
Lord Griffith strongly urged the development of a common law rule requiring a declaration from 
the court in such cases as this: 
I cannot agree that it is satisfactory to leave this grave decision with all its social 
implications in the hands of those having the care of the patient with only the 
expectation that they will have the wisdom to obtain a declaration of lawfulness 
before the operation is performed. In my view the law ought to be that they must 
obtain the approval of the court before they sterilise a woman incapable of giving 
consent and that it is unlawful to sterilise without that consent. I believe that it is 
open to your Lordships to develop a common law rule to this effect.  288  
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Lord Goff particularly emphasised the importance of independent representation of the person, so 
that they could participate in the process of decision making, and their point of view could be put 
forward. 
Under the new jurisdiction established in Re F the approach adopted was for a combination of case 
law, practice notes and Practice Directions289 setting out which cases should come to court.  Yet the 
courts continued to refer to the duty to apply to court as ‘matter of practice’290, or as being ‘in the 
public interest’ or that of their patient291, rather than being strictly necessary as a matter of law.  
The incentive to involve the court was not that failure to apply to court was itself clearly unlawful, 
rather it was an impulse to clothe potentially controversial non-consensual acts or omissions with 
legal authority, offering protection against possible claims or criticisms. 
The Law Commission sought to rationalise the position in relation to medical treatment in its 
Report Mental Incapacity (1995)292, which a decade later would form the basis of the MCA 2005. 
The Commission recommended codifying the defence of necessity, which it termed the ‘general 
authority’ to care for a person who lacked capacity.  But it also stipulated that for certain serious 
medical interventions there should always be an independent check on whether the procedure 
would be in the best interests of the person concerned.293 Certain procedures listed in their 
proposed statute, such as sterilization, would require authorisation by the court or the consent of 
an attorney or court appointed deputy.294 A second group of treatments, which could be specified 
by ministerial order, would require a second medical opinion, reflecting the approach taken to 
treatment without consent under the Mental Health Act 1983, discussed in Section 4.  The Law 
Commission also proposed a set of powers to address what would now be called ‘safeguarding’ 
matters, such as powers to decide where a person should live and restrictions on contact with their 
parties.295  However, this approach was not adopted by the government.296   
Under the MCA the general authority, now rebadged the ‘general defence’ and found in ss5 and 6 
MCA, was not subject to any statutory restriction except in relation to deprivation of liberty.297 
Instead the Government took the view that the courts should take the lead in deciding which cases 
should come to court.  
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Case law has set out ... categories of case that should have prior sanction of the 
court... the Government intends the situation to continue under the Bill. The current 
law has developed by guidance in case law responding to difficult cases. We want 
the courts to continue to decide which cases should have their prior sanction... for 
that reason we consider it would be most effective to use the Codes of Practice to 
specify the situations where decisions should be taken only by a court.298  
The MCA Code of Practice listed the cases that the Practice Directions had stated should always 
come to court.299  This meant that there was a wide discretionary de facto power in the form of the 
general defence, then there were the cases which the Practice Directions and the Code of Practice 
(but not the appellate courts) said required the intervention of CoP, but in between, aside from 
IMCAs there was to be no intermediate set of safeguards. The second opinion proposal of the Law 
Commission was never implemented.  
The Law Commission also appeared to envisage that judicial sanction would be required for major 
treatment or serious welfare decisions that the person objected to, outside of an emergency.300  
This approach is not reflected in the MCA; there is no statutory provision that P’s objection to an 
intervention which was being imposed would trigger a requirement of court authorisation. The Law 
Commission had entitled their statutory limitation on the general authority ‘no powers of coercion’, 
which emphasised that, outside of an emergency, force or the threat of force could not be used ‘to 
enforce the doing of anything to which the person concerned objected’.301 Yet the equivalent 
provision in s6 MCA is simply entitled ‘Section 5 acts: limitations’ and in its presentation starts from 
the presumption that force can be used, subject to certain restrictions.   
Meanwhile the MCA Code flatly contradicts the Law Commission’s comments on coercion.  It 
advises that ‘cases where there is a dispute about whether a particular treatment will be in a 
person’s best interests’, including ‘cases where there is conflict between professionals or between 
professionals and family members which cannot be resolved in any other way’, should be brought 
to court.302  But the Code did not state that where P objected to a medical treatment the case 
should be brought to court.  The Code also states that the general defence in s5 MCA may offer 
protection against liability for acts that the person themselves objects to, including a move out of 
their home; implying that court authorisation would not be necessary for such steps to be taken, 
even if the use of force were required to transport the person (provided the s6 MCA provisions 
were followed).303  The Code states that an application ‘can’ be made to the CoP in cases of ‘serious 
disagreement’, for example ‘if members of a family disagree over what is best for a relative who 
lacks capacity to give or deny permission for a move.’304   
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Thus outside of situations of deprivation of liberty, the MCA Code appears to envisage only very 
limited use of the CoP to address disputes about capacity and best interests, with the emphasis 
being on disputes among professionals and relatives rather than objections by the person 
themselves.  The Code does emphasise, however, that that for medical treatment cases 
applications should be made by the organisation responsible for P’s healthcare, and local 
authorities should make the application where ‘social care staff are concerned about a decision 
that affects the welfare of a person who lacks capacity’305, rather than P or families being the 
applicant. 
The idea that the MCA could not be used to impose serious non-emergency decisions on a person 
without court authority was not taken up by the Government in the Mental Capacity Bill. This 
approach of leaving it to the judges to decide has enabled the courts steadily to reassert such an 
approach through its case law, with a strong reliance on Article 8 ECHR.   In doing so, they have 
been assisted by the passage of the Human Rights Act 1998. 
In D v an NHS Trust (Medical Treatment: Consent: Termination)306, a case concerning the lawfulness 
of terminating the pregnancy of a woman without her capable consent, Coleridge J was asked to 
consider whether it was necessary as a matter of law to apply to court for a declaration in such 
circumstances, given the advent of the Human Rights Act 1998.  Coleridge J considered the case of 
Glass v UK.307  Glass concerned the administration of medical treatment to a child without the 
consent of the child or the mother, in circumstances that were not an emergency, and where the 
hospital had not sought a court order consenting to the treatment on the child’s behalf.  The ECtHR 
held that the decision to override the mother’s objections to treatment of her son in the absence of 
court authorisation was a violation of Article 8 ECHR.308  Applying this reasoning to adults, Coleridge 
J held that Article 8 ECHR ‘has enhanced the responsibility of the court to protect positively the 
welfare of these patients’, 309  and that where issues of capacity and best interests are ‘clear and 
beyond doubt’, an application to the court was not necessary.310 However, in other circumstances 
authority from the court would be required ‘to avoid any doubt as to the legitimacy of the Article 8 
interference’.311  In cases of termination of a pregnancy, this included, inter alia, cases where there 
was doubt or dispute as to capacity or best interests among professionals, the woman’s family or 
the woman herself.312  Coleridge J’s guidance was endorsed by the President of the Family Division 
at that time.313 
D v an NHS Trust was a pre-MCA decision of the High Court.  Coleridge J’s reasoning that Article 8 
had converted what was merely ‘good practice’ into a legal duty in certain circumstances to seek 
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court authority for treatment in the best interests of a person who lacked capacity was considered 
by the Court of Appeal in R (Burke) v General Medical Council & Ors.314 Mr Burke had sought judicial 
review of guidance by the General Medical Council concerning when artificial nutrition and 
hydration treatment could lawfully be withdrawn from an incompetent patient.  At first instance, 
Munby J (as he then was) had relied upon Coleridge J’s judgment in D v An NHS Trust to conclude 
that court authorization was required for treatment decisions where there was doubt or dispute 
about the person’s mental capacity or best interests. 315  However, the Court of Appeal in Burke 
rejected Coleridge J and Munby J’s interpretation of the requirements of Article 8.  Lord Philips 
distinguished Glass on the basis that in the case of a child, outside of an emergency, consent to 
treatment can only be given by the child (if he or she is competent), the parent or the court.  In 
Glass the situation was not an emergency and the medical professionals had not obtained consent 
from any of those three sources.  Thus, under domestic law the treatment was unlawful and it was 
because it was unlawful that it was not ‘in accordance with the law’, not because of the failure to 
refer a dispute to court, that an Article 8 violation was found.316  The situation for adults who 
lacked capacity was different, according to the Court of Appeal, because the purpose of a court 
declaration was not to ‘authorise’ the treatment, but simply to ‘declare’ whether the treatment 
was lawful or not.317  Lord Philips thus reverted to the earlier position adopted by the House of 
Lords in Re F and Bland: ‘Good practice may require medical practitioners to seek such a 
declaration where the legality of proposed treatment is in doubt. This is not, however, something 
that they are required to do as a matter of law.’318 
Although this question has not been revisited by either the Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court, 
it appears that the approach adopted by Coleridge J and Munby P has been followed in the CoP.  
The current Practice Direction 9E on Serious Medical Treatment of the CoP states that serious 
medical treatments such as non-therapeutic sterilization and the withdrawal of artificial nutrition 
and hydration from a person in a permanent vegetative state ‘should’ be brought to court, rather 
than describing this as mere ‘good practice’.319  The Practice Direction has led the CoP to declare, of 
sterilization, that ‘Such a treatment decision is so serious that the Court has to make it’.320  Yet Ruck 
Keene writes that it plainly is not a duty as a matter of law, and hopes that the practice direction 
will be revised to make this clear.321  However, in relation to welfare interventions, as opposed to 
medical treatments, the ‘duty’ to apply to court under Article 8 has been strongly affirmed in the 
CoP in numerous cases.  The principle was first stated in obiter remarks by Munby P himself in A 
Local Authority v A (A Child) & Anor322, commenting that ‘if a local authority seeks to control an 
incapacitated or vulnerable adult it must enlist the assistance of either the Court of Protection or 
                                                     
314 [2005] EWCA Civ 1003; [2006] QB 273 
315 R {Burke) v The General Medical Council Rev 1 [2004] EWHC 1879 (Admin), paras 200 and 202 
316 R {Burke) v The General Medical Council [2005] EWCA Civ 1003, paras 75 – 80. 
317 Ibid, para 80 
318 Ibid, para 80 
319 Court of Protection, Practice Direction 9E - Applications relating to serious medical treatment (Judiciary of England 
and Wales 2015). Para 5. 
320 A Local Authority v K [2013] EWHC 242 (COP), para 36 
321 Alex Ruck Keene, 'Powers, defences and the ‘need’ for judicial sanction', n 185, p249 
322 [2010] EWHC 978 (Fam) 
 70 
 
the High Court… Otherwise it may find itself being sued in tort’.323  Oddly, he did not discuss why 
professionals could not rely upon s5 and s6 MCA and the Codes of Practice in these circumstances.   
The landmark case of London Borough of Hillingdon v Neary & Anor324 offered an opportunity to 
review this principle in a welfare case.   A local authority had unlawfully detained a man with 
autism in a care home and refused to let him return home to his father, despite Steven Neary (the 
detained person) and his father showing clear opposition to this detention. The case had received 
considerable publicity from the perspective of a father battling with the local authority for almost a 
year to get his son home.  The judgment highlighted numerous difficulties Steven Neary’s father 
had encountered in challenging the local authority and like HL v UK, it was a compelling example of 
the potential for abuse of the ‘powers’ conferred by the MCA. Citing Munby J’s obiter remarks in A 
Local Authority v A (A Child) & Anor, Mr Justice Peter Jackson held that even where local authorities 
had authorised detention under the DoLS, public authorities had a wider duty under Article 8 ECHR 
to place disputes about serious welfare issues that cannot be resolved by discussion before the 
CoP.325 This duty has been reiterated in a number of subsequent cases, where the CoP found 
violations of both Articles 8 and 5 ECHR where councils failed to ensure that disputes about 
residence and contact were placed before the CoP.326 These cases do not cite any particular 
Strasbourg authorities for this principle; they appear to enshrine in law a new duty which was not 
recognised under the declaratory jurisdiction or by those drafting the MCA or the Code of Practice. 
Despite the lack of promising domestic precedents from the appellate courts, the CoP has also been 
developing a body of case law expounding (or clarifying) duties to seek prior authorisation from the 
CoP for medical treatments that are the subject of a dispute, and particularly in cases where P 
objects to the treatment. These cases have mainly concerned procedures relating to pregnancy and 
childbirth. In NHS Trust & Ors v FG (Rev 1)327 Keehan J described four categories of case where a 
healthcare provider should make an application to the CoP regarding obstetric care:  
1. cases where the proposed intervention amounts to serious medical treatment as defined in 
Practice Direction 9E;  
2. cases where there is a real risk that P will be subject to more than transient forcible 
restraint;  
3. cases where there is a dispute between professionals, or with P or others concerned with 
their welfare, as to what obstetric care is in P’s best interests; and 
4. cases where there is a real risk that P will be deprived of their liberty and this cannot be 
authorised under the DoLS328.  
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He emphasised the importance of bringing the application in good time to enable P’s participation 
to be fully enabled.  This was recently reiterated by Baker J in Re CA (Natural Delivery or Caesarean 
Section).329 
There is also a growing trend for medical practitioners to seek court authority in cases where they 
consider it unethical to give treatment which might lawfully be given to a detained patient without 
consent under s 63 of the Mental Health Act 1983330, to seek a declaration from the CoP that it is 
lawful to withhold life sustaining treatment from patients who are refusing that treatment.331 In 
this latter category the CoP has advised that it may be prudent to seek CoP authorisation, but again 
the legal basis for this is unclear. The general defence in ss 5 and 6 the MCA 2005 is a defence for 
acts and not omissions, but a declaration of the CoP also encompasses omissions to act.332 This may 
be important for practitioners where such omissions engage common law duties and the positive 
obligation to preserve life under Article 2 ECHR.333 Ethical concerns, or the desire to seek legal 
protection lest the patient should die from an omission to treat or bring an action in battery for 
forced treatment, may be prompting such applications.  
These CoP authorities do not distinguish their approach from the House of Lords and the Court of 
Appeal in Re F, Bland and Burke.  Although the Court of Appeal’s reading of Glass in Burke suggests 
that Article 8 may not require court authorisation for treatments to which an adult or their family 
objects, there are other Strasbourg authorities on Article 8 that offer support to the CoP’s 
approach. A growing body of ECtHR case law has found that in certain circumstances Article 8 
requires procedural safeguards to ensure that interferences with rights to home, family and private 
life are ‘fair and such as to afford due respect to the interests safeguarded to the individual by 
Article 8‘.334  In Funke v France335 the ECtHR has held that even if interferences with Article 8 rights 
are in pursuit of a legitimate aim, and despite the margin of appreciation afforded to states, the 
‘the relevant legislation and practice must afford adequate and effective safeguards against 
abuse’.336  In that case, which concerned the use of search warrants without judicial authorisation, 
the Strasbourg court held that ‘in the absence of any requirement of a judicial warrant the 
restrictions and conditions provided for in law… appear too lax and full of loopholes for the 
interferences with the applicant’s rights to have been strictly proportionate to the legitimate aim 
pursued.’337   
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In X v Finland338 the ECtHR held that ‘forced administration of medication represents a serious 
interference with a person’s physical integrity and must accordingly be based on a “law” that 
guarantees proper safeguards against arbitrariness’.339  Noting that ‘The decision-making was solely 
in the hands of the treating doctors who could take even quite radical measures regardless of the 
applicant’s will’ and the applicant ‘did not have any remedy available whereby she could require a 
court to rule on the lawfulness, including proportionality, of the forced administration of 
medication and to have it discontinued’340, it found a violation of the Article 8(2) requirement that 
interferences are in accordance with the law.  It is important to be clear that X v Finland concerned 
‘access’ to a remedy, rather than a requirement for judicial sanction to be sought by professionals 
prior to administering involuntary treatment.  Technically of course such a remedy exists under the 
MCA in the form of the CoP.  In practice, however, it is questionable whether this remedy is 
realistically available to P in most circumstances.  Domestically, in the context of immigration 
appeals, the Court of Appeal has held that Article 8 requires that ‘procedures for asserting or 
defending rights must be effectively accessible’.341  
It is relevant to the principles established in Funke v France that the ‘powers’ contained in s5 and s6 
MCA are very broad; deliberately so for they were crafted to be used for a very wide range of 
situations appertaining to the care and treatment of adults with mental disabilities.  Some 
interventions under the MCA – such as serious medical treatment against a person’s will or 
significant restrictions on contact with a loved one – are just as serious an interference with Article 
8 rights as a search of one’s property.  The question arises, therefore, whether the general defence 
of s5 and 6 MCA – including its requirements to consult with P and those close to P regarding their 
best interests342 - offers a ‘fair’ decision making process to safeguard Article 8 rights, and sufficient 
guarantees against arbitrariness to protect against abuse.  Would the use of the DoLS or an IMCA 
offer more satisfactory protection of Article 8 rights?   
The answer to the question is likely to be highly specific to the nature of the interference and the 
situation of the person.  However, in J Council v GU & Ors (Rev 1)343 Mostyn J indicated that 
certainly some kinds of restrictions – including strip searches and monitoring of correspondence – 
were so invasive that even the safeguards of the DoLS and CoP authorisation were not sufficient to 
satisfy the requirement of Article 8 that such interferences are ‘in accordance with the law.  Mostyn 
J drew attention to the absence of ‘equivalent detailed procedures and safeguards’ under the MCA 
as compared with the MHA 1983.344  In its consultation on a replacement framework for the DoLS, 
the Law Commission also drew attention to the absence of ‘specific procedures or safeguards 
governing the provision of care or treatment which might interfere with article 8 rights’ such as 
restrictions on contact with family and friends and removal from a person’s home.345  They 
proposed a network of procedural safeguards to offer some protection of these Article 8 rights, 
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which received strong support at consultation346, but this was not a requirement for court 
authorisation.  
At present, the received wisdom from the CoP is that serious conflicts concerning welfare matters 
must be placed before the CoP. It is unclear whether this simply involves disputes about where a 
person lives or also extends to restrictions on contact with loved ones or other possible ‘welfare’ 
interventions.  It would certainly be an oddity if contact could be restricted by those relying upon 
the general defence, when the statute prohibits such steps being taken by a court appointed 
deputy.347  There is a clear statement from the CoP that certain obstetric interventions must seek 
prior judicial authorisation, but the position on other treatments is less clear.   
Nevertheless, health and social care practitioners taking decisions under the MCA hear a consistent 
refrain from the court and its practitioners that if they undertake serious interferences with rights 
to home, family and private life against the objections of P or P’s family without court 
authorisation, they are on thin ice.  Prompting health and social care professionals to bring a 
greater number of disputes to court may ensure better protection of P’s Article 8 rights, in part 
because under the MCA there are few alternative means of ensuring a fair decision making process 
and offering guarantees against arbitrariness.   
By placing the onus on professionals to bring an application, instead of relying on the theoretical 
availability of the CoP as a remedy for P, some of the difficulties accessing a court experienced by P 
may be overcome. However, this approach also expands the range of situations where P’s personal 
affairs are subject not only to the scrutiny of the CoP, but also to the public at large, as a greater 
number of court hearings are publicly reported (albeit usually anonymously).  It increases the 
importance of questions about how P may participate in proceedings. As more and more cases 
come to the attention of the CoP, finding Charles J’s elusive ‘Procedural Balance’ between 
participation and dealing with large numbers of cases expeditiously and fairly becomes ever more 
challenging. 
The limits of clinical authority under the general defence and requirements to seek judicial 
authorisation from the CoP are thus unclear and contested.  The law in this respect is hardly, as the 
ECHR requires, ‘formulated with sufficient precision to enable the citizen to regulate his conduct’ in 
accordance with the rule of law.348  In 2014 the House of Lords Committee on the MCA 2005 raised 
concerns that ‘the responsibility of public authorities to initiate proceedings in cases of dispute is 
not widely known or adhered to’, and recommended that the government provide clearer guidance 
for public authorities ‘regarding which disputes under the Act must be proactively referred to the 
Court’.349 Following this recommendation, the government made a commitment to provide 
guidance to public authorities on when disputes should be referred to the CoP as part of the second 
tranche of reviews of the COPR and practice directions.350 However, to date no such comprehensive 
guidance has been published by a government body or the CoP.  
                                                     
346 Law Commission, ‘Mental Capacity and Deprivation of Liberty: Interim Statement’ (2016), para 1.24 
347 MCA s20(2)(a) 
348 The Sunday Times v United Kingdom (App No 6538/74) [1979] ECHR 1, para 49. 
349 Mental Capacity Act 2005: post-legislative scrutiny, n 47, paragraphs 236-7 
350 Department of Health and Ministry of Justice, Update for the House of Lords Committee on the Mental Capacity Act 
(2015). 
 74 
 
Although it is not obvious how the approach of the High Court in cases such as Neary sits alongside 
the approach taken by the Court of Appeal and House of Lords in Re F, Bland and Burke, it is 
understandable why the High Court and the CoP have imposed sanctions on public authorities who 
have failed to bring disputes under the MCA to the CoP.351  These decisions are occurring against a 
backdrop of rising public concern about the power exercised by health and social care professionals 
in relation to disabled people and their families.  Interventions under the MCA by healthcare 
providers and local authorities in dispute with families of older and disabled people regularly 
feature in the news.  Meanwhile some families of adults with learning disabilities and autism, 
including the family of Steven Neary, have campaigned for legislation requiring CoP oversight of all 
residential placement decisions under the MCA.352   
To health and social care practitioners and to people subject to decisions made under the MCA 
there is no clear systematic guidance as to where someone aggrieved by the imposition of an 
intervention on P without consent has a legitimate expectation that the court will need to 
'authorise' the intervention. Many of these cases are controversial, involving interventions such 
as such as restrictions on contact with loved ones or forced treatment, and raise significant human 
rights issues. The system at present means that cases come to court largely where the authorities 
or the professionals feel the need to seek reassurance that what they are proposing is lawful. From 
the point of P's rights, this lack of clarity as to when the court will be involved is a barrier to access 
to justice. 
Whilst technical legal arguments may continue to rage about whether the court is required to 
authorise treatment or declaring it to be lawful, the reality is that it is only called upon to do so in 
certain cases. The policy route which has been chosen to govern access to court was to 
allow guidance to develop through the common law, Practice Directions and the MCA Code of 
Practice, resulting in a lack of clarity. Clearly there is a fear that the imposition of a duty to refer 
would risk generating a case load that the court could not possibly manage. In Burke the Court of 
Appeal was anxious to avoid overburdening practitioners and overwhelming the court. The Court 
was deeply impressed by the estimate put forward in evidence by the Intensive Care Society that 
there would be 10 cases a day coming to court if Munby J's guidance at first instance on reference 
to court was to be followed.353 
We agree with the House of Lords Committee on the MCA that clear and systematic guidance on 
the circumstances where a court application is necessary must be provided. We believe that this 
should be done following a policy consultation that ensures a transparent consideration of these 
issues, giving disabled people and their families the opportunity to contribute their views.  Such a 
consultation would offer an opportunity to explore the potential volume of litigation should a more 
restricted approach to the general defence be taken.  A consultation could also consider whether 
the CoP is the most appropriate procedural safeguard in these cases or whether other alternatives 
might be developed.  Restrictions on the general defence, the development of a second opinion 
system, or other alternative procedural safeguards would require amendment to the MCA. In the 
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interests of achieving clarity for professionals and service users alike, the consultation could form 
the basis for  updated guidance in the MCA Code of Practice, which is more likely to reach front line 
professionals, carers, and service users. 
Access to the Court of Protection under the deprivation of liberty safeguards  
As outlined in Sections 2 and 3.1 above, Article 5(4) guarantees to everyone who is detained a right 
to bring proceedings before a court to determine the lawfulness of one’s detention. A body of case 
law developed by the ECtHR has stated that ‘special procedural safeguards’ may be necessary to 
assist with the exercise of this right. The DoLS provide a complex system of safeguards that are 
intended to ensure that even those who are incapable of exercising their Article 5(4) rights 
independently are able to enjoy access to this fundamental safeguard against arbitrary detention. 
In practice, however, there are signs that this system does not function as it should, and many – if 
not most – of those who are detained under the DoLS are unable to protect their interests under 
this right. 
When a person is subject to an authorisation issued under the DoLS in Schedule A1 and wishes to 
challenge this in the CoP, a number of safeguards may, at least in theory, overcome some of the 
practical difficulties outlined above in making an application to the CoP. The DoLS require P to be 
provided with information about their right to challenge the authorisation in the CoP, in line with 
Article 5(2) ECHR.354 The supervisory body must appoint a relevant person’s representative (RPR) to 
support and represent P in matters connected with the DoLS.355 If the RPR is unpaid (typically a 
family member or a friend) and they or P request it, or if it appears to the supervisory body that the 
RPR and relevant person would have difficulty exercising rights to seek a court review without 
assistance, the supervisory body must also make a referral to an IMCA, known as a s 39D IMCA, to 
assist them.356 The s39D IMCA must assist the RPR or P to exercise the right to apply to court, if it 
appears to the advocate that either of them wishes to do so.357 P and the RPR are entitled to non-
means tested legal aid to seek a court review of the lawfulness of their detention.358 The safeguards 
of RPR and s39D IMCA are designed to satisfy the ECHR requirement for special procedural 
safeguards to support a person in exercising their Article 5(4) rights of court review, whilst the legal 
aid provisions help to overcome some of the funding difficulties that can affect other kinds of CoP 
litigation. 
In our research, we found that the overall number of DoLS cases in the CoP appears to be very low, 
with marked regional disparities, suggesting that many people are not able to exercise rights of 
appeal.359 One reason may be that those charged with supporting the person (the RPR, the IMCA, 
and the supervisory body) may be confused as to where ultimate responsibility lies for assisting P to 
exercise rights of appeal. It may also be the case that RPRs, advocates and supervisory bodies 
believe that the person should only be supported in exercising rights of appeal if it is in the person’s 
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best interests to do so. The recent cases of AJ v A Local Authority360 and RD and Others361 have 
clarified their respective duties to assist P in exercising their Article 5(4) rights of access to a court. 
In AJ v A Local Authority362, Baker J clarified where responsibility lay in appropriate cases for 
ensuring that appeals against authorisations granted under the DoLS are heard by the CoP. Citing 
the Strasbourg case law outlined above, Baker J confirmed that: ‘There is no place in Article 5(4) for 
a best interests decision about the exercise of that right since that would potentially prevent the 
involvement of the court.’363 In other words the person responsible for launching an appeal against 
detention on P’s behalf must not decline to bring a case because they do not consider it to be in the 
person’s best interests to challenge the detention.  
Baker J held that a key function of the RPR is to challenge any authorisation under the DoLS, 364 and 
that supervisory bodies should not appoint an individual as RPR if it appeared to them that they 
would not comply with this obligation because, for example, they supported continuing 
detention365. The judge went on to say that IMCAs appointed to support the RPR and P under the 
DoLS should ‘act with diligence and urgency to ensure that any challenge to an authorisation under 
Schedule A1 is brought before the court expeditiously’.366  
On Baker J’s analysis, the supervisory body should bring the matter before the court itself only as a 
last resort, where the RPR and IMCA have failed to take steps to challenge the authorisation. Thus 
in the context of the DoLS, the ruling in AJ appears to shift the onus away from the public authority 
having direct responsibility for referring disputes to the CoP – in contrast to what appeared to be 
the ratio in Neary. Instead, AJ clarified that supervisory bodies’ primary responsibilities under 
Article 5(4) lay in ensuring that the relevant safeguards are in place to enable others – the RPR and 
the IMCA - to support P in challenging a DoLS authorisation. The ratio in Neary that public 
authorities should make the application to court in cases of dispute remains intact in Article 8 
matters outside of the DoLS, however. 
It was clear that AJ strongly and consistently objected to her detention in the care home. However, 
for many people who are deprived of their liberty under the DoLS their wishes and feelings 
regarding the detention and challenging it in court may be unclear or may fluctuate. In such 
circumstances, there was a lack of clarity among professionals as to what counts as an objection 
sufficient to trigger the duties outlined in AJ.  
In RD and Others five test cases were identified to clarify this duty.  Each case involved an individual 
whose behavior– in the past or present – could be interpreted as an objection to their care 
arrangements, but where it was unclear whether or not they wished to challenge their detention in 
court. Each applicant was an older person with dementia. In some of the test cases the individual’s 
expressed wishes about the care arrangements fluctuated or were unclear; in some the individuals 
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expressed a desire not to go to court or a refusal to submit to the court’s ‘governance’ despite an 
expressed objection to their detention. 
Applications were made to the COP and Baker J was asked to determine whether the s.21A 
applications had been properly brought and, in doing so, to set out some guidance to RPRs and 
IMCAs to apply in the future. 
Before Baker J the parties advanced three different constructions of ‘objections’ sufficient to trigger 
the duty upon RPRs and IMCAs to assist P with an application to the CoP. The public authorities, 
stressing the significant cost of s21A proceedings367, advanced a minimal construction of objections 
based on the ‘informed wish’ of P to bring an appeal. They argued that the s39D duty upon IMCAs 
to assist P in bringing an appeal implied that P understood the matters referred to in s39D(7) MCA: 
the effects, purpose, duration and conditions of the DoLS authorisation, why assessors felt they 
met the qualifying requirements, and their appeal rights. This would set a high bar for 
understanding a complex set of safeguards, which is unlikely to be achieved by many of those 
subject to the DoLS. In tension with this position, the public authorities also agreed that there 
might be ‘indirect evidence’ of this wish through P’s behaviour, but cautioned that this must not 
merely be behaviour indicative of an objection to the care (which, they argued, could be attributed 
to P’s mental disabilities) but should appear to a ‘trained representative’ such as an IMCA to be an 
expression of a wish to go to court. They argued that ‘The appearance of an equivocal or 
ambivalent expression would not meet the threshold for the wish.’368 
The OS initially argued that if there was any direct or indirect evidence of a wish by P to leave the 
care home, and it is not possible for the RPR or IMCA to be satisfied that P does not wish to go to 
court, then there was a duty to apply to court. In a later submission the OS distinguished the roles 
of IMCA and RPR, arguing that the duty of the RPR was wider than that of an IMCA and the decision 
of whether or not to apply to court on P’s behalf should be based on his best interests.  
Counsel for four of the claimants, for whom RPRs and IMCAs acted as litigation friends, rejected the 
public authorities’ position as too narrow, arguing that IMCAs and RPRs should consider not only 
whether P was expressing a wish to go to court, but also whether P would wish to do so if he had 
capacity. They also argued that drawing a distinction between behaviour caused by dementia and 
behaviour which indicates a wish or preference on the individual's part is often neither possible nor 
appropriate.369 They rejected the ‘best interests’ approach advanced by the OS on the basis this 
could result in situations where RPRs decided not to assist P in exercising his Article 5(4) rights 
when he wished to do so, in contradiction of the position adopted in AJ and ECtHR case law. 
Meanwhile the public authorities rejected the OS’s initial submissions that absent the RPR or IMCA 
being satisfied that P does not wish to go to court, any direct or indirect evidence of a wish by P 
that they wish to leave their place of residence should prompt an application. They argued that this 
was tantamount to an automatic judicial review under the DoLS, which the system could not 
sustain. 
Baker J adopted a hybrid of these approaches. He first distinguished between the role of the s39D 
IMCA and RPRs. Both IMCAs and RPRs are under a duty to assist P with an application under s21A 
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MCA where P wishes, or ‘P would wish to make the application in circumstances where he or she is 
unable to communicate that wish’, because the right of appeal is available to all detained under 
DoLS ‘irrespective of whether or not they can communicate their wishes’.370 However, RPRs have 
an additional duty to assess for themselves the matters contained within s21A MCA371, and if they 
conclude that the relevant requirements are not met then ‘the RPR has a right to apply to the 
court’. Baker J concluded that the decision as to whether or not to exercise that right should be 
based on the best interests principle - best interests is, therefore, integral to the decision by the 
RPR whether or not to apply to the court himself under s.21A..372 This did not contradict the 
position in AJ, because ‘the best interests principle does not apply where the RPR is facilitating P's 
wish to apply to the court, but it does apply when the RPR himself is deciding whether or not to 
apply.’373  
The approach to RPRs taken by Baker J is comparable to the approach required of advocates under 
the Care Act 2014, who have a duty to assist a person with any complaint or challenge to a decision 
made under the Act if they wish to do so, but an additional duty to challenge a decision if the 
person is unable to communicate a wish and the advocate believes a decision will be detrimental to 
the individual’s wellbeing.374 
Baker J adopted as guidance eight paragraphs based on proposals by Victoria Butler-Cole, Counsel 
for the four applicants represented by IMCAs and RPRs, and Claire Leonard, who appeared for 
Bristol Clinical Commissioning Group:  
1. The RPR must consider whether P wishes, or would wish, to apply to the Court of 
Protection. This involves the following steps:  
(a) Consider whether P has capacity to ask to issue proceedings. This simply requires P 
to understand that the court has the power to decide that he/she should not be 
subject to his/her current care arrangements. It is a lower threshold than the 
capacity to conduct proceedings.  
(b) If P does not have such capacity, consider whether P is objecting to the 
arrangements for his/her care, either verbally or by behaviour, or both, in a way that 
indicates that he would wish to apply to the Court of Protection if he had the 
capacity to ask. 
2. In considering P's stated preferences, regard should be had to:  
(a) any statements made by P about his/her wishes and feelings in relation to issuing 
proceedings,  
(b) any statements made by P about his/her residence in care,  
(c) P's expressions of his/her emotional state,  
(d) the frequency with which he/she objects to the placement or asks to leave,  
(e) the consistency of his/her express wishes or emotional state; and  
(f) the potential alternative reasons for his/her express wishes for emotional state.  
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3. In considering whether P's behaviour constitutes an objection, regard should be had to: 
(a) the possible reasons for P's behaviour,  
(b) whether P is being medicated for depression or being sedated,   
(c) whether P actively tries to leave the care home,   
(d) whether P takes preparatory steps to leave, e.g. packing bags, 
(e) P's demeanour and relationship with staff,  
(f) any records of challenging behaviour and the triggers for such behaviour.  
(g) whether P's behaviour is a response to particular aspects of the care arrangements 
or to the entirety of those arrangements.  
4. In carrying out this assessment, it should be recognised that there could be reason to think 
that P would wish to make an application even if P says that he/she does not wish to do so 
or, conversely, reason to think that P would not wish to make an application even though 
he/she says that she does wish to, since his/her understanding of the purpose of an 
application may be very poor.  
5. When P does not express a wish to start proceedings, the RPR, in carrying out his duty to 
represent and support P in matters relating to or connected with the Schedule, may apply to 
the Court of Protection to determine any of the four questions identified in s.21A(2) i.e. on 
the grounds that P does not meet one or more of the qualifying requirements for an 
authorisation under Schedule A1; or that the period of the standard authorisation or the 
conditions subject to which the standard authorisation is given are contrary to P's best 
interests; or that the purpose of the standard authorisation could be as effectively achieved 
in a way that is less restrictive of P's rights and freedom of action.   
6. Consideration of P's circumstances must be holistic and usually based on more than one 
meeting with P, together with discussions with care staff familiar with P and his/her family 
and friends. It is likely to be appropriate to visit P on more than one occasion in order to 
form a view about whether proceedings should be started.  
7. By way of an alternative to proceedings, it may be appropriate to instigate a Part 8 review, 
or to seek to work collaboratively with the family and the commissioning authority to see 
whether alternate arrangements can be put in place. Such measures should not, however, 
prevent an application to the court being made where it appears that P would wish to 
exercise a right of appeal.   
8. The role of the IMCA appointed under s.39D is to take such steps as are practicable to help P 
and the RPR understand matters relating to the authorisation set out in s.39D(7)(a) to (e), 
and the rights to apply the Court of Protection and for a Part 8 review, and how to exercise 
those rights. Where it appears to the IMCA that P or the RPR wishes to exercise the right, 
the IMCA must take all practical steps to assist them to do so. In considering P's apparent 
wishes, the IMCA should follow the guidance set out above so far as relevant.375 
Paragraph 7 – that as an alternative to proceedings the RPR should consider exercising the power 
to seek a Part 8 review by the supervisory body376 or working collaboratively with the family - is 
likely to be widely taken up. In this case there are clear analogies with the Mental Health Act 1983 
where a patient can apply to the hospital managers to review the continued need for detention and 
this is a right that exists alongside the right to apply for discharge by a Mental Health Tribunal; a 
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parallel right, but not an alternative. The right of access to the court is protected by Article 5(4) and 
must not be delayed or denied. 
As to the outcome of these cases, in two of them the local authority had conceded that the 
application was rightly brought and the cases had been remitted to the local court for 
consideration. In the other three the RPRs were invited to reconsider the cases in the light of the 
above guidance, and report back to a reconvened hearing which would be held ‘in a few weeks.’377 
In RD’s case, she now appeared settled and on occasion was now expressing fear that she might 
have to leave the home. When she had been asking to leave she was asking to go to the home 
where she had lived with her parents many years previously, and, which was no longer available. 
Baker J said that ‘I have not found clear evidence that RD ever wished to appeal to the court against 
the standard authorisation. Her presentation has followed the familiar pattern in which she 
appeared very unsettled at times in the early stages of her stay at B House, but has now, to a 
certain extent, settled down subsequently.’378 It is noteworthy in this context to observe that AJ, 
who was said to be a clear cut case of objections meriting an application under Article 5(4), herself 
did not wish to go to court.379 Baker J asked RD’s RPR to apply the guidance and come back to court 
with an assessment as to whether it was appropriate to apply on her behalf. Similarly with JB, who 
expressed her desire to leave mainly in the afternoons when she felt she should be picking up her 
children from school. The local authority argued that this was the result of her illness rather than 
indicative of a true wish to leave. Again Baker J said this was a matter for the RPR/IMCA and asked 
them to apply the guidance and return with a view as to whether an application was appropriate.  
One key point arising from RD and Others is that the decision whether P would wish if s/he had 
capacity to apply to the court is a matter for the clinical judgment of the RPR or the IMCA, acting in 
accordance with the guidance.380 Although Baker J’s guidance was designed to ensure that those 
responsible for assisting P in exercising Article 5(4) rights cannot refuse to do so on the 
discretionary basis that it is not in P’s best interests, in accordance with the Strasbourg authorities 
outlined above and in Section 2.3, it does suggest that such decisions may often be finely balanced 
questions of judgment and there may well be disagreements as to whether or not P’s behavior 
does amount to an ‘objection’ for this purpose. The Official Solicitor’s initial submission that an 
application should be made wherever there was any behavior which could be construed as an 
objection, unless there was clear evidence they did not wish to go to court, was presumably 
designed to restrict the scope for judgments of this nature to constrain the exercise of Article 5(4) 
rights. However this approach was not adopted by Baker J. 
To assist RPRs and IMCAs in applying this guidance to make decisions about applications under 
s21A MCA.381 Victoria Butler Cole, who appeared in both AJ and RD, has produced a flowchart, 
which we reproduce with thanks in Figure 1, below. 
In its decision in RD and Others, as in Cheshire West, the CoP has gone further in developing and 
clarifying the Article 5 ECHR rights of adults considered to lack capacity than the Strasbourg 
authorities to date. RD and others both affirms the universal right to be supported in exercising a 
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right of appeal if they wish, or would likely wish, to do so, and imposes a duty upon RPRs and 
IMCAs to safeguard the individual’s best interests in respect of the detention. It remains to be seen 
whether the principles put forward in the guidance have sufficient clarity to be readily applicable.  
It is also important in passing to note the obiter comments of Charles J in Re NRA and others 
regarding the duties of RPRs, as on first reading these appear to be at odds with the approach 
adopted by Baker J in RD. Charles J outlined the role of the RPR when considering the safeguards 
that should be made available to those deprived of their liberty by the Court, outside the 
framework of the DOLS, and therefore without its safeguards such as the RPR. Charles J construed 
the role of the RPR as being to advance P’s best interests, and the best interests test had to be 
applied to the conduct of any challenge brought to the CoP.382 These remarks were obiter, and 
hence Baker J’s view of the role of RPRs as outlined in AJ and RD is the correct approach to take 
when considering whether to make a s21A application on behalf of P. Additionally, it is clear from 
Baker J’s judgment in RD that this ‘best interests’ approach cannot be applied to impede the 
important function of seeking access to the CoP on the basis of P’s wishes and feelings. This tension 
between advancing P’s best interests, or advancing the outcomes preferred by P, has continued to 
haunt CoP (and Tribunal) case law regarding different forms of representation for P, and will be 
returned to in Section 3.5 and Part 4 of the report, below.
                                                     
382 Re NRA & Ors [2015] EWCOP 59, para 170 
 82 
 
 
 
Figure 1 Section 21A MCA decision making flowchart, by Victoria Butler-Cole 
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Access to a court for those detained outside the scope of the DoLS 
As noted above, following Cheshire West many people who live in domestic or quasi-domestic 
settings such as supported living would be considered deprived of their liberty but are not eligible 
for the DoLS, as Schedules A1 and 1A only apply to care homes and hospitals. These individuals do 
not have access to ‘special procedural safeguards’ such as RPRs and IMCAs. In theory, in order to 
comply with the requirements of Article 5 ECHR, those responsible for the detention should apply 
to the CoP to authorize the detention using a welfare order. Where there is no objection to the 
detention by P or others close to P, they may use the ‘streamlined’ procedure outlined in Section 
1.4 above. Where either P or others close to P object, however, more formal proceedings will be 
required and P is likely to be joined as a party. 
Problems arise in protecting the Article 5 rights of this population on two fronts. In the first place, 
as noted above, there is no non-means tested legal aid for this group. Where the detention is non-
contentious the streamlined procedure may suffice, except in situations such as those which 
occurred in Re JM383 where there is nobody available to act in the capacity of litigation friend or 
Rule 3A representative. In such cases, the individuals’ Article 5 rights will not be protected. Where 
the detention is contentious, matters are even worse. For contentious cases, P should be joined as 
a party and be independently represented, but the unavailability of public funding for such 
litigation means P may incur significant costs in opposing or challenging any authorisation. The CoP 
and representatives are thus left with the uneasy decision of whether to protect P’s personal 
resources (which may be necessary to fund an alternative to the placement they object to) or to 
fund the legal procedures required to protect their Article 5 rights. 
For the vast majority of people falling into this category, however, it seems that no application to 
the CoP has been made to authorise their detention in accordance with Article 5. For these 
individuals, their de facto detention is a clear violation of Article 5(1). In the event that these 
individuals, or those close to them, object to the detention, they would encounter the same 
problems in exercising rights to challenge the detention under Article 5(4) as those who wish to 
challenge best interests decisions outside of the DoLS: a lack of awareness of their rights (violations 
of Article 5(2)), lack of ‘special procedural safeguards’ such as RPRs or IMCAs to assist them in 
understanding and exercising these rights, difficulties securing legal representation due to the 
absence of public funding in this area. We are unable to give an indication of how many of the 
(likely) tens of thousands of persons who are de facto detained in these circumstances would wish 
to challenge their detention, but we regard this as a matter of the utmost concern in human rights 
terms. The Law Commission’s proposals, when enacted in law, should better protect the Article 5 
rights of this population, but until that point their rights remain in limbo. 
Recommendations on access to a court 
Recommendation 1: In situations where P objects to a best interests decision that constitutes a 
serious interference with his or her human rights, s/he should be informed of her/his right to 
challenge best interests decisions in the CoP and assisted to access legal advice if they wish to 
do so.  This would operate in a similar way to requirements that already operate under Article 
5(2) for deprivation of liberty to notify a person of their right of appeal against detention. 
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Recommendation 2: The duty upon advocates to assist P in challenging a best interests decision 
to which P objects should be clarified. 
Recommendation 3: There should be a review of the CoP’s application forms and guidance to 
facilitate ease of completion by a person wishing to challenge any deprivation of legal capacity. 
Recommendation 4: The availability of public funding for legal representation in CoP 
proceedings, and for litigation friends where appropriate, should be reviewed in the light of the 
requirements of the ECHR for access to a court to challenge loss of legal capacity and 
deprivation of liberty (including outside of the DoLS). 
Recommendation 5: When the government considers the final proposals of the Law 
Commission regarding amendments to the MCA DoLS it should also undertake a policy review 
of which matters under the MCA require an application to the CoP, or whether alternative 
procedural safeguards might suffice. 
3.2 PARTY STATUS 
When a person is made a party to proceedings, her or his level of participation changes in 
important ways. Under the Court of Protection Rules (COPR) as drafted in 2007, the default position 
is that P is not made a party to the case unless the CoP directs otherwise.384 Even if P is not made a 
party to the proceedings, P is still bound by any orders made by the CoP in the case. 385 This 
approach was strongly contested during the consultation over the COPR in 2007, with one 
respondent affirming that it was ‘vital that the individual concerned is at the heart of the case and 
we do not see how this can happen if the individual themselves is not considered to be a party to 
the case. They are after all the primary party and the reason why the case is being heard.’386 Others 
argued that the default position should be that P is joined as a party except in non-contentious 
property and affairs cases. However, the Government clearly rejected this position with the 
adoption of the COPR 2007.  
The question of party status remains controversial today. At the roundtable, one participant 
echoed this argument, saying that the question ‘shouldn’t be “when should a person be a party to 
the case?” Instead it should be “when shouldn’t they be” ’; this participant commented that even if 
95% of cases ended up with the person not joined as a party, there should be a rebuttable 
presumption that they are. In Re NRA, Charles J freely acknowledged: 
the instinctive reaction of most English and Welsh lawyers would be that P must be a 
party to all proceedings in the Court of Protection because necessarily the orders 
directly affect his or her welfare or property and affairs and so he or she needs to be 
bound by them and have a say in what they should contain. Indeed, this was my 
starting point when the COP Rules were originally drafted.387 
Yet, however desirable in principle it is that P has party status, this is subject to a number of 
practical constraints. Hence the pattern of recent litigation and revisions to the COPR has been to 
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devise alternative ways to ensure that P can participate and ‘have a say’ in CoP proceedings 
without being given party status. 
The financial cost of party status 
One of the major barriers to P being joined as a party is that, once so joined, they will require 
independent legal representation in order to exercise the rights and discharge the obligations 
attached to party status. In the vast majority of CoP cases,388 P would be regarded as lacking 
litigation capacity, in which case they may only be joined as a party if a litigation friend or 
Accredited Legal Representative (see Section 3.5 below) can be appointed.389 Although in theory P 
may act as a litigant in person390, in reality most of those subject to the CoP’s jurisdiction will 
require funded representation of some form. Yet, as discussed earlier, there is no public funding for 
CoP property and affairs cases, and public funding for welfare cases outside the DoLS is subject to a 
stringent means test. In a recent CoP case concerning deprivation of liberty, Mostyn J withdrew P as 
a party, because otherwise it was foreseeable that ‘his savings would soon be consumed in legal 
costs’.391 
At the roundtable, one participant who represented litigants in the CoP questioned whether it was 
right that P should be joined in non-contested cases, and ‘pay for the privilege when there is 
actually no dispute’. Another lawyer commented that even in cases where the evidence was 
overwhelming but a ‘difficult relative’ refused to accept the outcome, it was not straightforward to 
persuade the court to remove the person as a party. This meant that the person might have to pay 
many thousands of pounds out of their life savings to be represented. Legal representatives of 
clients in the CoP spoke of cases where welfare litigation had cost their clients tens of thousands of 
pounds, describing themselves as between ‘a rock and a hard place’ in protecting their clients’ 
interests. 
Party status under the amended Court of Protection Rules 
Following the 2015 amendments to the Rules, the general rule that P is not to be made a party 
remains in force. However, the new Rule 3A on the ‘Participation of P’ requires the court to 
consider in each case whether the person should be made a party, having regard to: 
a) the nature and extent of the information before the court;  
b) the issues raised in the case;  
c) whether a matter is contentious; and  
d) whether P has been notified in accordance with the provisions of Part 7 and what, if 
anything, P has said or done in response to such notification.392 
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Where P is not joined as a party (unless the CoP directs otherwise) they must still be notified about 
the proceedings and key decisions, in a language which she or he understands.393 The CoP may also 
still hear the person on the question of whether or not a particular order should be made.394 They 
may also have a ‘representative’ under Rule 3A, whose function is to provide the CoP with 
information on: 
‘the person's past and present wishes and feelings (and, in particular, any relevant 
written statement made by him when he had capacity)… the beliefs and values that 
would be likely to influence his decision if he had capacity, and… the other factors 
that he would be likely to consider if he were able to do so.’395  
The role of Rule 3A representatives is discussed further in Section 3.5 below. 
Ruck Keene et al, writing before Rule 3A was adopted, stated that at that time ‘the working 
presumption has developed that P will be joined in all serious medical treatment cases and in 
healthcare and welfare cases other than those concerning a very limited single decision to be taken 
on P’s behalf’. 396 Practice Direction 2A on the ‘Participation of P’ confirms the established practice 
in the CoP, whereby non-contentious property and affairs cases (which form the vast majority of 
the CoP’s work) are dealt with without joining P as a party or any representative.397 However, other 
cases may ‘call for a higher level of participation’.398 The guidance is not more specific than this, 
however, on whether P should be joined as a party.  
Although in this report we focus on welfare cases, we recognize that not joining P as a party may 
also raise serious concerns in some property and affairs cases.  Sheree Green, solicitor and Chair of 
the Law Society’s Mental Health and Disability Committee, reports on a case of a client of hers, 
‘Sarah’, who objected to an application by the local authority to act as her deputy for property and 
affairs. Despite her objections, which were known to the court, she was not joined as a party to the 
case. A special visitor visited Sarah without prior notice, and so she had nobody with her to assist 
with the meeting or access to her hearing aids or the information she would need to discuss her 
finances. The visitor concluded that she lacked financial capacity and the local authority was 
appointed as deputy. Her advocate alerted her solicitor, who helped her to apply to successfully 
discharge the deputyship. The case signifies the potential importance of party status to ensure 
adequate representation of P in challenging the evidence of an applicant or court appointed expert, 
in accordance with the adversarial principle of Strasbourg jurisprudence. 
                                                     
393 Court of Protection Rules 2007, SI 2007 No 1744, Part 7 as amended by The Court of Protection (Amendment) Rules 
2015 SI 2015 No 548  
394 Court of Protection Rules 2007, SI 2007 No 1744, r 88 
395 Court of Protection Rules, 3A(2)(c), requiring representatives to provide the CoP with the information required by 
MCA 2005, s 4(4). 
396 Court of Protection Handbook: A User's Guide, First edition, n 186, Paragraph 12.5 
397 Practice Direction 2A, paragraph 3 
398 Practice Direction 2A, paragraph 4 
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Party status and detention 
The question of party status for P in non-contentious applications to the CoP for authorisation of a 
deprivation of liberty under the streamlined procedure was controversial in the Re X litigation399 
discussed in Section 1.4 above. To recap, under the streamlined procedure as originally formulated 
by Munby P,400 the CoP could authorize the deprivation of liberty of P in proceedings to which they 
were not a party, subject to certain ‘triggers’ to identify situations such as disagreement between P 
and others, where greater participation was required. In the Court of Appeal,401 Black, Moore-Bick, 
and Gloucester LLJ cast doubt on the compatibility of such a process with the requirements of 
Article 5 ECHR in obiter remarks. To understand the significance of party status, it is worth 
reviewing their arguments in closer detail. 
In Re X (No 1) the President held that Article 5 ECHR did not require P to be joined as a party, as 
long as they were able to ‘take proceedings’ in accordance with Article 5(4); 402 to participate in 
such a way as to ‘present their case "properly and satisfactorily"’;403 and have ‘access to a court and 
the opportunity to be heard either in person or, where necessary, through some form of 
representation’.404 The President went on to say that P should always be given the opportunity to 
become a party if they wish, and ‘whether joined as a party or not must be given the support 
necessary to express views about the application and to participate in the proceedings to the 
extent that they wish’.405 The President’s reasoning that P need not be made a party to the 
proceedings was explained in Re X (No 2), where he relied upon an analogy with wardship of 
children, who are not always made a party.406 In wardship proceedings, this is because: 
There is no "lis" between the parties. The plaintiffs are not asserting any rights; they 
are committing their child to the protection of the court and asking the court to 
make such order as it thinks is for her benefit."407 
In other words, where proceedings are inquisitorial rather than adversarial – as they are often said 
to be in the CoP408 - it will not be necessary for P to become a party. 
In their obiter remarks, Black LJ and Gloucester LJ409 disagreed with Sir James Munby P’s analogy 
between incapacitated adults and children, with Black LJ holding that the correct comparator for an 
                                                     
399 Re X and others [2014] EWCOP 25; Re X and others (Deprivation of Liberty) (Number 2) [2014] EWCOP 37; Re X (No 2) 
[2015] EWCA Civ 599 In the Matter of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 Re: NRA, HR, ML, MJW, VS, EJG, MT, DPW, NR, and 
LM [2015] EWCOP 59; In the Matter of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 Re JM, AMY,JG, MM and VE [2016] EWCOP 15 
400 In Re X & Ors (Deprivation of Liberty) and Re X and others (Deprivation of Liberty) (Number 2) 
401 Re X (Court of Protection Practice)  
402 [2014] EWCOP 25, para. 18 
403 Re X (No 1) at para. 19, citing Airey v. Ireland (App no 6289/73) [1979] ECHR 3; (1980) 2 EHRR 305, §24 
404 Re X (No 1) at para.19, citing Winterwerp v the Netherlands (App no 6301/73) [1979] 2 EHRR 387, para. 60 
405 Ibid, para. 19 
406 Ibid, paras. 4-10 
407 In re B (JA) (An Infant) [1965] Ch 1112, 1117 
408 Re X (No 2) [2015] EWCA Civ 599 at para. 10, citing Cheshire West and Chester Council v P and M [2011] EWHC 1330 
(COP), para. 51 and Re G (Adult) [2014] EWCOP 1361, para. 26 
409 Re X (No 2) para. 169. 
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adult without capacity is not a child but an adult with capacity, citing Cheshire West.410 She also 
rejected the analogy with wardship and private law proceedings, stating that the closest parallel 
was with secure accommodation proceedings (where the child is a party).411 Tellingly, Black LJ 
stated ‘no other example could be found of an adult whose liberty was in question in proceedings 
before a court or tribunal not being automatically a party to those proceedings’.412  
The Court of Appeal did not hold that Article 5 ECHR in essence always required P to be made a 
party if ‘his participation in them can reliably be secured by other means’.413 Black LJ contrasted the 
network of safeguards available under the DoLS scheme and the streamlined procedure. A person 
detained under the DoLS would have an RPR and also possibly a s39D IMCA to assist them in 
understanding and exercising their rights; a person detained under the streamlined procedure had 
no equivalent independent assistance in understanding and exercising their rights, and thus its 
safeguards lacked the requisite degree of independence from the detaining authorities.  
In the streamlined procedure the court bases its decision upon information from the (would be) 
detaining authorities.414 Black LJ observed that it is only in relation to the consultation with P by a 
close friend, relative or advocate415 ‘that any significant degree of detachment is introduced’.416 
However, Black LJ felt that this consultation process was only a limited safeguard: there was no 
equivalent to an RPR, whose role involves challenging any proposed deprivation of liberty (see 
Section 3.1 above), and it may be that those consulted support the arrangements or are unaware of 
alternatives. In contrast, a relevant person joined as a party would have a litigation friend who 
would be required to look after their interests and who would have access to all the documentation 
and reports, and be able to challenge the case presented to the court417, providing analogous 
safeguards to an RPR.  
The streamlined procedure rested on the presumption that it was sufficient for P to be given an 
opportunity to be joined as a party if they expressed a desire to do so. Black LJ considered that P ‘is 
not likely to be in a position to make an informed decision himself about his participation in the 
proceedings or indeed about his living circumstances’418 and consequently there was ‘too 
significant a risk that cases would slip through the net, going unrecognised by the applicant and by 
the court despite the best efforts of all involved’.419 
Although Black LJ’s remarks about the requirements of Article 5 are obiter dicta, and not strictly 
binding precedent her statement of the position regarding Article 5 compliance carried significant 
                                                     
410 Ibid, para. 84 
411 Ibid, para. 86 
412 Ibid, para 106 
413 Ibid, para 96 
414 Ibid, para. 102 
415 Required in the COP DOL 10 forms that are used for the streamlined procedure, described at Section 1.4 above. 
416 Ibid, para. 103 
417 Ibid, para. 105 
418 Ibid, para.103 
419 Ibid, para. 106 
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weight. In HSE Ireland v PD420, decided shortly after the Court of Appeal’s ruling, Baker J considered 
the Court of Appeal judges’ ‘clear statements of principle’ to ‘serve as a strong reminder of the 
importance to be attached to ensuring that P’s voice is heard on any application where deprivation 
of liberty is in issue.’421 Baker J emphasised Black LJ’s observation that ‘it is generally considered 
indispensable in this country for the person’s whose liberty is at stake automatically to be a party to 
the proceedings in which the issue is to be decided’.422  
Nevertheless, for the reasons outlined above, the requirement that P be joined as a party for all 
applications for authorisation of a non-contested deprivation of liberty was deeply problematic 
given the insufficiency of funding to secure representation, and the shortage of litigation friends to 
instruct representatives on behalf of P. Thus, the decisions of Charles J in In Re NRA and others and 
in Re JM and others have reasserted an amended streamline procedure where P is not made a 
party but where the Rule 3A Representative plays a central role.423 Rule 3A representatives in these 
cases are intended to offer similar guarantees of independence of process and support for P as an 
RPR under the DoLS, but without requiring that P is made a party to the proceedings. Their role is 
considered further in Section 3.5 below. 
Party status and the right to participate 
The Court of Appeal’s remarks in Re X cast doubt on whether it could be lawful for P to be deprived 
of their liberty by proceedings to which they are not a party without additional steps being taken to 
secure independence of process, and support and representation for P. However, it is not clear 
whether similar reasoning might also apply in circumstances where Article 5 ECHR is not engaged. 
The obiter dicta of Moore Bick LJ could, as Charles J observed in Re NRA424 be interpreted as 
applying to all cases before the CoP, not merely those concerning deprivation of liberty: 
These are essentially practical considerations, but they invite consideration of what 
is actually meant by being a party to proceedings. In my view a party can best be 
described for these purposes as a natural or juridical person who has come before 
the court in order to obtain vindication of his rights and relief of some kind (usually 
described in the proceedings as a claimant) or who has been brought before the 
court by another under compulsion in order that the court's powers may be invoked 
against him (usually described as a defendant). Such persons are directly affected by 
the court's decision and are therefore entitled to play a full part in the proceedings 
in accordance with the rules of procedure.425 
 
As noted in Section 2.4 above, the ECtHR has developed a threefold rationale for the importance of 
personal participation in court proceedings concerning legal capacity and deprivation of liberty: 
                                                     
420[2015]EWCOP 48. 
421 Ibid, para 31. 
422 Ibid.  
423 In the Matter of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 Re: NRA, HR, ML, MJW, VS, EJG, MT, DPW, NR, and LM [2015] EWCOP 
59; In the Matter of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 Re JM, AMY,JG, MM and VE [2016] EWCOP 15 
424 [2015] EWCOP 59, para 32 
425 Re X (Court of Protection Practice) [2015] EWCA Civ 599, para 170 
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1. The dignity principle: the fundamental right to participate, including meeting judges taking 
decisions with serious consequences for a person’s life.  
2. The evidential principle: a person is an important source of evidence before the court for 
legal capacity, guardianship and deprivation of liberty proceedings.  
3. The adversarial principle: Participation may be necessary to help a person to present his 
case and to refute expert evidence or arguments recommending measures that a person 
opposes. 
The evidential principle does not necessarily entail that a person should be made a party, and there 
is nothing in theory to prevent P attending court in person.426   
However, party status may be regarded as important to reflect the impact of the decision on the 
person’s human rights and the need to uphold their individual dignity.  A lack of party status was 
perceived by some participants at the roundtable as problematic as a matter of principle – even 
when decoupled from wider participatory and evidential questions. One participant felt that 
‘presentationally, it seems odd that P should not be a party. It objectifies and depersonalises them’, 
as if the proceedings were about a ‘thing that happened to be a human being’. Another participant 
with a background in human rights litigation, felt that it was ‘obvious’ that P should be a party. In 
response to concerns about difficulties of funding legal representatives that arose where a person 
as joined as a party, they countered: ‘Of course they should have representation, it just shouldn’t 
bankrupt them’. Party status thus foregrounds a difficult tension between the funding of legal 
representation and protection of fundamental human rights. 
It is arguable that it is necessary to join P as a party as the ‘subject’ of the proceedings in 
accordance with the adversarial principle, to guarantee equality of arms in representation.  Where 
a person is not a party to the proceedings, their ability to shape the course of proceedings through 
presenting evidence and arguments to the court, and contesting the evidence and arguments of the 
other parties is limited, as Sarah’s case shows. For example, party status has been (unsuccessfully) 
sought by media organisations, who wanted to be able to help shape instructions to expert 
witnesses and examine expert witness evidence regarding the mental capacity of P to speak to the 
media about her case.427  
The approach of the Court in Practice Direction 2A, and also in the Re X streamlined procedure, has 
been to distinguish between contested and non-contested cases. On this approach, arguably the 
adversarial principle is only engaged where P or others object to the proposed measures before the 
CoP. In Re X, Black LJ highlighted the potential danger of relying upon P to express an objection or a 
desire to be joined as a party in order to trigger additional protection of his or her interests, given 
that they are unlikely to be in a position to make an informed decision.428 This reasoning echoes the 
ECtHR’s approach in HL v UK, that where a person is ‘legally incapable of consenting to, or 
disagreeing with, the proposed action’ their compliance is not to be treated as if it were consent.429 
Although these remarks were made in a different context, they do highlight the potential danger of 
                                                     
426 The Court of Protection Rules 2007 SI 2007 No 1744,, r 88(1) 
427 G v London Borough of Redbridge, Associated Newspapers Limited and Others [2014] EWHC 1361 
428 Re X (No 2) [2015] EWCA Civ 599, para. 103 
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making the degree of scrutiny to which the court subjects an application dependent on the extent 
to which P is perceived, or recorded, as objecting.  
This may have implications for situations where other fundamental rights than Article 5 are 
engaged, for example rights to respect for home, family life, privacy or bodily integrity under Article 
8 ECHR. For the most part, this concern is theoretical in relation to health and welfare applications: 
Practice Direction 2A and anecdotal reports suggest that it is very rare for the person not to be 
joined as a party in health and welfare cases outside of non-contested deprivation of liberty 
applications.  
Whilst we recognize the symbolically charged importance of party status, we do not make any 
specific recommendations in this report.  Instead, we regard this as coupled to wider 
recommendations regarding the adequacy of P’s representation in proceedings, and particularly 
funding for representation, and the extent to which P is placed at the centre of the proceedings. 
3.3 NOTIFICATION 
Notification of proceedings in the CoP is an essential precursor to direct participation. Notification 
is particularly important to give P the opportunity to voice any objection to the proposed measures. 
In several cases, the ECtHR has found that failure to notify individuals of proceedings connected 
with their legal capacity violated fair trial guarantees, in part because it denies a person the 
opportunity to use any remedies against the proposals.430  The right to be notified is thus closely 
linked to the ‘adversarial principle’ under the ECHR and under the common law.431 Being notified of 
proceedings which concern the person and may have significant consequences for their lives is also 
a matter of dignity.  
Notification under the Court of Protection Rules 
The notification of P is governed by Part 7 of the COPR, which has recently been amended.432 
Whether or not they are a party, P must generally be notified of the following matters relating to an 
application: 
1. That an application has been issued by the CoP, or withdrawn, and the date and location of 
any hearing;433 
2. The identity of the applicant, ‘that the application raises the question of whether P lacks 
capacity in relation to a matter or matters, and what that means’, ‘what will happen if the 
court makes the order or direction that has been applied for’ and whether it contains any 
proposal for the appointment of a deputy to make decisions on the person’s behalf;434 
                                                     
430 Shtukaturov v Russia (App no 44009/05) [2008] ECHR 223, paras 10, 16 and 69; MS v Croatia (App no 36337/10) 
[2013] ECHR 378, para. 105; X and Y v Croatia (App no 5193/09) [2011] ECHR 1835; para. 94; Sýkora v The Czech 
Republic (App no 23419/07) [2012] ECHR 1960, paras. 107-109 
431 See Ridge v Baldwin [1964] AC 40. 
432 The Court of Protection Rules 2007 SI 2007 No 1744, as amended by the Court of Protection (Amendment) Rules 
2015 SI 2015 No 548. 
433 Ibid, r 42(1) 
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3. Where the CoP has given directions under Rule 3A that a litigation friend, accredited legal 
representative or ‘Rule 3A representative’ should be appointed;435 
4. If the application is withdrawn, then the consequences of the withdrawal should be 
explained to the person;436 
5. That P ‘may seek advice and assistance in relation to any matter of which he is notified’;437 
6. If the court makes any decision relating to P, other than case management decisions;438 
7. Any other matters which the court directs.439 
P must also be notified of similar matters in relation to any appeal.440  
Notification must be effected by the applicant (or appellant) or an agent appointed by them, or by 
‘such other person as the court may direct’.441 The person notifying P of the relevant matter must 
‘provide P, or arrange for P to be provided with, with the information specified… in a way that is 
appropriate to P’s circumstances (for example, using simple language, visual aids or any other 
appropriate means)’.442 This must be provided to P ‘personally’, as soon as practicable and within 
14 days of the relevant matter.443 The person effecting notification must file a certificate of 
notification with the court. Following the 2015 amendments, this certificate must state when the 
person was notified and ‘the steps taken to enable P to understand, and the extent to which P 
appears to have understood, the information’.444 
Cases where P is not notified 
Although the presumption is that P will be notified of the matters listed above, the court may direct 
that P must not be notified of some or any matters, or provided with any document.445 The court 
has used this power on a number of reported occasions. For example, in P v Independent Print Ltd. 
& Ors446 the court had authorised the media to report elements of the case, but had made an order 
prohibiting anyone from bringing to P’s attention ‘the fact of or the content of any such media 
reports’.447 This decision was based on expert evidence that if he ‘believes that information about 
him is being shared with the media it will contribute to a sense of distrust. This will seriously 
                                                     
435 Ibid, r 41A, as inserted by the Court of Protection (Amendment) Rules 2015 SI 2015 No 548, r 18.  
436 Ibid, r 42(3) 
437 Ibid, r 42(4) 
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undermine his care plan and developing therapeutic relationships.’448 Some may find it unsettling 
to think that the readers of the judgment have knowledge of these orders when P does not. 
In some cases, P has not been notified of an application for serious medical interventions that the 
person opposes. In Re AA449 a hospital trust applied for an order authorising them to deliver by 
caesarean the child of a woman who was detained under the MHA 1983 using force if necessary, as 
it was believed to be in her best interests. The woman, Alessandra Pacchieri, later told media 
organisations that the first time she was made aware of the application and order was the morning 
of the operation.450 This seems plausible, since order stated that ‘The terms of this order shall not 
be disclosed to the Respondent until after the medical procedure described below has been 
completed.’451 The published judgment and transcript do not discuss the reasoning behind the 
decision not to notify Pacchieri of the application or the court’s decision.452 Ms Pacchieri was made 
a party to the proceedings, and was represented by the Official Solicitor, yet it is unclear whether 
she herself had any contact at all with those representing her (a matter which is discussed further 
below).  
Notification engages the dignity principle, the evidential principle and the adversarial principle of 
the right to participate. The decision not to notify a person until after the substance of the decision 
has been implemented not only affects their ability to directly put their objections to the court, but 
may also have a wider impact on the quality of the evidence available to the court. Clearly, if the 
person is not to learn of the court proceedings, they cannot have any direct contact with the judge; 
thus the ‘principled’ approach of the individual meeting the judge cannot be fulfilled, nor can the 
judge come to an independent view of their capacity or the proportionality of the proposed 
measure. A prohibition on notification also presents serious difficulties for obtaining independent 
expert evidence, as contact with a court appointed expert for the purposes of an assessment for 
the court may involve revealing to the person the existence of the proceedings. In Re AA, the court 
appears to have based its decision entirely upon evidence provided by the applicant NHS trust. This 
raises the same concerns about the potential conflict of interest when a court must base its 
decision solely on evidence supplied by the applicant as those discussed by the Court of Appeal in 
Re X453, although in this case the proceedings clearly were contentious. 
The dangers of over-reliance on the evidence of the applicant public authority were illustrated in 
the pre-MCA case of St George's Healthcare NHS Trust v S454, where a trust applied ex parte to the 
court for declarations permitting a caesarean section on a woman who wanted a natural birth and 
who was detained under the MHA. The court made the declarations after having been provided 
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450 Sue Reid, 'I could feel my baby kicking inside me. I was crying as I begged them not to cut me open: Mother whose 
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with information by the applicant trust that was untrue, including that the woman had been in 
labour for 24 hours, when in fact she was not in labour at the time. The woman in question sought 
judicial review of the decision after the caesarean had been carried out, and the Court of Appeal 
held that the caesarean constituted trespass. The Court of Appeal in the St George’s case laid down 
guidelines for similar applications, including that the hearing should be inter partes (with notice to 
all parties) as an order made in the woman’s absence would not be binding unless she was 
represented by a litigation friend, or by counsel or a solicitor.  
Where a person must not learn of the proceedings, it is difficult to see how they could meet or 
engage with their legal representatives (if they are a party to the case and they are represented), 
because in doing so they would need to learn about the existence of the proceedings. It will be 
almost impossible for them to present their views and arguments, or to rebut the arguments or 
evidence of other parties. In Re AA, Ms Pacchieri was represented by expert counsel, but it is 
difficult to see how they could do anything other than ensure the court’s processes ‘ticked all the 
boxes’455 rather than provide an effective safeguard against any potential arbitrariness in the 
evidence submitted by the applicant, unless they had direct contact with the person or were able to 
instruct experts to do so on their behalf. Non-notification thus raises significant problems for the 
ECtHR ‘adversarial principle’ and the common law rules of natural justice, even if P is joined as a 
party and is represented. 
In subsequent published judgments concerning planned (or possible) interventions relating to 
childbirth, the question of notification was given more explicit consideration than had taken place 
in Re AA. In The Mental Health Trust & Anor v DD & Anor456 DD was pregnant and there was 
medical evidence that pregnancy and childbirth presented serious risks to her and her child, yet she 
would not engage with professionals. The trust obtained orders authorising a range of interventions 
including a scan to assess her health and that of the child, a planned caesarean to deliver the child 
safely, forcible entry to her home for the purpose of assessing her mental capacity to give or refuse 
consent to contraception and – in a later hearing457 – forcible entry to her home for the purpose of 
removing her to hospital to be sterilised. It was considered too risky to notify DD of these plans, in 
case she disappeared prior to these steps being taken. Even partial information was regarded as 
problematic in case it elevated her anxiety. Mr Justice Cobb felt that it was a justified interference 
with DD’s Article 8 rights to be only given partial information about the plans, and that her Article 6 
rights were protected by her full and effective representation (through the Official Solicitor) at the 
hearing, and her having been given opportunities (which she did not take up) to participate in the 
proceedings.458 
In NHS Trust & Ors v FG (Rev 1)459 Mr Justice Keehan stated that orders permitting applicants not to 
notify P were ‘extremely unusual’ and ‘at the extremity of what is permissible under the European 
Convention’; he stated that it would only be justified ‘if the interests of the patient and/or the child 
                                                     
455 A phrase, tellingly, used by Ms Pacchieri’s own counsel. In the published transcript in Re AA counsel for AA, Mr Lock, 
takes Mostyn J through the requirements of the MCA, at one point commenting ‘So, my Lord, for capacity there is a tick 
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456 [2014] EWCOP 11 
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demand the same’.460 In relation to care proceedings, the threshold for not notifying a mother of a 
plan to remove her child at birth is extremely high.461 It was put to Mr Justice Hayden in Re DM462 
that CoP cases such as FG had appeared to lower the bar for such radical interventions,463 but this 
suggestion was rejected.464  
In An NHS Trust v The Patient,465 Mr Justice Holman made orders authorising surgery to remove a 
tumour from a man who refused surgery on the basis that he wished ‘keep the tumour with him for 
life'466 and did not believe it posed any threat. His sister felt that he was terrified of the surgery, 
because of his past experiences of psychiatric hospitals.467 The court authorised covert sedation to 
minimise his distress before going to hospital. However, Holman J added a rider to the order that 
‘The patient must be told in clear but sensitive terms before he is anaesthetised that he is going to 
be anaesthetised and that the operation is going to be performed’, stating ‘it remains extremely 
important in any civilised society that they are not subjected to anaesthesia or invasive surgery 
without, as a minimum, being informed in sensitive and appropriate language as to what is about to 
be done to them before it is done’.468 Clearly, the purpose of this ‘notification’ of what was to occur 
was not to present an opportunity to use a legal remedy against it, but an attempt to reconcile the 
exigencies of the case with the spirit of the ‘dignity principle’ discussed in Section 2.4 above.469  
Decisions not to notify P may also raise wider questions of ‘transparency’. In FG and An NHS Trust v 
The Patient, the court sat in public470 but issued reporting restrictions so that P did not learn about 
the court’s decision (of which they had not (yet) been notified) through reports of the proceedings 
in the media. 
Complex considerations regarding notification 
The foregoing cases highlight a range of complex considerations about notifying P of applications 
and decisions in the CoP concerning them. On the one hand, failure to notify P of the application 
and decisions is problematic from the perspective of all three of the ECtHR’s rationales for 
promoting the participation of P in the proceedings. It presents problems for obtaining 
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independent evidence, it makes it difficult for P to put their case to the court directly or through 
their legal representative, and it may be offensive as a matter of principle not to notify a person of 
proceedings with such momentous consequences for their lives. Some earlier reported CoP cases 
make non-notification orders with little recognition that they lie at the outer extremity of what is 
permissible under the ECHR, and consequently no explicit consideration of whether they are 
necessary and proportionate. However, more recent cases increasingly recognise that non-
notification raises profound human rights questions and do state the justification more explicitly. 
Whilst recognising strong arguments in favour of notification of the relevant individual, participants 
at the roundtable (especially those involved in representing P) discussed some of the moral 
difficulties that could be raised by a decision to notify the person. In particular, notifying P of an 
application or decision can cause the person significant distress or anxiety. One lawyer, who had 
experience of cases where the court’s final decision had caused the person immense distress, 
argued that there was sometimes a need for expert evidence on how (if at all) notification should 
be effected. This argument may have some support in ECHR jurisprudence. In the only case where 
the ECtHR has held that it was lawful not to notify P of legal capacity proceedings concerning them, 
Berková v Slovakia471, the court’s decision was based on expert recommendations.472 In future 
reforms of the COPR, it might be appropriate to consider an explicit requirement that any court 
orders that P should not be notified of the application or any material decisions concerning the 
proceedings should only be made if necessary, proportionate and based on appropriate evidence. 
It is difficult to balance the competing legal and moral imperatives to ensure that the best possible 
evidence and arguments are gathered and tested for the court’s decision, and the dignity principle 
is respected, with the possibility that the act of notification itself may cause significant distress to 
the person. Because notification raises such profound questions, it is important that it is considered 
carefully on a case by case basis. This will require ensuring that applications are brought well in 
advance of the anticipated requirement of an order wherever possible, to ensure the court is given 
adequate time to ensure questions of participation are considered appropriately. Moreover, in 
cases where P is not a party to the proceedings, if the purpose of notification is to provide P with 
the opportunity to oppose the application, it is questionable whether the existing COPR 
requirement that those effecting notification must tell P that they ‘may seek advice and assistance’ 
are sufficient if the person is incapable of independently accessing that assistance.  
The COPR, as presently drafted, do not place those notifying P under any duty to provide active 
assistance in seeking advice and assistance or otherwise informing the court of their objections. 
Paradoxically, these provisions appear to be based on the assumption that a person alleged to lack 
mental capacity in relation to the matter in question would have the independent capability to 
contest that assertion in court. In contrast, the guidance under the Re X streamlined procedure 
places those consulting P and notifying them of the application under an implicit duty to help the 
person to secure such assistance.473 If the notification process is to provide an effective safeguard 
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for P to enable them to convey any objections to the court, or to seek assistance in order to use 
remedies against the application, it is suggested that the COPR and relevant practice directions 
should be amended to place those effecting notification under an explicit duty to convey P’s views 
to the court and to assist them in seeking legal advice and representation if they desire it. 
Recommendations on notification 
Recommendation 6: The COPR should be amended to require explicit consideration by the CoP 
of the reasons for non-notification of P of any matter regarding the proceedings, and in 
particular consideration of whether non-notification is necessary and proportionate in pursuit 
of a legitimate aim, and supported by objective evidence. 
Recommendation 7: The COPR should be updated to place those notifying P of P’s right to 
advice and assistance in relation to the proceedings under a duty to help P secure this advice if 
that is P’s wish. 
3.4 EVIDENCE AND INFORMATION BEFORE THE COURT 
The person as a source of evidence under the European Convention on Human Rights 
One of the principles established by the ECtHR for the participation of P, is that the person 
themselves is an important source of evidence on which the court must base its decision. This 
evidential principle has been adopted by the ECtHR more widely than in legal capacity and 
deprivation of liberty cases. In cases where the courts are dealing with questions of fact, as well as 
law, the ECtHR has held that personal presence is generally required,474 unless there are no issues 
with the credibility of witnesses, the facts are not contested and the parties are given adequate 
opportunities to put forward their cases in writing and challenge the evidence against them.475 
Personal presence has also been held to be important in cases involving the assessment of 
‘emotional suffering’, where the applicant should have the opportunity to explain orally any ‘moral 
damage’ and ‘distress and anxiety’ which particular acts entailed for him; this has been held to 
outweigh considerations of speed and efficiency.476 Personal presence has been considered 
important if the case involves an assessment of a person’s state of health or character,477 or where 
they are an important source of the factual evidence.478 Many of these considerations are likely to 
be relevant in CoP proceedings, where the court is often required to assess the individual’s health, 
character or emotional state and the potential impact of an order upon a person.  
The ECtHR has adopted a similar approach in its case law on legal capacity and deprivation of 
liberty. In Shtukaturov, it held that the applicant’s presence was necessary in legal capacity 
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proceedings ‘to allow the judge to form his personal opinion about the applicant’s mental 
capacity‘.479 In X and Y v Croatia, the ECtHR elaborated on its reasoning, stating that whilst medical 
reports concerning a person’s mental capacity are relevant and important, ‘at the end of the day, it 
is the judge and not a physician, albeit a psychiatrist, who is to assess all relevant facts concerning 
the person in question and his or her personal circumstances.’ This, the court held, was a necessary 
procedural safeguard to minimise the risk of any arbitrariness.480 In Shtukaturov the ECtHR had 
emphasised that this was to enable the judge to form their own view of the person’s mental 
capacity – a question of fact – whereas in X and Y v Croatia the court emphasised the importance of 
judicial contact with the person ‘to assess the proportionality of the measure to be taken’,481 which 
is a question of judgement as well as fact.  
The person as a source of evidence or information in the Court of Protection 
The emphasis placed by the Strasbourg Court on personal participation as an important source of 
evidence in judgments concerning legal capacity and deprivation of liberty is difficult to reconcile 
with current practice and procedure in the CoP. No official statistics are available on how frequently 
the judge has some direct contact with P, but in evidence to the House of Lords Committee on the 
MCA 2005, Senior Judge Lush estimated that P was present in 5-10% of hearings.482 However, most 
cases in the CoP do not have an oral hearing,483 and so overall the number of cases where the judge 
has direct contact with the person would be comparatively few. Therefore, in the majority of cases, 
judges of the CoP are basing their decisions regarding mental capacity and the proportionality of 
any proposed measures on expert evidence and the evidence of the parties, and not any direct 
contact with the person affected. A group of barristers and solicitors working in the CoP submitted 
evidence to the House of Lords Committee on the MCA 2005 expressing concern that ‘Often, 
declarations about P’s lack of capacity are granted without the evidence being tested orally, and 
without hearing from P directly or even considering whether P should be heard’.484 At face value, 
this appears to run contrary to the rulings of the ECtHR discussed above, and will be discussed 
further below when considering P’s attendance in court and personal contact with judges. 
Nevertheless, despite this trend, in some high profile cases, judges have relied heavily upon an 
encounter with P as a source of evidence when making determinations as to their mental capacity. 
In CC v KK and STCC485 Baker J found that Mrs KK had the mental capacity to make decisions about 
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where she should live, following a conversation with her in court. He arrived at this conclusion 
despite unanimous expert evidence holding that Mrs KK lacked mental capacity in this respect. His 
comments echoed those of the ECtHR in X and Y v Croatia, that whilst expert evidence was ‘of very 
considerable importance’, ultimately it was up to the judge – not the expert – to make the final 
decision regarding P’s mental capacity.486 In Re SB (A Patient; Capacity To Consent To 
Termination)487, Holman J rejected the evidence of SB’s treating psychiatrist and an independent 
expert that she lacked the mental capacity to consent to the termination of a pregnancy after 
hearing evidence directly from SB herself. Holman J observed that: 
In most cases that come before the Court of Protection, at any rate in my 
experience, the assessment of capacity by one or more psychiatrists is regarded as 
determinative. But those are generally cases in which the patient himself or herself 
is not positively and strongly asserting, and actually giving evidence, that he or she 
has the required capacity.488 
Like Baker J, Holman J asserted that the question of capacity was ‘for the judgment of the court’.489 
More recently in WBC v Z & Ors490 Mr Justice Cobb found that an applicant local authority had not 
rebutted the presumption of capacity where it relied upon a year old psychiatric report to argue 
that Z lacked the mental capacity to decide her place of residence. Z gave ‘unsworn evidence’491 in 
court, where the judge recorded her conduct was ‘was entirely appropriate’, she ‘concentrated well 
for the duration of her evidence, was courteous to counsel and to me’492 and she showed ‘insight’ 
into relevant matters.493 These cases are very unusual instances of the court rejecting unanimous 
expert evidence that a person lacks mental capacity, and are important examples of the court 
relying upon the evidence of direct personal contact between P and the judge. 
Direct contact between the judge and P may also have a bearing on best interests decisions. In Re 
M (Best Interests: Deprivation of Liberty) (Rev 1)494 Jackson J met M, a 67 year old lady who wished 
to return to live in her own home from residential care, but this was opposed on the basis that she 
might not be able to manage her diabetes effectively when at home. M was visited by a district 
judge during the course of the proceedings, and Peter Jackson J recorded one purpose of the visit 
as informing the court of M’s views.495 M told the district judge ‘I want to be out of here quick or be 
dead.’ Peter Jackson J concluded that it was in M’s best interests to go home, notwithstanding the 
risks, given the strength of her feelings. Some participants at the roundtable felt that the evidence 
that M had given to the district judge about the strength of her feelings had an important impact 
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on the outcome of the case. Likewise in Wye Valley NHS Trust v Mr B496 Jackson J’s meeting with Mr 
B to discuss his views regarding the proposed amputation of his leg led him to the view that it was 
not in his best interests for the surgery to go ahead unless he agreed to it.  Further examples of CoP 
judges meeting with P are detailed by Butler-Cole and Hobey-Hamsher in their 2016 article on 
assessment of capacity by judges in the CoP.497 
Whilst the published cases attest to the powerful impact of P attending court or meeting the judge 
in asserting that they have mental capacity or informing the court of their wishes and feelings for 
the purpose of best interests decisions, these cases also point towards the potential that such 
evidence could be relied upon for a finding of incapacity or that a best interests decision should run 
counter to what the person wants. There is a theoretical possibility that a party who wishes to 
rebut unanimous expert evidence that P has mental capacity could request the opportunity to 
cross-examine the person in court in order to demonstrate that they lack mental capacity. 
Alternatively a judge might reject unanimous expert evidence that P has mental capacity following 
a direct meeting with the person. Some participants at the roundtable suggested that they might 
not invite the judge to meet P where they had reports indicating the person to have mental 
capacity, because of the risk that the judge might conclude that the person lacked mental capacity. 
To date, no such cases have been reported.  
Whilst the Strasbourg authorities clearly show that a judge may arrive at the conclusion that P has 
capacity, contrary to the expert evidence, we argue that it would be impermissible under the MCA 
2005 and under the ECHR for the contrary to occur – for a judge to conclude that P lacked mental 
capacity, despite unanimous expert evidence to the contrary, and to impose a measure on this 
basis.  Taking the MCA 2005 point first, the second principle in s 1 of the MCA 2005 s that a person 
is not to be treated as unable to make a decision unless all practicable steps have been taken to 
enable him to do so without success. An assessment of capacity in the context of a meeting with a 
judge or an adversarial cross-examination is likely to place P under significant stress and therefore 
to run counter to this 'support principle.'498   
Meanwhile there are also strong human rights arguments against such an approach by either a 
judge or a party.  We suggest that the Strasbourg jurisprudence might lean towards an asymmetric 
approach to this matter. Where the outcome of the decision is that a person’s rights are to be 
restricted – through a declaration of incapacity or the authorisation of a deprivation of liberty – it 
may not be compatible with the Convention for a judge to come to this view without the support of 
any expert evidence. By way of comparison we observe that a court could not authorise a 
deprivation of liberty on grounds of ‘unsoundness of mind’ that had no support from ‘objective 
medical expertise’ under Article 5.499 Meanwhile, since the judge is recognized by Strasbourg as an 
important safeguard against arbitrary restrictions on legal capacity and liberty based on excessive 
deference to expert opinion, it is permissible for a judge to come to a less restrictive view than that 
adopted by the experts before the court, based on his impression of a person. 
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Giving evidence, or being a source of information? 
In the CoP, it is clear that some judges have effectively gathered evidence regarding the person’s 
mental capacity and wishes and feelings both in the courtroom, in cases such as CC v KK and Re SB, 
and through judicial meetings with the person, which appeared not to be in the presence of the 
other parties. This approach would appear to be endorsed by the ECtHR authorities, which 
positively embrace judges having direct contact with the person in order to form their own view as 
to the person’s mental capacity, and learn more about their wishes and feelings. However, this 
approach may not sit comfortably for those with a background in family proceedings who transpose 
the logic of judicial meetings with children onto the CoP’s practices and procedures for meeting P.  
There is some evidence of cultural resistance among some CoP nominated judges regarding the 
evidential status of any information supplied directly to the court or the judge by P. In YLA v PM & 
Anor500 Parker J declined to meet P to ascertain her wishes and feelings, and expressed concern at 
counsel’s suggestion that the judge should ‘form my own assessment of the strength of her wishes 
and feelings; and indeed capacity’. Parker J applied reasoning from cases concerning children, 
where although the court may see the child to allow them to express their wishes and feelings and 
‘to feel part of the proceedings’, the meeting is ’not to be used for gathering evidence’. In 
particular, Parker J was concerned that hearing from P in private would not permit the other parties 
to be part of the process of evidence gathering.501 In a subsequent case, Parker J agreed to meet P, 
but again stressed that ‘if the meeting takes place only in the presence of the judge, with no 
opportunity to test the evidence, then in my view no factual conclusions save those which relate to 
the meeting itself should be drawn, in particular with regard to capacity’.502 
Parker J’s resistance to meeting P or treating this as evidence were based on her experience as a 
Family Court judge. It is important to remember that many of the High Court judges hearing CoP 
DoLS and welfare cases will also be Family Court judges, who may be influenced by the approach 
taken within the Family Court towards children. In family proceedings, there are guidelines for 
judges on meeting with children.503 The guidelines for family proceedings state that ‘It cannot be 
stressed too often that the child’s meeting with the judge is not for the purpose of gathering 
evidence’.504 In the recent report of the Vulnerable Witnesses and Children Working Group, it was 
acknowledged that this was a ‘difficult concept’ for a young person to grasp, as ‘it amounts to 
saying the judge is here to listen to you but cannot take any notice of what you say’.505 The current 
guidelines are based on Re W (Children) (Rev 2)506, which held that when courts considered 
whether or not a child should be called as a witness, they should weigh up ‘the advantages that 
that will bring to the determination of the truth and the damage it may do to the welfare of this or 
any other child’.507 The President of the Family Court and the CoP, Sir James Munby, has called for a 
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review of the current guidelines508 in light of a recent Supreme Court judgment in In the matter of 
LC (Children)509, which considered when it would be appropriate for a child to give evidence as to 
her state of mind. 
In many – albeit not all – CoP proceedings, P may not be considered as competent to give evidence. 
The test of witness competence is distinct from tests of litigation capacity or capacity in relation to 
the decisions under consideration by the CoP.510 It requires the witness to understand the 
solemnity of the occasion and the responsibility to tell the truth, in order for them to be sworn to 
give evidence.511 Where P is not competent to give evidence formally to the court, any information 
they provide to the court will technically stand as hearsay evidence.512  
The COPR as originally drafted made no provision for the admission of hearsay evidence. This 
contrasted with the evidence of children in family proceedings, where s 96 of the Children Act 1989 
makes provision for a child to give evidence to the court even if they do not understand the nature 
of the oath, provided they understand ‘that it is his duty to speak the truth’ and they have 
‘sufficient understanding to justify his evidence being heard’. However in LB Enfield v SA513 
Macfarlane J interpreted the CoP’s power to ‘admit such evidence, whether written or oral, as it 
thinks fit’514 as permitting the court to admit hearsay evidence from a person who was regarded as 
an incompetent witness. Macfarlane J went on to hold that ‘the weight to be attached to any 
particular piece of hearsay evidence will be a matter for specific evaluation in each individual 
case’.515 A distinction may need to be drawn between P giving evidence which has a bearing on 
questions of fact beyond their own mental state – for example, regarding allegations about an 
individual or past events where their recollection may be poor – and the evidence they provide for 
the court concerning their mental capacity and their own wishes, feelings, values and beliefs. In the 
latter case, it is difficult to see how a person’s ‘incompetence’ as a witness could decrease the 
weight that should be attached to their evidence, since the matter to be determined is their own 
understanding and subjective experience. 
The 2015 amendments to the COPR clarified the CoP’s powers in this respect, with a new power to 
‘admit, accept and act upon such information, whether oral or written, from P, any protected party 
or any person who lacks competence to give evidence, as the court considers sufficient, although 
not given on oath and whether or not it would be admissible in a court of law apart from this 
rule.’516 Thus the question of whether or not P is competent to give evidence is sidestepped as the 
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CoP has the power to base its decisions on ‘information’ from P, without P giving evidence as a 
sworn witness. This flexible provision was considered by HH Mark Rogers J in the recent case of A 
County Council v AB & Ors (Participation of P in Proceedings)517 regarding whether the court could 
elicit ‘information’ from P, notwithstanding that P was not competent to give evidence: 
It may well be that the net result will quickly be apparent that his information is too 
unclear or lacks probative value and so the exercise can gently be curtailed. In other 
words, using Rule 95(e) the Court may admit the information but there is no 
guarantee that it would accept or act upon it… Of course even if this exercise proves 
fruitless the position may be different at the best interests stage because it is 
certainly clear that AB has communicated his views as to the future.518 
In this statement HH Mark Rogers J highlighted the multiple purposes which this information may 
serve: it may (or may not) have a bearing on questions of fact regarding past events, it may form 
the basis of an assessment of mental capacity by a judge, or even if it does not serve either of those 
evidential purposes, it helps to satisfy the requirement under s 4(4) of the MCA 2005 that P is 
supported and enabled to participate in best interests decisions concerning him. The judge held 
that it was for the litigation friend, and not the CoP, to decide whether or not P should give 
evidence or information to the court in this way.519 We suggest that this interpretation is incorrect; 
it is clear from Rule 3A (see Appendix A) that it is for the court – not the litigation friend – to 
consider ‘on its own initiative or on the application of any person’ whether or not P should have the 
opportunity to address (directly or indirectly) the judge.520 
Practical steps for P giving evidence or information to the COP 
Until recently there was no CoP guidance available for judges on meeting P and P giving 
information to the court. However, in November 2016 Mr Justice Charles, Vice President of the 
CoP, issued (non binding) practice guidance on Facilitating participation of ‘P’ and vulnerable 
persons in Court of Protection proceedings.521 The provisions related to judges meeting P will be 
considered in Section 3.6 below. In this guidance Charles J set out some considerations regarding 
whether or how P should give information to the CoP, indicating that the CoP is beginning to 
grapple with the practical issues that will arise as P participates more directly in proceedings: 
6. Consideration should be given in advance to the following:  
(a) Does P wish to attend the court and give the information in person?  
(b) Alternatively, or additionally might P wish to be video or audio recorded (this 
could be on a mobile phone in some cases, as long as a copy is available for 
the Judge and the parties, and appropriate security and confidentiality 
assured)? Where might such a recording take place (in Court, outside Court 
or at P’s home or day centre, for example)?  
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(c) The impact of the hearing being in public on the choices made;  
(d) How should questions be drafted and posed to P to elicit P’s views, 
minimising leading questions? Who might be best placed to ask P questions 
to elicit P‘s views – P’s representative or another professional? Will it be 
necessary to seek advice, for example from an intermediary who has 
assessed P’s communication needs and abilities, to facilitate communication 
with P?  
(e) In cases where P’s communication is such that it is necessary to ask closed or 
leading questions, can these be broken down and drafted in such a way as to 
minimise (not avoid altogether) the extent that they lead P? Such work would 
need to be done in advance.  
(f) What other advance work might need to be undertaken with P by, for 
example explaining the issues before the Court to P (see above) and ensuring 
that P knows what they are to be asked about either in person at a hearing or 
via a recording. 
As to P giving sworn witness evidence, the guidance issued by Charles J appears to foresee that this 
will only be necessary in fact finding hearings, acknowledging also that the occasions where P will 
be competent to give sworn evidence will be rare.522 Regarding such rare occasions, however, the 
guidance advises that the following needs to be considered: 
(a) A Ground Rules Hearing to discuss and determine the precise arrangements for P giving 
evidence; 
(b) P’s need for an intermediary should be determined and how this might be funded; 
(c) Careful advance preparation and if possible agreement of questions to be posed to P by the 
Court and the parties is likely to be required in advance of the Ground Rules Hearing.523 
These matters relating to attending court, and any special measures or reasonable adjustments 
that may be required, will be considered in Sections 3.6 and 3.7 below. 
Should judges base decisions upon evidence or information provided directly by P? 
At the roundtable, participants expressed mixed views and experiences concerning judges relying 
upon encounters with P as a source of evidence or information. One lawyer had experience of 
judges who would comment that ‘if it wasn’t for the expert report, I’d be confident that P had 
capacity’ on the basis of their meeting with the person. Another felt that judges might be less 
inclined to make a decision that conflicted with what the person wanted, if they had met the 
person and seen for themselves the strength of their wishes and feelings. However, a judge who 
attended the roundtable stated that they felt that meeting P never had much evidential impact 
upon the case; a position that sits in tension with the evidential principle. One participant 
expressed concern that it should be the function of the parties, not the judge, to ‘pull in evidence’. 
Another suggested that in cases such as Re SB, judges were ‘in reality, conducting a capacity 
assessment with no training’, and questioned whether it was right that judges were ‘unleashed’ 
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upon P. They drew attention to the fact that in Mental Health Tribunals, there was a medical 
member who at least had medical expertise.524 
The question of whether, and is so when, it is appropriate for judges to form their own view – 
which may depart from expert evidence – as to P’s mental capacity and best interests is likely to be 
contentious for those working within the system, regardless of the position under the ECHR. For 
example, Butler-Cole and Hobey-Hamsher question whether a courtroom is an appropriate setting 
for the assessment of capacity, given guidance in the MCA Code of Practice that assessors should 
look to settings that are likely to make the person feel comfortable. They go on to argue that where 
capacity is assessed in the courtroom ‘there is not only a real risk that the person will not receive 
the appropriate support and assistance to make a decision’; an approach that potentially runs 
counter to the requirements of s1(3) MCA and Article 12(3) CRPD. They also express concern that a 
person may appear ‘capacitous’ in a courtroom but this does not translate into everyday life.525 
Further consideration needs to be given to how evidence or information should be taken by judges 
if they meet P, especially if this occurs outside the presence of their legal representatives or the 
other parties. Consideration should also be given to the question of whether P could ever be 
compelled to give evidence or information, for example if one of the parties sought to rely upon 
this to demonstrate that they lack mental capacity. For the reasons outlined above, we suggest that 
a finding of incapacity cannot be arrived at by a judge without any supporting expert evidence. 
Practical questions of how the person should be supported to give evidence or information must 
also be addressed, and are discussed in Sections 3.6 and 3.7 below. Because of the complexity of 
these questions, it is appropriate that they should be considered in more detail by a competent 
body, comparable to the Children and Vulnerable Witnesses Working Group in the family court, 
with input from disability organisations with expertise in the area of access to justice.   
Recommendations on P as a source of evidence or information before the court 
Recommendation 8: A working group should be established to consider: those cases in which 
the evidential principle requires that the judge meet P to form their own view as to their 
capacity and the proportionality of any proposed measure; the best way to facilitate P giving 
evidence to the CoP for different kinds of matters; and how to address questions of fairness to 
P and the other parties in providing evidence or information directly to the judge.  The 
recommendations of this group should be given force of law in the COPR, rather than non-
binding guidance, to clarify P’s rights in this regard. 
Recommendation 9: The working group should include, in addition to legal and other experts, 
members of organisations representing disabled people to comply with the CRPD principle that 
those developing policies and legislation affecting disabled people should consult with them 
through their representative organisations.   
                                                     
524 The future status of the medical member of Mental Health Tribunals, in England at least, may be in doubt: Ministry 
of Justice, Transforming our justice system: summary of reforms and consultation, (Cm 9321, 2016); Ministry of Justice, 
Transforming our justice system: assisted digital strategy, automatic online conviction and statutory standard penalty, 
and panel composition in tribunals. Government response, (Cm 9391, 2017).  
525 Victoria Butler-Cole and Laura Hobey-Hamsher, n 497 
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3.5 REPRESENTATION IN PROCEEDINGS 
Article 6 ECHR rights to a fair trial guarantee effective access to a court. In Airey v Ireland 526 it was 
recognised that this might require legal representation if the subject matter of the case involved 
complicated points of law, expert evidence, the examination of witnesses and an ‘emotional 
involvement that is scarcely compatible with the degree of objectivity required by advocacy in 
court’.527 These are likely to be factors in many CoP cases concerning health and welfare. Cases 
concerning deprivation of liberty under the MCA are widely acknowledged as engaging highly 
complex and technical areas of law.528 Effective representation is important for any litigant in the 
CoP, but it is especially important for P whose core rights are at stake, and who is likely to have 
disabilities that would make it especially difficult or even impossible to understand and participate 
in the proceedings without assistance. 
Effective legal representation under the ECHR 
The additional difficulty that people with mental disabilities may have participating in proceedings 
has been recognised by the ECtHR in a number of cases where it has found that legal 
representation was indispensable for effective access to a court in cases concerning legal 
capacity529 and divestment of parental rights of people with intellectual disabilities.530  
In cases concerning both Article 5(1)531 (judicial authorisations of deprivation of liberty) and Article 
5(4)532 (rights to seek a review of the lawfulness of detention), the ECtHR has found violations of 
the right to liberty where detained people were not provided with effective legal representation. 
Article 5(4) does not require people with mental disabilities to take the initiative in obtaining legal 
representation before having recourse to a court.533 
Effective legal representation extends beyond the mere appointment of a representative. 
Representatives should be independent of any guardians534 or public bodies535 with whom P is in 
dispute. The ECtHR has stated that representatives must not be passive. In cases concerning 
deprivation of legal capacity and deprivation of liberty, the presence of a public prosecutor536, a 
                                                     
526 (App no 6289/73) [1979] ECHR 3; (1980) 2 EHRR 305 
527 Ibid, para. 24 
528 The Vice President of the Court of Protection, Mr Justice Charles, described trying to understand the DoLS as akin to 
going through a ‘a washing machine and spin dryer’. Mental Capacity Act 2005: post-legislative scrutiny paragraph, n 
47, para 271. See also the comments of Jackson J in C v Blackburn and Darwen Borough Council [2011] EWHC 3321 
(COP) 
529 MS v Croatia (App no 36337/10) [2013] ECHR 378 
530 AK and L v Croatia (App no 37956/11) [2013] ECHR 8 
531 MS v Croatia (No 2) [2015] ECHR 196 
532 Megyeri v Germany (App no 13770/88) [1992] ECHR 49; Pereira v Portugal (App no 44872/98) [2002] ECHR 161 
533 Megyeri v Germany (App no 13770/88) [1992] ECHR 49, para 22 
534 DDv Lithuania (App no 13469/06) [2012] ECHR 254 
535 Ivinović v Croatia (App no 13006/13) [2014] ECHR 964 
536 Shtukaturov v Russia (App no 44009/05) [2008] ECHR 223, para 74 
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temporary litigation guardian537 and even an independent legal aid lawyer538 to represent the 
person, were not sufficient to comply with Article 6 ECHR where they were passive and did not 
make submissions on the person’s behalf or oppose the measure in question.  
In the recent case of AN v Lithuania539 the ECtHR has given the strongest indication yet that it 
regards the role of a person’s representative in court as being to advance arguments in support of 
the person’s own view of his situation, rather than an ‘objective’ assessment of their best interests. 
The case concerned the deprivation of legal capacity of AN and the appointment of his mother as 
his guardian. The court emphasised that being subject to guardianship ‘does not mean that he is 
incapable of expressing a view on his situation’ and it is essential that he has access to a court ‘and 
the opportunity to be heard either in person or, where necessary, through some form of 
representation’540. The court went on to say: 
The Court also reiterates that there is the importance of ensuring the appearance of 
the fair administration of justice and a party to civil proceedings must be able to 
participate effectively, inter alia, by being able to put forward the matters in 
support of his or her claims.541 
This construction of effective participation as being able to ‘put forward matters in support of his or 
her claims’ gives a strong indication that the role of representatives in securing participation is to 
advocate for what P wants, rather than his or her ‘best interests’. 
The ECtHR has also held that it is important for a person’s legal representative to meet with the 
person they are representing in order to hear their arguments and ‘to understand and effectively 
represent [their] position’.542 Contact between the person and their representative was held to be 
‘necessary or even crucial in order to ensure that the proceedings would be really adversarial and 
the applicant’s legitimate interests protected’.543 
These cases suggest that the ECtHR takes the view that even where a person is deprived of legal 
capacity, the role of their legal representative is to actively pursue arguments on their behalf that 
reflect the person’s own position. This contrasts with an approach to representation based on 
advancing a case putting forward the representative’s own view of the person’s ‘best interests’, 
which may not reflect the person’s own position regarding the measures in question. However, the 
waters are muddied on the ECtHR position on ‘best interests’ representation, versus representing 
P’s wishes and feelings, by the case of RP v UK544. This case concerned how litigation friends should 
act when representing a parent in care proceedings. The ECtHR held that acting in a person’s best 
interests did not require the OS (as litigation friend) ‘to advance any argument R.P. wished’ 
                                                     
537 Salontaji-Drobnjak v Serbia (App no 36500/05) [2009] ECHR 1526 
538 MS v Croatia (No 2) [2015] ECHR 196 
539 (App No. 17280/08) [2016] ECHR 462 (31 May 2016) 
540 Ibid, para. 90 
541 Ibid, para. 91 
542 MS v Croatia (No 2), para 151 
543 MS v Croatia (No 2), para155; See also AN v Lithuania (App No. 17280/08) [2016] ECHR 462 (31 May 2016), para 106 
544 (App no 38245/08) [2012] ECHR 1796 
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although it was imperative that her views ‘be made known to the domestic court’.545 The 
Strasbourg court also held that litigation friends were an appropriate accommodation to facilitate 
disabled people’s effective role in proceedings, and that – interpreting Article 6 ECHR in light of 
Article 13 CRPD – ‘it was not only appropriate but also necessary for the United Kingdom to take 
measures to ensure that R.P.’s best interests were represented’.546 The Court gave no further 
elaboration as to the meaning of ‘best interests’. Ruck Keene, Bartlett and Allen547 observe that the 
ECtHR’s decision in RP v UK is ‘entirely inconsistent’ with its position on the importance of active 
representation of those subject to legal capacity or deprivation of liberty proceedings, outlined 
above. It is important to recognize that the position of the ECtHR in these guardianship cases is far 
closer to the situation of those subject to proceedings in the CoP than the facts in RP v UK. 
Representation under the amended Court of Protection Rules 
The amended COPR provide for a variety of different forms of representation for P in CoP 
proceedings: 
1. If P has litigation capacity they may be joined as a party and may either instruct legal 
representatives on their own behalf, or may even act as a litigant in person in the 
proceedings – perhaps with some form of lay support.  
2. If P lacks litigation capacity they may only be joined a party to the proceedings if a litigation 
friend or an ‘accredited legal representative’ is appointed to represent them.548 (The 
amended COPR are silent, however, as to whether a P who lacks litigation capacity may be 
the applicant in a case, as in such circumstances they will not need to be joined as a party). 
3. If P is not joined as a party to the proceedings, a ‘Rule 3A representative’ may be appointed 
whose function is ‘to provide the court with information as to the matters set out in section 
4(6) of the [MCA] and to discharge such other functions as the court may direct’.549 
It is very rare for P to be considered to have litigation capacity in CoP cases550, and rarer still for P to 
act as a litigant in person in the proceedings – although this situation has occurred in at least one 
reported property and affairs case.551 In health and welfare and deprivation of liberty cases outside 
the Re X streamlined procedure, it is most common for P to be represented by a litigation friend 
who instructs their legal representative on their behalf. Typically, the litigation friend has been the 
                                                     
545 Ibid, para 76. 
546 Ibid, para. 67 
547 Alex Ruck Keene, Peter Bartlett. and Neil Allen, 'Litigation friends or foes?: representation of 'P' before the Court of 
Protection' (2016) 24(3) Medical Law Review 333–359 
548 Court of Protection Rules 2007 SI 2007 No 1744, r 3A(4) as inserted by Court of Protection (Amendment) Rules 2015, 
SI 2015 No 548, r 5. 
549 Ibid, r 3A(2)(c). 
550 There are very few published judgments of the CoP where the relevant person was regarded as having the capacity 
to litigate. Re SB (A Patient; Capacity To Consent To Termination) [2013] EWHC 1417 (COP), CC v KK and STCC [2012] 
EWHC 2136 (COP) and GW v A Local Authority & Anor [2014] EWCOP 20 are rare examples of this occurring. 
551 In both L v NG [2015] EWCOP 34 and Re P (capacity to tithe inheritance) [2014] EWHC B14 (COP) the relevant person 
was said to have litigation capacity and appeared to be joined as a party and participate in the proceedings as a litigant 
in person.  
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Official Solicitor, but they might also be the RPR or an IMCA,552 and since In Re NRA and others the 
litigation friend is likely to be a friend or family member in non-contentious cases.   
Prior to the 2015 amendments, the COPR were drafted in such a way as to appear to presume that 
P would always lack litigation capacity at the outset of the proceedings.553 Provisions for 
terminating the appointment of a litigation friend referred to P ‘ceasing’ to lack the capacity to 
litigate554 and if P sought to terminate the appointment of their litigation friend on this basis, they 
were required to supply evidence.555 In effect, therefore, the COPR as drafted in 2007 presumed 
that P would lack the capacity to litigate and placed the burden of proof upon those asserting that 
he had litigation capacity, contrary to the presumption of mental capacity under the MCA.556 
Recommendations to reconsider this rule were not taken up in 2010557, but the 2015 amendments 
have replaced these provisions.  There is now no presumption in the Rules that P will lack litigation 
capacity and be required to supply evidence in order to seek the termination of the appointment of 
a litigation friend. 
‘Best interests’ representation in the Court of Protection 
People who have litigation capacity can instruct their solicitor to conduct the case according to 
their wishes and preferences, so long as their instructions are ‘properly arguable’.558 Thus, they can 
use CoP proceedings to contest any measure proposed in their best interests by arguing either that 
they have the mental capacity to make the relevant decision, or that it is not in their best interests, 
or that it would be unlawful for other reasons. In contrast, when a person is considered to lack 
litigation capacity, the pre-MCA case of Re E (Mental Health Patient) 559 defines the role of litigation 
friends as being to ‘carry on the litigation on behalf of the plaintiff and in his best interests‘, and 
they are ‘responsible to the court for the propriety and the progress of the proceedings. It has been 
assumed that this approach should be adopted in the CoP, and in consequence litigation friends 
may take the view that it is not in P’s best interests to oppose the measure on his behalf; they may 
even argue for it. 
Established practice in the CoP, recently confirmed by Charles J in Re NRA, required litigation 
friends to form a view as to what is in P’s best interests and advance it, ‘although it may not accord 
with what P is asserting’.560 This means that litigation friends may be required to advance 
arguments that are at odds with the outcome the person themselves wants. For example, in Re E 
                                                     
552 AB v LCC (A Local Authority) [2011] EWHC 3151 (COP)  
553 Rule 141(1) stated that ‘Subject to rule 147, P (if a party to proceedings) must have a litigation friend.’ 
554 Rule 147(1) stated ‘This rule applies where P ceases to be a person who lacks capacity to conduct the proceedings 
himself but continues to lack capacity in relation to the matter or matters to which the application relates’. 
555 Rule 144(2) (unamended). Court of Protection (2007) Practice Direction 17A - Litigation Friend, (Judiciary of England 
and Wales, London). 
556 MCA 2005, s 1(2).  
557 Court of Protection Rules Committee (2010) Report of the ad hoc Court of Protection Rules Committee London: 
Judiciary of England and Wales. 
558 Buxton v Mills-Owens [2010] EWCA Civ 122 
559 [1985] 1 WLR 245 
560 Re NRA & Ors [2015] EWCOP 59, para 170. 
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(Medical treatment: Anorexia) (Rev 1)561, E’s litigation friend argued that it was in her best interests 
to be forcibly fed, although E herself opposed that measure. It was left to E’s parents, who were 
unrepresented, to support the case against intervention which she would have advanced.  
A litigation friend may also seek to withdraw proceedings before the court has determined the 
substantive issues, including withdrawing proceedings to seek a court review of a deprivation of 
liberty which the detained person objects to. In TA v AA562 the Court of Appeal was asked to 
consider whether it was lawful for a litigation friend to withdraw an appeal against a standard 
authorisation issued under the DoLS on the basis that: 
i. that there had been no material change since the last application was determined [seven 
months earlier] and that the Appellant was running the 'same argument' as before; 
ii. an application under section 21A was not an appropriate means of challenging care 
arrangements, at least not without a review [by the supervisory body who granted the 
authorisation]563; 
iii. section 21A proceedings [to appeal against a DoLS authorisation] represented a 'significant 
burden on both the [Legal Services Commission] and the court service and should only be 
brought if there is merit in so doing and it is proportionate', which was not the case in 
relation to the Appellant's application564 
It was argued by the appellant, who was P’s father and RPR, that to permit the appeal against 
detention to be withdrawn before it had been determined by the CoP violated the detained 
person’s Article 5(4) rights to seek a court review of the lawfulness of their detention. Regrettably 
the Court of Appeal was unable to dispose of the appeal due to jurisdictional issues. Hence it is 
unclear whether and when appeals against detention can be withdrawn by litigation friends on the 
basis that there was no material change, there were alternative means to challenge care 
arrangements (albeit not Article 5 compliant565) and that appeals under the DoLS were a ‘significant 
burden’ to the court system and should only be brought ‘if there is merit in doing so and it is 
proportionate’. It is suggested that this last ground for withdrawing an appeal is dubious and likely 
to be discriminatory, since a person with litigation capacity cannot have their Article 5(4) right of 
appeal disposed of in this way and on these grounds. We suggest that the appropriate mechanism 
for managing the limited resources of the CoP is the permission seeking process – which was 
deliberately omitted by Parliament for the purpose of DoLS appeals566 – and the ordinary case 
management powers of the court, rather than by those representing P.  
                                                     
561 [2012] EWHC 1639 (COP) 
562 [2013] EWCA Civ 1661 
563 These are known as ‘Part 8 Reviews’, as they are provided for in Part 8 of Schedule A1 to the MCA which contains 
the DoLS. 
564 [2013] EWCA Civ 1661 para. 22 
565 For a review of the lawfulness of detention to be compliant with Article 5(4) it must be a review by a court or 
tribunal, which must be independent of the detaining authorities (Weeks v UK (Application no. 9787/82) [1987] ECHR (2 
March 1987); Hutchison Reid v UK (App no 50272/99) [2003] ECHR 9). It has been recognised by the government that 
reviews by the supervisory body would not satisfy the requirements of Article 5(4): Department of Health, ‘Protecting 
the Vulnerable: the “Bournewood” Consultation: Summary of Responses’ (2006) para 38. 
566 s50(1A) MCA, as amended by the MHA 2007 
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In obiter remarks in Re NRA and Others, Charles J also expressed support for the view that whilst an 
RPR should decide whether or not to issue a challenge on the basis of P’s objections, as per the 
guidance in AJ (discussed in Section 3.1 above), but the challenge itself should proceed on the basis 
of the RPR’s assessment of P’s best interests.567 Charles J held that litigation friends ‘may well have 
to advance argument that does not accord with P's expressed wishes. Indeed, this is not 
uncommon’, and both litigation friends and Rule 3A representatives ‘may well have to advance a 
solution that does not accord with objections being expressed by P’.568  In some cases this will lead 
to the somewhat bizarre outcome that an RPR – acting on the guidance in AJ and RD and Others 
may be required to assist P in making an application to the CoP on the basis that they wish to 
challenge the deprivation of liberty in accordance with Article 5(4), yet if they then assume the role 
of litigation friend they must – acting in P’s best interests’ – either withdraw the application or 
support or consent to the very measure that they were supposed to help P to oppose. This scenario 
highlights the consequences that ensue when ‘best interests’ and ‘wishes and feelings’ models of 
representation collide. 
Arguments against representing a person’s ‘best welfare interests’ in the CoP 
We have suggested above that this model of best interests representation sits in tension with the 
‘active representation’ model of ECtHR jurisprudence on participation in legal capacity and 
deprivation of liberty proceedings. It potentially undermines both the dignity principle, that the 
person’s own voice (not that of their representative) should be at the centre of the proceedings, 
and the adversarial principle that the person who is the subject of proceedings should be able to 
advance and rebut evidence and arguments in support of their position. It raises questions about 
the value of the right guaranteed by Article 6 of ‘direct access to a court to seek restoration of his 
or her legal capacity’569 or the Article 5(4) right ‘to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his 
detention shall be decided speedily by a court’ if once a person gets to court their legal 
representative may not seek the restoration of their capacity or a court review of the lawfulness of 
their detention. This model of ‘best interests’ representation also runs counter to the increasing 
emphasis on respect for the ‘will and preferences’ of P under Article 12(4) of the CRPD.570  
An alternative analysis of the requirements of the common law for litigation friends has been 
proposed by Ruck Keene, Bartlett and Allen, who maintain – citing Osborn v the Parole Board – that 
the common law emphasises ‘the importance of respect for the individual to be affected by the 
decision-making process’ and argue that ‘procedural fairness dictates that the litigation friend be 
(and be seen by P to be) representing P, rather than discharging any other functions’.571 They argue 
that models of representation of those without litigation capacity in ordinary civil proceedings and 
the representation of children’s interests in family proceedings by a guardian are not an 
appropriate model for the representation of P in the CoP.  They argue that if the litigation friend is 
bound to act in P’s best interests under s1(5) MCA, then: 
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there is a strongly arguable case that they would owe a duty to P (not to the court) 
to select the option that P would have chosen if such an option is available. Until and 
unless prevented by the deployment of appropriate case management tools by the 
court, a litigant with capacity can advance a hopeless case even if this would be most 
unwise. If it is right that a decision maker must at least in some circumstances follow 
the wishes and feelings of P if it is practical to do so, a litigation friend acting on 
behalf of a person without capacity must advance such a hopeless case if that clearly 
reflects P’s wishes.572 
In other words, in the context of CoP litigation, P’s best interests for representation are advanced 
not by arguing for his representative’s assessment of his best welfare interests but by actively 
pursuing the best possible case for what P wants, even if that means advancing a hopeless case. 
They argue for an amendment to the COPR to ‘Make clear that the primary duty of a litigation 
friend acting on behalf of P should—where P’s wishes and feelings can reliably be identified—be to 
proceed on the basis that the case that they put to the court is derived from those wishes and 
feelings’.573 
The traditional ‘best interests’ approach to representing P in the CoP also conflicts with the duties 
upon IMCAs and RPRs to assist P in exercising his or her Article 5(4) rights, as outlined by Baker J in 
the AJ and RD cases described in Section 3.1 above. In these cases Baker J has held that ‘best 
interests’ cannot be used as a reason to restrict the exercise of Article 5(4) rights. It would be odd if 
this simply applied to the access to a court element of Article 5(4), but did not actually result in a 
person having an Article 5(4) compliant hearing before a court that was empowered to fully 
consider the person’s rights and order the person’s discharge. It remains to be seen whether 
another test case will be brought that could require the CoP to clarify the approach that should be 
taken by a litigation friend.  
A different model of representation is adopted before Mental Health Tribunals and the Mental 
Health Review Tribunal in Wales. Solicitors may represent clients without taking instructions from a 
litigation friend. Traditionally this model of representation has been closer to the ‘active 
representation’ model supported by the ECtHR jurisprudence on deprivation of liberty and 
deprivation of capacity, where solicitors advance a case based on the outcome that P wants, even if 
there is little likelihood that their arguments will be successful. However, the ‘best interests’ 
approach taken by litigation friends has begun to have an influence on practice in the Mental 
Health Tribunals through recent litigation. Since the Law Commission is considering the relative 
merits of a CoP based system as against a system based on review by the Mental Health Tribunal, it 
is important to understand the key features of the tribunal system and the model of participation 
which is employed there. This will be discussed in more detail the Section 4.8 of this report, where 
we consider the approach of the Tribunal in closer detail. 
In some cases in the CoP it may be unclear precisely how P wishes, or would wish, his or her 
representatives to proceed.  For example, in cases where P is unconscious or has profound 
communication impairments, it may be unclear what P’s overall wishes, feelings, values and beliefs 
would be in relation to the decision the CoP has been asked to make.  In circumstances where a 
person’s ‘will and preferences’ are unclear, the approach recommended by the United Nations 
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Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities is to proceed on the basis of the ‘best 
interpretation of will and preferences’.574  Representatives may approach this task in accordance 
with MCA s 4(6) – consulting with those caring for and close to the person about their wishes, 
feelings, values and beliefs.  However, insofar as they have based this case on an interpretation of 
what P would likely want, it is important that they are transparent with the CoP and the other 
parties about how they have arrived at this reasoning.  The critical point is that the case is based on 
a ‘substituted judgment’ of what P would want, not ‘objective’ factors such as health, or extended 
lifespan (unless it can be shown that it is likely that P would desire this).  To paraphrase Lady Hale’s 
remarks in Aintree University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust v James575, the purpose of P’s 
representative is to represent the person’s own ‘point of view’.576 
It is also important to note that under the MCA a person is not to be regarded as unable to make a 
decision for himself ‘unless all practicable steps to help him to do so have been taken without 
success.’577  In addition, Article 12(3) CRPD requires that States Parties to the Convention ‘take 
appropriate measures to provide access by persons with disabilities to the support they may 
require in exercising their legal capacity.’  These provisions mean that prior to the question of 
representing P in his or her best interests, there is a requirement to support P to make decisions 
regarding her or his participation in the proceedings, including the conduct of his representation.  
As yet, this element of the MCA has not received as much attention in relation to the practices of 
litigation friends and other representatives as the question of what P’s ‘best interests’ are in 
relation to litigation.  Yet supporting P’s legal capacity is fundamental to a human rights approach 
to representation.  There are examples of systems of support to enable people to instruct 
representatives and participate in litigation that do not involve representatives or others taking 
substituted decisions on a person’s behalf.578   
It might also be possible for P to take some decisions about his participation and representation, 
even if overall it is considered that he lacks the capacity to instruct his representatives in the fine 
grained detail of the conduct of his case.  At present litigation capacity has been constructed as an 
all or nothing affair because of its ongoing nature579, but this does not sit comfortably with the 
general principle that mental capacity is ‘decision specific’580 and the requirement to consider less 
restrictive courses of action.581  Of course, if representatives acted on the basis of P’s wishes and 
feelings, rather than P’s best interests, concerns about ‘denials’ of litigation capacity would weigh 
less heavily. 
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Further attention needs to be given to how P can best be supported and enabled to make decisions 
for himself about his or her participation and representation in CoP proceedings.  This will require 
litigation friends and other representatives to take a new approach.  The COPR should be amended 
so that P’s representatives base their case, as far as possible within their other professional 
obligations, on the outcome that P themselves wants. 
Rule 3A representatives and Accredited Legal Representatives 
The CoP system has had to grapple with a growing number of situations where a person is unable 
to secure the services of either a legal representative, a litigation friend, or both; this has been 
highlighted in the recent Re X sequence of litigation. This may be because public funding is not 
available for the litigation in question and it is not possible, or is undesirable, to use P’s personal 
financial resources to pay for legal representation. Or it may be, as in Re MOD, that there is no 
suitable person to act as P’s litigation friend and the Official Solicitor is unable to act in this 
capacity. This means that in some cases a person cannot be joined as a party to the proceedings, or 
a person who is not a party is not afforded any independent representation or assistance in CoP 
proceedings, where it would be desirable for them to be. The 2015 amendments created the roles 
of ‘Rule 3A representative’582 (‘representatives’) and ‘Accredited Legal Representatives’ (ALRs) to 
address these situations.583 
Rule 3A representatives can represent the person where they are not joined as a party. Unlike ALRs 
they need not be legal practitioners – the role might be fulfilled, for example, by an advocate or a 
family member. Rule 3A representatives were introduced following growing awareness of the 
Strasbourg case law on participation outlined above. They were also referenced in comments by 
the President in Re X No 2 that in deprivation of liberty cases, ‘P will also need some form of 
representation, professional though not necessarily always legal’584, and that they could be 
represented in the proceedings without being made a party.585 Their role is defined by Rule 3A(2)(c) 
as follows: 
P’s participation should be secured by the appointment of a representative whose 
function shall be to provide the court with information as to the matters set out in 
section 4(6) of the Act and to discharge such other functions as the court may direct; 
Rule 3A representatives must, therefore, provide the court with information on ‘the person's past 
and present wishes and feelings (and, in particular, any relevant written statement made by him 
when he had capacity)’, ‘the beliefs and values that would be likely to influence his decision if he 
had capacity’ and ‘the other factors that he would be likely to consider if he were able to do so’. 
Hence it is important to emphasise that the Rules construct the Rule 3A representative’s role on the 
‘wishes, feelings, values and beliefs’ model of representation, rather than the representative’s own 
views of P’s best interests.  However, the role is not limited to providing the CoP with information; 
                                                     
582 Rule 3A(2)(c) and s4(6) MCA 
583 NB: In Part 17 Section 2, Rule 3A representatives (lay representatives) and Accredited Legal Representatives are both 
referred to as ‘Rule 3A representatives’ (see rule 146A, as amended). For the avoidance of confusion, we will refer to 
lay representatives appointed under Rule 3A as ‘Rule 3A representatives’, whilst ‘Accredited Legal Representatives’ will 
be referred to as such. 
584 (2014) EWCOP 37, para. 14  
585 Ibid, para 19. 
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the power for the court to impose other functions makes the role very flexible and therefore makes 
it possible to fulfil a variety of functions in support of participation. 
ALRs are legal representatives ‘authorised pursuant to a scheme of accreditation approved by the 
President to represent persons meeting the definition of “P” in this rule in proceedings before the 
court’.586 The Law Society has developed such a scheme, which is likely to begin operation in 2017. 
The role of ALRs is defined by Rule 3A(2)(b) as ‘to represent P in the proceedings and to discharge 
such other functions as the court may direct’. Like lawyers acting for clients before the Mental 
Health Tribunals, ALRs will be able to represent P without taking instructions from a litigation 
friend, and thus may be able to address situations like those in MOD where there is no available 
litigation friend who can act for P but it is desirable that P is joined as a party to the proceedings. As 
the scheme is not yet in operation, and there is no available guidance further specifying how ALRs 
must discharge their functions. It remains to be seen what model of representation ALRs adopt, 
whether one based on the ‘best interests’ approach of litigation friends in the CoP or one closer to 
the approach taken by solicitors representing clients before the Tribunal.  
Like litigation friends, both representatives and ALRs must be able to discharge their functions 
‘competently and fairly’.587 Unlike litigation friends, there is no requirement for a representative or 
an ALR to have ‘no interests adverse to those of that person’.588 The court may appoint a 
representative or ALR on its own initiative or upon receipt of an application, but only with the 
consent of the person who will act as representative or ALR.589 The court can also direct that a 
person may not act as representative or ALR, or terminate their appointment, on its own initiative 
or on the application of any person.590 
The rule permitting the appointment of Rule 3A representatives came into force in April 2015, and 
at the time of writing there have been four reported cases concerning the (possible) appointment 
of Rule 3A representatives: Re NRA, Re JM (both discussed in Sections 1.4, 3.1 and 3.2 above), HSE 
Ireland v PD591 and Re VE592.  
In HSE Ireland v PD Baker J noted that the Rule 3A requirement to consider whether it was 
appropriate to appoint a representative applied as much to cross-border cases where the CoP was 
asked to consider for recognition a foreign order authorising a deprivation of liberty, as for 
domestic cases.  
In Re VE Mr Justice Charles responded to a need to provide further guidance for friends or family 
acting in the role of a representative under Rule 3A, whom local authorities described as often 
confused about their role. He issued an Explanatory Note for representatives, which we have 
included in Appendix C. Tellingly, this note emphasised the role of Rule 3A representatives in 
scrutinising P’s care and support from the perspective of their best interests: 
                                                     
586 Rule 6, COPR as amended. 
587 Rule 146A COPR, as amended. 
588 Contrast with Rule 140(1)(b) for litigation friends. 
589 Rule 148A COPR, as amended. 
590 Rule 148B COPR, as amended. 
591 [2015] EWCOP 48 
592 [2016] EWCOP 16 
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What you need to do is to consider and decide from that perspective whether P's 
package of care and support is the least restrictive available option that best 
promotes P's best interests and then inform the Court what you have decided and 
what P's wishes and feelings about the package of care and support are 
In short, the Court is asking you, as someone who knows the position on the 
ground, to consider whether from the perspective of P's best interests you agree or 
do not agree that the Court should authorise P's package of care and support.593 
Although in the COPR the primary role of Rule 3A representative is to convey to the CoP 
information about P’s wishes, feelings, values and beliefs – the subject matter of s4(6) MCA – these 
subjective matters take a back seat in Charles J’s guidance, which reflects a best interests model of 
representation. 
Re NRA and Re JM formed part of the Re X sequence of litigation outlined in Section 1.4 above. 
These concerned how the CoP should facilitate P’s participation in a non-contentious application for 
authorisation of a deprivation of liberty that fell outside the scope of the DoLS, and so could only be 
authorised directly by the CoP in accordance with the requirement of Article 5(1) ECHR. In Re NRA, 
Charles J departed from the Court of Appeal’s assessment in Re X (Court of Protection Practice)594 
that it was likely that P would need to be joined as a party to protect his Article 5 and common law 
rights. His judgment considered the ‘Procedural Balance’ to be struck between the competing 
interests of securing to P his rights under Article 5 ECHR and the common law, and ‘avoiding 
disproportionately intrusive, delayed and/or expensive intervention in the lives of P and his or her 
family and carers.’595 Like Sir James Munby P when he had first established the ‘streamlined’ 
procedure, Charles J emphasised that much of the CoP’s jurisdiction is investigative and non-
adversarial.596 Re NRA was concerned with applications that – at least on the face of the evidence 
submitted to the CoP by the detaining authorities – were non-controversial; neither P nor anybody 
else objected to the detention. He acknowledged, however, the risks that ‘an application that is 
presented as non-contentious and in P's best interests may be neither’ and the potential advantage 
of an independent check, but these were competing factors in the Procedural Balance to be 
struck.597  
Several possible routes to representing P in the proceedings were considered by Charles J in Re 
NRA, including: joining P as a party (a route favoured by the Law Society and the Official Solicitor) 
and his representation either through a litigation friend instructing legal representatives or even a 
litigation friend addressing the court directly (the ALR scheme not being operational at the time of 
the hearing), or his not being joined as a party and being represented through a lay Rule 3A 
representative, who could be an independent person such as an IMCA (a route advanced by the 
Secretary of State for Justice) or a family member. The pressing reality that undermined arguments 
for P to be joined as a party and given legal representation was the unavailability of legal aid for 
these cases; likewise the solution of appointing an independent Rule 3A representative (such as an 
IMCA) was undermined by their being no professional advocates or representatives funded or 
                                                     
593 Ibid, Explanatory Note appended to judgment. Emphasis in original. 
594 [2015] EWCA Civ 599 
595 Re NRA & Ors [2015] EWCOP 59, para 33. 
596 Ibid, paras 35-39.  
597 Ibid, para 44 
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contracted to undertake such work. Charles J did, however, conclude that a lay person could act as 
a litigation friend without acting through a legal representative, offering an alternative to a Rule 3A 
representative where no funding was available to instruct a solicitor. 
Charles J concluded that any representative on behalf of P needed to fulfil three main functions: 
i. eliciting P's wishes and feelings and making them and the matters mentioned in s. 4(6) of 
the MCA known to the Court without causing P any or any598 unnecessary distress, 
ii. critically examining from the perspective of P's best interests, and with a detailed 
knowledge of P, the pros and cons of a care package, and whether it is the least restrictive 
available option, and 
iii. keeping the implementation of the care package under review and raising points relating to 
it and changes in P's behaviour or health.599 
Drawing on his experience in the CoP and Family Court, he concluded that it would be P’s family 
who would be best placed to fulfil these tasks. Yet the precise role they occupied in the litigation – 
as a person in their own right, as a litigation friend or as a Rule 3A representative – was less 
relevant.600 One advantage of appointing a family member as a Rule 3A representative was the 
power of the CoP to direct that they undertake specific functions, such as monitoring a care 
package and keeping the authorisation under review, analogous to the role of the RPR.601 Thus this 
would be the most appropriate course of action in most cases.602 The COPDOL 10 form to be used 
by public authorities applying for authorisation of a deprivation of liberty under the streamlined 
procedure has been amended to include a list of persons who are willing to act as a litigation friend 
or Rule 3A representative.603 
As regards the need for an independent check, referenced by the Court of Appeal in Re X and Lady 
Hale in Cheshire West, Charles J saw no reason why family members could not ordinarily satisfy this 
requirement. Although in Re UF604 Charles J had concluded that a relative could not be appointed as 
P’s litigation friend, this was because they were ‘clearly wedded to a particular answer’ and lacked 
the requisite balanced approach.605 The question of whether a family member or friend can act as a 
litigation friend is case sensitive and turns on whether they can ‘a balanced way consider and 
properly promote P's best interests’.606 Charles J felt that in most cases they could. 
Charles J’s view of the role of a Rule 3A representative is, then, closely connected to a ‘best 
interests’ model of representation – which he also emphasises in relation to RPRs under the DoLS. 
This sits in tension with the role of Rule 3A representatives as outlined in the COPR, which is 
primarily connected to conveying information regarding P’s wishes and feelings, rather than his 
                                                     
598 Sic (typo in the copy of the judgment on BAILII at the time of writing) 
599 Ibid, para 164 
600 Ibid, para 231 
601 Ibid, para 233 
602 Ibid, para 239 
603 Form COPDOL 10, as amended September 2016. 
604 [2013] EWCOP 4289 
605 Ibid, para 23 
606 Re NRA & Ors [2015] EWCOP 59, para 173 
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best interests. It also contrasts with the view advanced by Ruck Keene and colleagues in connection 
with litigation friends, that a person’s best legal interests are better served by representing what 
the person wants, rather than the representative’s assessment of their best welfare interests. This 
distinction may be less critical in streamlined procedure cases where the matters are non-
contentious; in other words, P is not objecting and neither are P’s family.  But it could be 
problematic under a human rights model of representation if P’s views about his or her care were 
different from those of the representative. 
It remains to be seen how this Rule 3A representative role will develop. The model of 
representation to be adopted by both lay representatives under Rule 3A and ALRs are caught in the 
cross winds of wider conflicting forces. Those who favour a best interests model of representation, 
based on the traditional understanding of the role of the litigation friend, or those who prefer a 
more ‘active’ approach to representing the wishes and feelings of P – however hopeless that may 
seem. The latter approach may well be the preferred by the ECtHR and the common law, and is 
almost certainly the model favoured under the CRPD. 
Recommendations on representation of P 
Recommendation 10: Funding for legal representation and Rule 3A representatives for capacity 
and deprivation of liberty cases must be reviewed by the government as a matter of urgency. 
Recommendation 11: The CoP should reconsider the approach to representation taken by 
litigation friends and Rule 3A representatives to take into account the ‘active representation’ 
approach based on the person’s wishes and feelings increasingly advocated under human rights 
law, and requirements under the MCA to support P in making decisions about participation and 
representation for himself wherever possible. 
3.6 ATTENDING COURT AND PERSONAL CONTACT WITH JUDGES 
The ECtHR increasingly emphasises personal contact between P and the judge for three reasons: 
1. As a matter of principle, where judges are making important decisions about a person’s life 
(the ‘dignity principle’); 
2. For evidential reasons, so that the judge may form her or his own view as to the person’s 
mental capacity and the proportionality of any measures they may impose, as a safeguard 
against over-reliance on expert evidence (the ‘evidential principle’); 
3. To increase equality of arms, so that the person may put their case to the judge (the 
‘adversarial principle’). 
The evidential principle has already been discussed in Section 3.4 in connection with giving 
evidence or information in court. Potentially, the adversarial principle could be satisfied by effective 
representation in court, subject to the debates concerning the appropriate mode of representation 
outlined in Section 3.5. This section will review the case law on when judges in the CoP should meet 
P as a matter of principle, regardless of whether it will enhance the quality of their decision making. 
The rule of personal presence under the ECtHR 
The ECtHR first set out what it later came to call the ‘rule of personal presence’607 in deprivation of 
capacity proceedings in X and Y v Croatia: 
                                                     
607 Lashin v Russia (Application no. 33117/02) [2012] ECHR 63, para 82. 
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judges adopting decisions with serious consequences for a person’s private life, such 
as those entailed by divesting someone of legal capacity, should in principle also 
have personal contact with those persons.608  
Echoing this stance, the UKSC has also held that under the common law the requirements of justice 
and respect for dignity call for ‘a procedure which pays due respect to persons whose rights are 
significantly affected by decisions taken in the exercise of administrative or judicial functions’.609 It 
may be necessary to hear directly from the person concerned, not merely because it may enhance 
the procedural fairness and quality of decision making, but also to avoid ‘the sense of injustice 
which the person who is the subject of the decision will otherwise feel’.610 
At face value, this may be a very problematic approach for the CoP, since almost any decision made 
by a judge within this jurisdiction will have ‘serious consequences for a person’s private life’. Yet 
the vast majority of cases before the CoP are typically dealt with ‘on the papers’ without a hearing, 
such as non-contentious property and affairs or Re X non-contentious deprivation of liberty 
applications.  
The ECtHR has offered a little further refinement of this principle in subsequent cases. In Zagidulina 
v Russia611 the court indicated that the stronger a person’s views about the outcome of a decision, 
the stronger this right of personal presence, stating that a person’s ‘right to be heard’ was ‘ever 
more pressing’ given their ‘clear and undisputed refusal to undergo any treatment’.612 This suggests 
that one key criterion for implementing the rule of personal presence in the CoP may be whether or 
not the proceedings are contentious, particularly in terms of P’s potential objections. 
In Shtukaturov the court coupled its statement that the judge should have had some ‘brief visual 
contact’ with Mr Shtukaturov to an observation that he was ‘a relatively autonomous person.’613 
Likewise in AN v Lithuania614 the court observed that Mr AN was ‘a relatively independent person’, 
before concluding that the judge should have ‘brief visual contact’ with him. The court observed 
that just because a person is subject to guardianship ‘does not mean that he is incapable of 
expressing a view on his situation’.615 Where a judge does not have ‘direct contact with the person 
concerned’, the court commented, this would usually call for ‘judicial restraint on the part of the 
Court.’616 This suggests that the rule of personal presence may also be related to whether or not P 
can express a view – regardless of his capacity. 
                                                     
608 Ibid, para 84 
609 Osborn v The Parole Board [2013] UKSC 61, para. 68 
610 Ibid, para. 68 
611 (App no 11737/06) Chamber Judgment [2013] ECHR 398 
612 §62, echoing the ‘right to be heard’ in the assessment of emotional suffering established in Göç v Turkey (App no 
36590/97) [2002] ECHR 589, para 51. See also MS v Croatia (No 2) [2015] ECHR 196, para 158 
613 Shtukaturov v Russia (App no 44009/05) [2008] ECHR 223, para. 73 
614 (App No. 17280/08) [2016] ECHR 462  
615 Ibid, para 90. 
616 Ibid, para 120. 
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In Lashin v Russia617 the court held that there are possible exceptions from the ‘rule of personal 
presence’, but commented that ‘departure from this rule is possible only where the domestic court 
carefully examined this issue.’618 In Berková v. Slovakia619 it found that the decision of the domestic 
courts to exclude Ms Berková, a woman diagnosed with ‘a querulous type of paranoia’, from 
deprivation of capacity proceedings to be compatible with her rights. However, this was based 
upon a specific recommendation by medical experts. In contrast, in Lashin v Russia, ‘the District 
Court merely stated that the applicant’s personal presence would be “prejudicial to his health”, and 
there is no evidence that the court ever sought a doctor’s opinion on that particular question, 
namely what effect appearing in court might have had on the applicant.’620 It seems that in 
situations where the rule of personal presence would generally be engaged, the court may only 
dispense with this requirement where it has specifically considered the question of P’s participation 
and based its decision on actual evidence (rather than judicial conjecture) about the impact of 
participating directly in the proceedings upon the person.  
The ECtHR has also held that the right to personal presence may be dispensed with in exceptional 
circumstances, such as minor misdemeanor offences.621 It is unlikely that any matter before the 
CoP would be sufficiently trivial to engage this provision. A person can also waive their right to be 
present, but this waiver must be unequivocal and attended by minimum procedural safeguards 
commensurate to its importance.622 
Court of Protection rules and procedure for personal contact with judges and attending 
court 
Rule 88 of the COPR grants the court the power to hear from P on whether or not an order should 
be made, even if he is not a party to the proceedings. However, the court may proceed in P’s 
absence if the judge ‘considers that it would be appropriate to do so.’ Under the COPR prior to the 
2015 amendments, the rules were silent regarding whether judges could meet with P outside of a 
hearing and the presence of the other parties. Under the new Rule 3A imposes a duty on the court 
to consider the question of participation directions. The court must consider, in each case, whether 
P ‘should have the opportunity to address (directly or indirectly) the judge determining the 
application and, if so directed, the circumstances in which that should occur’. The accompanying 
Practice Direction 2A does not, however, give any guidance on when it would – or would not - be 
appropriate for the judge to be addressed directly or indirectly by P, nor the circumstances in which 
this should occur. Further detail is, however, provided by Charles J’s (non-binding) recent guidance 
on facilitating the participation of P in the CoP, which is discussed in more detail below.  
Nevertheless, neither of these sources of guidance reflect the strength of this principle in ECtHR 
case law, nor the limited circumstances in which it has held that a judge may not meet with the 
person concerned. 
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Judge Rogers in A County Council v AB & Ors (Participation of P in Proceedings)623 considered that 
Rule 90 of the CoP rules, which provides that ‘A private hearing is a hearing which only the 
following persons are entitled to attend; (a) the parties; (b) P and others’ creates a right for P to 
attend a hearing. The judge said this: ‘In my judgment Rule 90 provides or establishes the 
entitlement of P to attend proceedings. The word 'entitlement' or 'entitled' is clear.’624 This is an 
important statement of the right of P to attend court, though in what capacity remained an issue in 
the case. 
Historical, cultural and practical considerations 
Unlike Mental Health Tribunals, the CoP was not established on the assumption that all cases would 
be determined by an oral hearing which the person would attend. Historically, the working 
presumption seems to have been that P – like children in the Family Court – would participate 
directly only very rarely. In fact, the direct participation of P in the proceedings, and the question of 
P meeting with judges outside of the courtroom, is not discussed in the COPR consultations that 
took place when the new CoP was established. In common with its predecessor court, the majority 
of non-contentious property and affairs cases are decided ‘on the papers’ without an oral hearing 
at all. Indeed, to require direct judicial contact with P in all cases concerning legal capacity or 
deprivation of liberty would represent a potentially insurmountable practical challenge for the CoP 
under its current arrangements. This background has led to a number of barriers to P’s direct 
participation in the proceedings. 
As we have outlined above in Section 3.4 (Evidence and information before the court) sometimes 
the barriers to P’s direct participation may be cultural. A group of barristers and solicitors who 
regularly represent clients in the CoP observed to the House of Lords Committee on the MCA that: 
There is marked variation in the willingness of judges to meet P and allow P to give 
evidence, or put across his/her views in whatever way is suitable… We have 
considerable doubts that the current system which does not presume that judges 
should have ‘personal contact’ before making decisions about their capacity or best 
interests is compatible with the ECHR625 
They recommended that further guidance should be provided for the courts on hearing from P. At 
the roundtable, participants spoke of variations in judicial willingness to meet with P, but several 
commented that the practice of the CoP was increasingly moving towards P being given 
opportunities to attend court or meet with the judge in person. One judge who attended 
commented that if they knew that P wished to meet them, they felt it was a matter of ‘courtesy’ to 
do so, echoing that suggestion by the ECtHR and the Supreme Court in Osborn that direct contact 
between the judge and the person was a matter of principle. Cultural barriers to participation are 
not restricted to the judiciary, of course. It will also be important that lawyers and others working 
in the justice system – such as court staff, and litigation friends, support P’s direct participation and 
work collaboratively to overcome the barriers that may be faced. 
Part of the problem may be a lack of understanding of the purpose of direct contact between P and 
the judge. We have noted in Section 3.4 above, that the approach to taking information and 
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evidence gathering from children in the Family Court, which many High Court judges may have 
transposed onto P when sitting in the CoP, sits in tension with the approach required of judges 
under the ECtHR in relation to deprivation of capacity proceedings. This requires judges to use such 
encounters to form an independent view of P’s capacity and the proportionality of any measures 
proposed in relation to him. Furthermore because there is no established system in place in the 
CoP for facilitating the special measures and reasonable adjustments that may be required to assist 
P in attending court or meeting the judge in person, judges may be cautious of proceeding without 
adequate support, guidance and resources to ensure that P’s participation needs are met. This 
issue is returned to in Section 3.7 below. 
Despite these difficulties, reported cases indicate that some judges regularly seek out meetings 
with P, and growing numbers are adopting this practice.626 In Wye Valley Trust v B, a case involving 
the decision as to whether it was in Mr B’s best interests to amputate his leg, Peter Jackson J 
commented that ‘given the momentous consequences of the decision either way, I did not feel able 
to reach a conclusion without meeting Mr B myself.’627 In Re CD628, Mostyn J referred to Peter 
Jackson J’s judgment in the Wye Valley Case and said this about how invaluable he found the 
experience of meeting P: 
I took the view that it would be right if I were to meet CD face to face and I did so at 
the mental hospital on the first day of the hearing. It was an enlightening experience 
and one which I would recommend to any judge hearing a similar case. Mr Justice 
Jackson met Mr B and it is obvious from his judgment that the encounter was 
critically valuable. The reason it was enlightening for me was that the person I met 
was different in many respects to the person described in the papers. CD was 
engaging and polite. She was articulate. She was amusing. She listened carefully to 
questions and answered them equally carefully. True, there were comments that 
suggested powerful delusional forces; and Dr FH explained that she was heavily 
medicated. But even so, the person I met was a world away from the violent 
sociopath described in the papers.629 
Another striking example of the ‘dignity’ principle in action is the decision of Mr Justice Baker in W 
v M630 to visit M – a woman in a minimally conscious state, whose family applied for an order 
authorising the withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration.  If there has been historical 
reluctance among some CoP judges to meet with P or for P to attend court, the tide seems to be 
turning. Nevertheless, the challenges they face are considerable. The entire CoP system – from the 
court service itself, the very architecture of the court buildings and courtrooms, through to legal aid 
provisions, systems of representation via litigation friend, and systems for ensuring that P’s needs 
are supported and accommodated - is simply not set up or resourced for P to attend hearings or 
meet the judge in large numbers of cases.  
The court is attempting to grapple with the practical implications of the rule of personal presence 
without the supporting infrastructure of comparable courts, such as the Mental Health Tribunals, 
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which were designed to facilitate participation by disabled people from their very outset. Even the 
criminal courts, by comparison, have done substantial work to facilitate the participation of 
disabled and vulnerable witnesses. We return to this theme in Section 3.7, below. 
Attending court hearings 
In several reported CoP cases the judgment records that P has attended court for some, or all, of a 
hearing about their case.631 However, attending a court hearing in person can bring with it practical 
difficulties.  
Whereas the Mental Health Tribunals sit in the hospital where the person is detained or being 
treated, or in local community settings if the patient is subject to a Community Treatment Order, 
the CoP usually sits in its central London registry or a regional court. The CoP is taking steps 
towards increasing regionalization632, meaning that hearings may be held nearer to where the 
person lives. However, for some people even the distance to their regional court may be 
problematic, especially for those living in rural and remote areas. For people with very limited 
mobility, regionalization is still a far cry from holding a hearing in the place where they are receiving 
care or treatment. Several participants at the roundtable made frequent reference to the 
importance of the tribunal ‘going to the person’, in contrast with the person being required to 
travel to the hearing. There is one example, from before the passage of the MCA 2005, of a court 
‘going to the person’. According to a BBC documentary about the case of Re C (Adult: Refusal of 
Medical Treatment)633 the High Court hearing was actually held in the hospital where Mr C was 
detained.634 There are no reported examples of the CoP adopting this practice, but there appears to 
be no reason in principle why it could not do so.  
Some patients may find attending a hearing tiring or physically uncomfortable. For example, in 
London Borough of Redbridge v G & Ors635 the judgment records that ‘It was apparent that she was 
uncomfortable, if not actually distressed’ and so G was taken home by a carer.636 If P nevertheless 
wished to attend as much of it as possible, they might benefit from the hearing being held in their 
immediate vicinity to allow them to take breaks and rest more easily. 
At the roundtable, some participants spoke of experiences of high-risk patients where court 
attendance posed a potentially serious risk to themselves and others. They commented that 
because the tribunal hearing was held in the hospital, those risks could be managed much more 
effectively than they could in a courtroom setting.  
There may be emotional elements of attending court hearings that would be problematic for the 
individual’s wellbeing. It is in the nature of a court hearing, whose very purpose is to determine 
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whether or not P’s wishes should prevail, that they may hear evidence or arguments that they find 
distressing. For example, in the case of EM v SC637 EM applied to the CoP to discharge a standard 
authorisation for his detention in a care home. EM attended court and directly addressed the 
judge, Eleanor King J, to inform her of his views. He told the court that he was ‘fed up’ and that he 
wished to ‘go home’, where he believed that his son MM would assist him.638 MM did not attend 
the hearing but had written a letter for the court. At the hearing, the letter was read out to EM. In 
the letter MM stated that he does not visit his father and did not wish to do so, and that if he 
returned home he would not offer him any support.639 EM did not believe that the letter was 
written by MM, and dismissed its contents. EM’s case serves as an illustration of the potential that 
the court hearing process itself could potentially be distressing for the individual, regardless of the 
outcome of the case. It highlights that there may be a difficult balance to strike between ensuring a 
person has an opportunity to respond to the evidence and arguments, and minimising any harm 
that might ensue from the hearing process itself. 
Case study on participation in court hearings: A County Council v AB & Ors (Participation of P 
in Proceedings) 
The recent case of A County Council v AB & Ors (Participation of P in Proceedings)640 provides a 
noteworthy example of some of the practical issues that can arise for participation in court 
hearings, and how the CoP and practitioners have attempted to overcome these in the face of 
systemic challenges. The court was asked to determine whether AB could attend court and give 
evidence for a fact-finding hearing regarding allegations of abuse by his parents. The court’s 
conclusions regarding witness competence and giving ‘information’ or evidence to the court were 
described in Section 3.4, above. Critically, Judge Mark Rogers afforded to P’s litigation friend the 
pivotal role in deciding whether P should attend court or otherwise participate in the proceedings. 
Counsel for the Official Solicitor, AB’s litigation friend, had argued that the key decision-maker in 
respect of P's active participation in the case is the litigation friend, with the Court having no or 
only a residual duty to overrule.641 The key questions were whether the decisions as to whether P 
should attend Court and should give evidence are decisions for the Litigation Friend as part of the 
conduct of proceedings or a best interest determination for the Court. Judge Rogers held that the 
CoP has no general case management powers to exclude P, or ‘micro-manage’ the litigation friend, 
but has the ultimate power to dismiss the litigation friend. The judge concluded that because the 
CoP’s powers to micro-manage the decisions of the litigation friend were limited, there was no 
‘best interests’ decision for the CoP to make regarding P’s participation.  
Such a sweeping delegation of broad authority to the litigation friend with review available only in 
extreme cases would appear to be at odds with the Court’s duty under Rule 3A to consider ‘on its 
own initiative or on the application of any person’ whether it should make directions regarding P’s 
participation, including addressing the judge. We do, however, agree that the decision as to 
whether or not P should address the judge, directly or indirectly, may not be a ‘best interests’ 
decision under the MCA. As we have seen in other areas relating to participation, such as whether 
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or not an application is made for a review of detention under Article 5(4) or how P should be 
represented by his lawyers, best interests is not the most appropriate yardstick to apply, since it 
undercuts the rule of personal presence. We suggest that a more appropriate framework is one 
which addresses the threefold evidential, adversarial and dignity principles for the rule of personal 
presence. We suggest that the court should consider questions of participation in the context of its 
own overriding objectives and the requirements of the ECHR. Whilst we understand that the CoP 
may seek to avoid satellite litigation on P’s participation, we suggest that it cannot delegate its own 
obligations under Rule 3A of the COPR, the overriding objective and the ECHR to the litigation 
friend in this way.  One way to limit satellite litigation on P’s participation would be for the COPR 
and Practice Directions to emphasise the strength of P’s right to participate directly in the 
proceedings, subject only to very limited exceptions under the ECHR. 
AB’s own main interest was ‘to express his views as to the future not the past, and to provide his 
expressed wishes as to his own circumstances rather than to give an account of past events’. The 
judge commented that ‘Simply to regard AB's contribution as forensically worthless without even 
hearing him is not something I can contemplate.’642 A case note by AB’s solicitors643, Nicola 
Mackintosh QC, describes the considerable steps taken to prepare AB and to secure his 
participation. This is described here in some detail as it highlights the wide ranging practical 
challenges that may be faced by the CoP system if increasing numbers of P’s attend court hearings. 
AB had expressed a wish to attend court in order to ‘tell his story’. In order to support this, his 
lawyers met with a speech and language therapist (SALT) to prepare him for the hearing, to explain 
to him concepts like what a judge is, what the judge is deciding, and how he could tell his story. The 
court’s video facilities did not allow AB to view the proceedings from an adjacent room to minimize 
any distress, so facilities were found locally that could provide a video link to the court. This 
required special arrangements to be made with the court’s IT specialists and the facility to ensure 
the footage was secure. The court gave its consent for photos to be taken644 to explain the layout of 
the courtroom to AB and the identities of those involved. AB was taken to visit the court when it 
was not sitting, and to meet the clerk. Arrangements were made for his personal care needs to be 
met at the court, including the provision of mobile hoists. AB was provided with a separate room 
next to the court, with a fan because he had reduced control of his temperature. 
On the first day of the hearing there was a Ground Rules Hearing (these are discussed in Section 3.7 
below). The judge met with AB in a side room with his solicitor and his SALT. His SALT explained to 
the judge how he communicated using Makaton signs. Although the fact finding hearing was listed 
for 9 days, an agreement was reached early on between the parties, and AB was present 
throughout all of the discussions between lawyers and the court, having communicated his wish to 
be involved and listen to the proceedings. To reduce the need for transfers in and out of the 
courtroom, and because the room set aside for his use was uncomfortable, the judge permitted 
him to watch a DVD with his support workers between updates to the court. After the parties had 
reached agreement as to the core issues in the case – and so in effect the matters before the CoP 
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had been decided – it was seen as vital that AB could tell his story. This is an example of the 
‘dignity’ principle in action, since it could no longer have any bearing on the outcome of AB’s case.  
AB’s solicitor explains what happened as follows: 
Questions of P were drafted by P’s legal representatives with the assistance of P’s 
SALT and intermediary. As P’s communication was limited to responses such as ‘yes, 
no’ etc, it was necessary for leading questions to be posed however these were 
broken down into questions so that the leading element was minimised. Examples of 
questions included ‘Do you want to talk about when you were living at home?’, ‘How 
did you feel when you were living at home?’, When you were living at home did 
anyone do X to you?’, and if the answer was affirmative, ‘How did it make you feel?’ 
These questions were devised to ensure that P’s broad wishes were communicated 
to the court notwithstanding the agreement between the parties, so that P felt that 
he had been listened to by the parties and the judge, but avoiding detailed 
questioning on the fact finding schedule which eventually proved to be unnecessary. 
Opportunities were provided for AB to rest in between the question and answer sessions. Footage 
of these sessions was recorded on a mobile phone and played to the judge in his chambers, and to 
the other parties, avoiding the difficulties presented by the court video facilities. At the end of the 
proceedings, the judge held a further short hearing to explain to AB the outcome of his decision. AB 
positioned his wheelchair to be solely in line of sight of the judge and not the other parties. 
The case note is revealing for the sheer breadth of issues that need to be navigated – from the 
technical limitations of court video links, to accessibility and reasonable adjustments in the court 
buildings and in communication, to taking into account the emotional needs of AB, telling his story 
in front of those alleged to have abused him. Yet if the case note serves as a warning of the 
inadequacies of the CoP system itself in terms of facilitating participation, it is highly encouraging in 
terms of the willingness of the judiciary, court staff, P’s own lawyers and support staff to overcome 
the not inconsiderable hurdles facing his participation. It is reassuring to see his desire to tell his 
story taken so seriously. It raises important questions about the systemic availability of accessibility, 
special measures and reasonable adjustments, which we consider in Sections 3.7 and 3.8 below. 
Shortly after the case of AB, Charles J issued non-binding practical guidance on facilitating the 
participation of P.645 It provides a lengthy list of considerations for those representing P and for the 
judge in relation to court hearings. There are 12 matters to consider, one of which is necessary 
practical arrangements, which itself has 9 subheadings: 
12. P’s views should be sought at an early stage as to whether they wish to attend one or 
more of the court hearings, including meeting with the Judge. Suitable explanations will 
need to be given to P as to what this may mean, what may happen and what support might 
be available. Different considerations may apply to P’s attendance at an interim directions 
hearing as opposed to a final hearing or a hearing where P might be giving evidence, or 
where P might wish simply to listen to the evidence of others.  
13. If P wishes to attend a hearing, consideration should be given to the following: 
(a) The impact on P of the hearing being in public and what directions about this should 
be sought; 
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(b) Liaising with the Court staff as soon as possible in advance to advise them of P’s wish 
to attend, so that they and the Judge are made aware in advance; 
(c) Seeking Court staff views as to how practical arrangements can be made which are 
proportionate given the demands on Court facilities and other users of the Court; 
(d) Is the Court able to accommodate P’s visit? If not, is there another Court able to 
accommodate P and can this be arranged without disproportionate additional work 
and resources? 
(e) Whether use of video link would be an alternative option to an attendance by P? Are 
facilities available and do they actually work? There may be a need to test them in 
advance; 
(f) What is P’s understanding of a Courtroom, a hearing, the issues in the proceedings, 
what decisions are to be made and when? How can this be enhanced in the time 
available? 
(g) What assistance can be provided to P to understand what is to be decided at the 
hearing, who is who, the layout of a Courtroom and who sits where (including P 
themselves)? 
(h) Would it be helpful for P to be assisted to visit the courtroom before the hearing? 
Can this be arranged with the Court in practice? Who will accompany P? Is a visit 
feasible? 
(i) Might P be provided with pictures of the courtroom (for which special permission 
will be required) (or a courtroom, there are plenty of pictures available on line)? 
Pictures of the parties and their representatives? 
(j) What practical arrangements might need to be made? For example: 
(i) Who will accompany P to the hearing and support them throughout, if 
needed? 
(ii) What time will P need to arrive and how does this fit with P’s routine (such as 
the taking of medication) and any support required?  
(iii) How will P physically access the Courtroom? 
(iv) What arrangements will be made for P’s personal care if required? 
(v) Are there accessible toilet facilities if needed? 
(vi) Will P need a side room near the Courtroom for a break and are there 
facilities for this? 
(vii) Does P have any particular needs which should be considered in advance? 
(viii) Where will P sit in the hearing, and does this need to be discussed and 
agreed with court staff in advance of the hearing? For example in some cases 
P might need to be positioned in the hearing so as not to be within eyesight 
of another party or parties. 
(ix) Are there any safety/ security concerns – either relating to P’s potential 
conduct or the conduct of any other person in the courtroom?  
(k) Will P need breaks in the proceedings or if P’s input on all issues is not required, 
should the proceedings continue if P wishes to take a break or leave the hearing 
altogether?  
(l) Where and how will the Court’s decision be communicated to P? By the judge in the 
courtroom or in any side room? In the presence of the parties or in private? Is it 
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possible in appropriate cases to give a summary of the decision to P so as to allow P 
to leave before the full judgment is given if P wishes?646 
The guidance reflects a growing awareness by senior judiciary of the CoP of the practical 
implications of implementing Rule 3A, and enthusiasm to encourage participation by P. It stresses 
the importance of advance planning to facilitate P’s participation. The list of matters that might be 
problematic in making practical arrangements also suggests that much adaptation will be needed to 
ensure that the court is ready to receive P. One important question left unanswered by the 
guidance, however, is how the costs of increasing participation are to be met. We return to this 
question below. 
3.7 SPECIAL MEASURES AND REASONABLE ADJUSTMENTS 
The forgoing discussion in Sections 3.4 (giving information and evidence to the court) and 3.7 
(attending court and personal contact with judges) highlights some of the practical difficulties that 
P’s may experience in attending court hearings. This raises the question of what special measures 
and reasonable adjustments the CoP may need to adopt to facilitate the participation of P – or 
indeed any other parties who may experience barriers to participation.  
Obligations to make remove and overcome barriers to participation in proceedings 
The CoP is under a number of intersecting legal obligations to ensure barriers to participation are 
removed or overcome. Under international law, Article 13 of the UN CRPD requires states to 
provide ‘procedural and age-appropriate accommodations, in order to facilitate [the] effective role 
as direct and indirect participant’ of disabled people in legal proceedings. The MCA 2005 itself 
requires the provision of assistance to support the person to make decisions for themselves,647 or 
to enable them to participate in the making of decisions that concern them,648 and this must 
logically include decisions in the context of the CoP.  
Courts are also under specific duties to make reasonable adjustments to facilitate participation for 
disabled litigants. In J W Rackham v NHS Professionals Ltd649 the court found a number of 
intersecting duties to make reasonable adjustments to ensure access to and participation in 
hearings. In the recent case of Galo v Bombardier Aerospace UK650 the Court of Appeal in Northern 
Ireland held that ‘It is a fundamental right of a person with a disability to enjoy a fair hearing and to 
have been able to participate effectively in the hearing’ and that therefore ‘Courts needs to focus 
on the impact of a mental health disability in the conduct of litigation.’651 The Court of Appeal was 
highly critical of the Industrial Tribunal for failing to take steps to consider what reasonable 
adjustments Mr Gallo, who the Tribunal was aware had Asperger’s Syndrome, might require to 
facilitate his participation in the proceedings. The Court of Appeal stated that as soon as the 
Tribunal was aware that the litigant had a disability ‘enquiries should have been made as to 
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whether reasonable adjustments to the process were necessary’.652 Importantly, the Court of 
Appeal rejected the argument that the applicant had not requested any reasonable adjustments, 
stating ‘The duty is cast on the Tribunal to make its own decision in these matters.’653 Although this 
decision was taken by the Court of Appeal in Northern Ireland and thus has persuasive authority 
and is not binding precedent, if a similar approach were taken in England and Wales it would put 
the duty squarely upon the CoP itself to pro-actively investigate what special measures and 
reasonable adjustments are required to facilitate P’s participation. 
Special measures and reasonable adjustments in the CoP 
Perhaps surprisingly, given that almost the entire workload of the CoP concerns people who would 
experience barriers to participating directly in court proceedings, there was little discussion when 
the Court was established and the COPR drafted of what adjustments or accessibility measures 
might be required to enable P to participate in the proceedings directly. This may be because the 
model of participation which the court was based assumed either that the person would not be a 
party to the proceedings, or that they would only participate indirectly through their litigation 
friend. Only recently, with the advent of Rule 3A and Charles J’s non-binding guidance has the CoP 
itself turned to consider these issues. 
This contrasts starkly with other jurisdictions who have for some time considered how best to 
facilitate the participation of disabled people in proceedings. The most obvious comparator court is 
the Mental Health Tribunal, which we consider separately in Section 4 of this report. However, even 
ordinary courts have taken steps to introduce ‘special measures’ to make certain processes relating 
to proceedings more accessible. In particular, the criminal courts have grappled for several years 
with the question of how best to promote the ability of ‘vulnerable witnesses’ to give evidence. 
Vulnerable witnesses are defined by the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 (YJCEA) as 
including people with a ‘mental disorder’ in the meaning of the MHA, or otherwise with a 
‘significant impairment of intelligence and social functioning’ or a person with a physical disability 
or physical disorder.654 One roundtable participant proposed an alternative definition of 
vulnerability for the purpose of procedural fairness as ‘those who are at risk of unfairness if 
adjustments are not made’. It was suggested that legal professionals may not always be skilled at 
identifying ‘vulnerability’ in this sense, and it may be something that health and social care 
professionals should be flagging up to the court. A practice note issued by the Law Society advises 
solicitors on how to identify vulnerable clients who may need further steps to be taken to 
accommodate their needs and facilitate participation in proceedings.655  We return to questions of 
training in Section 3.9 below. 
The YJCEA 1999 and associated practice directions656 and general guidance657 outline certain 
‘special measures’ that may be put in place to enable vulnerable witnesses to give evidence in the 
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criminal courts. Special measures encompass a range of adjustments that might be made to the 
court’s practices and procedures to accommodate the needs of witnesses in a particular case. For 
example, a witness who is vulnerable because they are scared to be seen by the defendant, might 
give evidence behind a screen. A witness with a disability which makes it difficult for them to 
understand questions under cross-examination might use an intermediary with specialist 
communication skills. A ‘ground rules’ hearing might be used to establish how questions might be 
put to the person to ensure the avoidance of any unnecessary distress and to facilitate their 
understanding and communication. A person who was uncomfortable attending court in person 
might give video evidence, or might have a familiarisation visit to the court before the hearing. At 
the roundtable, participants with expertise in special measures spoke of the creative measures 
adopted by the criminal courts to facilitate the needs of witnesses with autism or learning 
disabilities, for example allowing them to give evidence whilst wearing an unusual outfit or with 
their back turned. A fuller description of the framework for special measures in the criminal courts, 
alongside toolkits for advocates working in these courts, can be found on the website the 
Advocate’s Gateway.658 There are examples of the Family Court using, for example, certain special 
measures such as intermediaries to good effect.659 
In contrast to the well-established frameworks in the criminal courts and Mental Health Tribunals, 
there are no specific provisions under the MCA, in the COPR or in practice directions for special 
measures in CoP proceedings, even though the main focus of the jurisdiction is the affairs of people 
who would fall within the definition of ‘vulnerable witnesses’ under the YJCEA. Steps were being 
taken to address this in the CoP’s sister court, the Family Court, but they appear to have stalled. 
The President of the Family Court and the CoP – Sir James Munby – acknowledged in 2014 that 
‘there is a pressing need for us to address the wider issue of vulnerable people giving evidence in 
family proceedings, something in which the family justice system lags woefully behind the criminal 
justice system’.660 The Children and Vulnerable Witnesses Working Group was established to review 
the procedures in the family justice system for children meeting judges and giving evidence, and 
wider issues of other vulnerable witnesses giving evidence. 661 The Working Group concluded that it 
was ‘unarguable’ that the approach taken in the criminal courts for vulnerable and intimidated 
witnesses should be modified and adopted in the family courts, although its recommendations 
have not yet been implemented.662 The Ministry of Justice opened a consultation into draft 
amendments to the Family Procedure Rules, which included specific provisions on the measures 
that might be taken to assist with participation.663 Although the consultation closed in September 
2015, there are no indications on the consultation website as to the response to the consultation or 
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what further steps may be taken. Recently The Guardian newspaper has reported on the situation 
of women in the Family Court who have been cross-examined by abusive partners; a situation that 
would not be permitted in the criminal courts and where special measures would be used.664 In 
response to these reports the Justice Secretary, Liz Truss, has committed to a review of a possible 
ban on cross-examination by abusive partners.665 It is unclear whether this review will also consider 
the introduction of a comprehensive system of special measures in the Family Court, but if these 
are introduced the likelihood that the CoP will follow its sister court down this path is increased.  It 
will certainly increase the awareness of the High Court judges working across both jurisdictions of 
the necessity for, and availability of, special measures that might enhance P’s participation. 
We have already referred to the guidance recently issued by Charles J on Facilitating participation 
of ‘P’ and vulnerable persons in Court of Protection proceedings. This guidance is clearly informed 
by the work of other courts on special measures, for example suggesting holding a Ground Rules 
Meeting, and considering whether a number of specific special measures might be of use – such as 
involving an intermediary to help put questions to P in evidence gathering, or the use of a video 
link. The guidance refers to the well respected Advocate’s Gateway666, and the Law Society’s 
Practice Note on Vulnerable Clients667 for further information for and guidance. 
The guidance is wide ranging and whilst clearly welcome, its legal status is uncertain. The fact it is 
issued as ‘practical guidance’ rather than a practice direction, or even amendments to the COPR, 
suggests its status for judges and lawyers may be less than clear. For those seeking advice on how 
to facilitate participation it may prove very useful as a starting point, but it does not go as far as 
inscribing into the COPR and associated practice directions the positive duty upon the CoP to 
consider what reasonable adjustments and special measures may be appropriate to facilitate P’s 
participation. Neither does the guidance resolve the pressing question of how special measures and 
reasonable adjustments are to be funded. In the Family Court, where special measures are starting 
to be used, there are no fixed arrangements for funding special measures. They might be partially 
funded by the parties, including through legal aid, or the court my bear some of the costs. The 
provision of a statutory right to funded special measures to facilitate participation is likely to 
require steps to be taken by Parliament, and not lie within the gift of the CoP. Nevertheless, it may 
be a pivotal issue if the rule of personal presence is to be taken seriously. 
Recommendations on special measures and reasonable adjustments 
Recommendation 14: The COPR and practice directions should be amended to include specific 
recognition of the need for the court to consider special measures and reasonable 
accommodations to facilitate P’s participation. 
Recommendation 15: The government should provide additional funding for special measures – 
either through the court service, or by means of legal aid - to ensure compliance with human 
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rights and common law obligations to ensure effective participation in CoP proceedings for 
disabled people. 
3.8 TRAINING OF JUDGES AND REPRESENTATIVES 
Article 13 of the CRPD emphasises the importance of training for those working in the justice 
system to promote effective access to justice. This will include the judiciary of the CoP, but is also 
likely to extent to solicitors and counsel representing disabled clients and even those working 
within the administration of the court. One of the issues highlighted by the Court of Appeal in Galo 
v Bombadier Aerospace Ltd was ‘the need for there to be better training of both judiciary and the 
legal profession in the needs of the disabled.’668 
It is our understanding that there is training on disability related issues for judges of the CoP, 
although we were not able to identify its content in time for publication of this report.  In order to 
ensure that training secures effective access to justice for P, we believe it needs to consider, at a 
minimum: 
1. The core rights to participate, including rights of access to a court and the rule of 
personal presence, contained within the ECHR, as well as broader duties to make 
reasonable adjustments; 
2. The practical matters that will need to be considered to ensure effective access to 
justice and the tools available to judges and representatives to achieve this; 
3. An overview of the nature of how different kinds of disability can impact on P’s and 
their ability to participate in proceedings, and guidance on where judges and 
representatives can find further guidance and information on these areas should the 
need arise. 
Ideally such training would be available to all judges, as it is not only CoP nominated judges who 
hear cases involving disabled litigants.  At present, the Judicial College prospectus669 lists the 
training provided for the judiciary by the Judicial College. The one module in the prospectus that 
makes reference to disability issues is a generic module on the Equality Act 2010, which appears to 
relate to disability related claims rather than the adjustments that the courts themselves might 
need to make to facilitate the participation of disabled people in litigation. The module does not 
appear to be mandatory.  
The Judicial College also published the Equal Treatment Benchbook670, which provides detailed 
guidance on the implications of the Equality Act 2010 for the courts. This includes separate 
chapters on physical disability, mental disability and mental illness, age and ‘vulnerable adults’. The 
Benchbook does discuss how special measures, intermediaries and reasonable adjustments may be 
required to promote participation in the court’s processes. This might form a useful basis for future 
training. 
A number of resources are available for solicitors and barristers working with disabled clients. In 
particular, the Advocates Gateway and the Law Society’s own practice note on Meeting the needs 
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of vulnerable clients provide a useful basis for any future training for counsel or solicitors. However, 
the provision of guidance will only make a difference where judges, solicitors, and barristers 
proactively seek out the resources that will assist disabled litigants; it will not help alert them to the 
need to do so. 
Professional training requirements for solicitors and barristers are determined by the Solicitors 
Regulation Authority and Bar Standards Board respectively. There do not appear to be any training 
requirements on disability-related issues at either the academic stage,671 qualifying stage, nor as a 
mandatory part of any Continuing Professional Development (CPD) requirements.672  
The present requirements for training judges and legal professionals are significantly out of step 
with the requirements of Article 13 CRPD. We recommend that in the first instance the CoP itself 
undertake a review of what training requirements its own judiciary may need in relation to 
disability, reasonable adjustments and special measures – perhaps as part of a wider review of 
reforms in this area. Professional bodies should reflect on how they can ensure that professional 
training equips solicitors and barristers to act for disabled clients. Ideally generic training on 
disability issues should be mandatory, with specialist training available for particular issues that 
arise for specific client groups or in particular kinds of litigation. One potential driver for promoting 
disability training for practitioners was suggested at the roundtable: to make public funding 
certificates contingent upon solicitors having undergone appropriate training to represent clients 
with disabilities. Similar measures have been successfully adopted requiring barristers working on 
criminal cases to have undergone training on vulnerable witnesses. 
The content of training for legal professionals will also need careful consideration. The particular 
training needs of different professionals will depend on their role – and generic training is likely to 
be inadequate. Professional bodies should liaise with experts in disability, access to justice, 
accessibility and reasonable adjustments to ensure that training fulfils the purpose of promoting 
effective access to justice for disabled people. 
Recommendations on training 
Recommendation 16: The Judicial College should introduce training on disability as it concerns 
access to justice. 
Recommendation 17: The CoP should review whether there is a need to introduce special 
training for its nominated judges on facilitating the participation of P, with particular regard to 
the growing human rights jurisprudence and the practical considerations this may entail. 
Recommendation 18: The Bar Standards Board and the Solicitors Regulatory Authority should 
introduce requirements for qualifying training courses and continuing professional 
development for practising solicitors and barristers on their specific obligations in respect of 
disabled clients. 
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3.9 ACCESSIBILITY MEASURES IN THE COURT OF PROTECTION SYSTEM 
Whereas reasonable adjustments and special measures respond to the specific needs of individuals 
in particular circumstances, Article 9 CRPD also requires states to take steps to ensure the general 
accessibility of the physical environment, information and communications, and services and 
facilities. Domestically, the Equality Act 2010 contains an anticipatory reasonable adjustment 
duty.673 This requires services and bodies performing public functions to anticipate the ways in 
which disabled people might be placed at a substantial disadvantage in accessing services or public 
functions and take reasonable steps to ensure this does not happen by altering provisions, criteria 
and practices, altering or removing physical features and providing auxiliary aids or services. 
The accessibility duty is highly relevant to the way the CoP system as a whole functions, rather than 
the actions of individual judges and those representing P. It has a bearing on all the points at which 
a disabled people – in this case P – might interact with the CoP system. For example, it raises the 
question of how accessible the CoP’s application processes is – from the government’s CoP website, 
the CoP forms and guidance, to those staffing telephone and desk communication points, and the 
general accessibility of the court’s buildings themselves for those with physical or sensory 
impairments. As the CoP is increasingly regionalised away from its central registry in London, this 
will be a matter for each court to address individually. 
Here, we draw particular attention to a striking lack of accessible information about the CoP and its 
processes for people with sensory disabilities or intellectual or cognitive impairments. There is, for 
example, no easy to read guidance on the CoP published by the court service. We find this deeply 
disappointing since it would surely be beneficial not only for P, but for those representing or 
notifying P in the proceedings, to have some well prepared accessible materials to help explain the 
role of the court, the nature of their rights, and specific matters such as what happens in a hearing. 
In contrast, for those detained under the MHA 1983 there is an array of easy to read sources of 
guidance, including easy to read information for those detained in hospital covering a broad range 
of rights including those governing information, the role of the nearest relative, visitors, leaving the 
hospital ward, 674 and the role of tribunals.675  There is even an easy to read version of the MHA 
Code of Practice.676 The better provision of accessible information for those detained under the 
MHA 1983 may be because the MHA largely operates within the NHS, which has, since 2016, 
operated an Accessible Information Standard. The standard is set by NHS England and establishes a 
detailed specification which all NHS providers licensed by NHS England must adhere to. The aim of 
the standard is ‘to make sure that people who have a disability, impairment or sensory loss are 
provided with information that they can easily read or understand with support so they can 
communicate effectively with health and social care services.’677 Ideally a similar accessible 
information standard would operate throughout all public services, including the justice system.  
                                                     
673 Equality Act 2010, s 20(3), (4) and (5) in combination (for services and public functions) with schedule 2. 
674 <http://www.nhs.uk/NHSEngland/AboutNHSservices/mental-health-services-explained/Pages/easy-read-mental-
health-act.aspx> accessed 22 December 2016 
675 <https://www.england.nhs.uk/learningdisabilities/wp-content/uploads/sites/34/2016/04/tribunal-factsheet.pdf> 
accessed 25 January 2017 
676 Department of Health, Code of Practice: Mental Health Act 1983 (Easy Read version) (2015) 
677 NHS England (2016) Accessible Information Standard: Making health and social care information accessible, URL: 
<https://www.england.nhs.uk/ourwork/accessibleinfo/> accessed 22 December 2016 
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Recommendations on accessibility 
Recommendation 19: The central London and regional courts housing the CoP should consider 
their accessibility obligations to disabled litigants seeking to attend court, with a particular focus 
on the kinds of support needs that P may have. 
Recommendation 20: The courts service as a whole should consider the introduction of an 
‘accessible information standard’ comparable to that recently adopted within the NHS and the 
CoP should produce accessible guidance and information for those involved in CoP proceedings. 
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4. PARTICIPATION AND MENTAL HEALTH (REVIEW) 
TRIBUNALS 
As noted above, the Law Commission’s recent review of Deprivation of Liberty proposed that a 
tribunal system would be preferable to a court for reviewing the lawfulness of deprivations of 
liberty, partly because tribunals are regarded as more accessible and better placed to facilitate 
participation than courts.678 We therefore now consider the development of the model of patient 
participation which applies in the Mental Health Tribunal (in Wales the Mental Health Review 
Tribunal). 
Mental Health Review Tribunals were established under the Mental Health Act 1959 following the 
recommendations of the Royal Commission on the Law relating to Mental illness and Mental 
Deficiency (the Percy Commission).679 Their role was to provide a mechanism to review the 
continued need for a patient’s detention. It is instructive to consider in outline how the model of 
participation before the tribunals differs from that in the CoP. It has evolved following pressure 
from service user support groups like MIND (the National Association for Mental Health) and the 
NCCL (National Council for Civil Liberties) and the test cases brought by Larry Gostin, the Legal 
Officer of MIND, such as X v United Kingdom680 in 1981. It is important to consider how that model 
of participation has evolved in the period since 1959. 
4.1 DEVELOPMENT OF THE MENTAL HEALTH TRIBUNALS IN ENGLAND AND WALES 
There have been three key stages in the development of the current system of Mental Health 
Tribunals. The first was the period from the establishment of the MHRT by the Mental Health Act 
1959 until the Mental Health Act 1983, and the development of the first set of tribunal rules.681 The 
second stage in the evolution of the tribunals began with the reform of the MHRT’s powers by the 
Mental Health Act 1983, and the introduction of the MHRT Rules 1983682, which advanced a more 
due process model of decision-making whereby some of the more egregious limitations of the 
rights of patients to participate in hearings were removed, most notably the right of access to 
information in reports. The 1983 Act was accompanied by the introduction of non means-tested 
legal aid to cover tribunal representation. 
Representation was crucial to participation since the representative would have access to 
information which had been withheld from the patient. Only with representation could such 
information be effectively tested before the tribunal. The 1983 Rules required tribunals to provide 
reasons for their decisions. Two of the earliest cases required tribunals to give reasons for their 
decisions which had to be more than mere rehearsals of the statutory language. It had been 
common for tribunals to state they were not satisfied that the patient was not suffering from 
mental disorder etc. without saying why they had reached their decision.  
                                                     
678 Law Commission No 222, n 94, Chapter 11. 
679 Lord Percy, Report of the Royal Commission on the law relating to mental illness and mental deficiency 1954–1957 
(Cmnd 169, 1957) (The ‘Percy Report’) 
680 [1981] 4 EHRR 188.  
681 Mental Health Review Tribunal Rules 1960 SI 1960 No 1139 
682 Mental Health Review Tribunal Rules 1983 SI 1983 No 942. 
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These changes, coupled with the advent of legal aid for tribunals, radically changed the tribunal 
from a primarily inquisitorial model to one based to the adversarial idea of a lis inter partes, and 
brought greater emphasis on the due process safeguards accompanying an adversarial process. The 
volume of case law on the Mental Health Act post 1983 increased dramatically. There had only 
been two cases between 1959 and 1983.683 In the period between 1983 and the Mental Health Act 
2007 there were over 100 judicial reviews of tribunal decisions.  
The third key stage in the tribunal’s development began when the MHRT was radically restructured 
in 2007, one of the key features being a divergence in the arrangements between England and 
Wales. The Tribunals Courts and Enforcement Act (TCEA) 2007 created two new tribunals: the First 
Tier Tribunal and the Upper Tribunal. The TCEA provides for the establishment of Chambers within 
the First Tier tribunal and the jurisdiction of the MHRT in England was transferred by the Transfer of 
Tribunal Functions Order 2008 to the Health, Education and Social Care Chamber of the tribunal 
governed by the First-tier Tribunal (Health Education and Social Care Chamber) Rules 2008.684 The 
tribunal is now known in England as the Mental Health Tribunal. Wales retained a separate Mental 
Health Review Tribunal, subject to the Mental Health Review Tribunal for Wales Rules 2008.685 The 
Upper Tribunal hears appeals from the First tier Tribunal and the MHRT Wales.686  
In our discussion of participation in the CoP we identified a number of aspects of participation. 
These are equally relevant here.  
1. Information about rights. In the original system established under the 1959 Act, activated by 
applications from patients or their nearest relatives, the first key prerequisite of 
participation is information about rights, a sine qua non.  
2. The process of application should be accessible.  
3. Representation and support should be available for patients to enable them to participate 
fully as parties in the process.  
4. ‘Equality of arms’ in that patients should be entitled to know the case being made for their 
continued detention, so as to be able to put counter arguments, and should have the right 
to be heard.  
5. The right to receive a reasoned decision, so that the person has the relevant material on 
which to base an appeal if the tribunal has misdirected itself in law, has taken into account 
an irrelevant fact or failed to take account of relevant facts.  
6. Decision-makers who have been trained to facilitate effective participation. 
We shall consider the Mental Health Tribunals in relation to the same issues as have been raised 
regarding the CoP:  
- notification;  
- access to a court;  
- party status;  
- giving evidence;  
                                                     
683 Re VE (Mental health Patient) (1972) 3 All ER 373, R v Bracknell Justices ex parte Griffiths [1976] AC 314.. 
684 SI 2008 No 2699. 
685 SI 2008 No 2705. 
686 Section 32 of the TCEA 2007 allows the Lord Chancellor by order to provide for an appeal against a decision of a 
scheduled tribunal to be made to the Upper Tribunal, instead of to the court to which an appeal would otherwise fall to 
be made, where the decision is made by the tribunal in exercising a function in relation to Wales.  
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- representation in proceedings; 
- attending court;  
- personal contact with judges; 
- broader issues of accessibility and training.  
Before we do so, it is important to recognize that when it was set up in 1959, the MHRT was a new 
court with a limited jurisdiction by comparison with the extensive jurisdiction conferred on the CoP 
by the MCA 2005. Its role was to consider the patient’s suitability for discharge from detention or 
guardianship under the Mental Health Act (MHA). Entitlement to apply arose once in the initial 
period of detention and subsequently once in each period for which the detention or guardianship 
was renewed. As one roundtable participant with extensive experience in the tribunal put it, ‘The 
Tribunal is periodic – there is always a next time. For some patients who have been detained a long 
time, each application forms a step in the process, for example from High Secure Hospitals, to 
medium secure settings and so on.’ 
It must also be remembered that the MHRT membership was specifically recruited for the purpose, 
and could be trained from scratch, whilst the CoP’s jurisdiction over health and personal welfare 
decisions would be exercised by Family judges already experienced in the processes of the Family 
Court, including those relating to child protection. 
The establishment of the MHRT under the Mental Health Act 1959 
The Percy Commission, whose recommendations formed the basis of the Mental Health Act 1959, 
had recommended a body whose role would be: 
To consider the patient’s mental condition at the time when it considers his 
application, and to decide whether the type of care which has been provided by the 
use of compulsory powers is the most appropriate to his present needs or whether 
any alternative form of care might be more appropriate, or whether he could be 
discharged from care altogether. 
This more best interests based role of considering whether the type of care being provided was 
most appropriate to his present needs was dropped in favour of confining the decision to 
considering whether or not patients should be discharged, based on their condition at the time of 
the hearing. The tribunal eventually created had no jurisdiction to examine the type of care the 
patient was receiving, or to determine upon its suitability, except in the broad sense that it could 
decide whether or not the patient still needed to be detained in hospital. 
Introducing the second reading of the Mental Health Bill in the Commons, Derek Walker Smith, the 
Minister of Health stated that the tribunal was designed to fulfill two functions. It was to provide a 
major safeguard against improper admission under the compulsory powers, and it was to provide 
the major safeguard against unduly prolonged detention.687 The other major safeguards against 
improper admission were the professional expertise of doctors and social workers in the admission 
process, and the fact that the hospital managers would have to scrutinise the admission documents 
to ensure that they were sufficient to justify detention.  
It was no part of the MHRT’s function to consider the lawfulness of the original decision to detain a 
patient or to renew detention. The High Court retained jurisdiction over the lawfulness these 
decision by way of habeas corpus and judicial review. The role of the MHRT was confined to 
                                                     
687 598 Hansard HC Debs Ser 5 Col 783, 26 January 1959. 
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deciding whether at the time of the hearing the criteria for detention are met. The new tribunal 
offered a judicial process for review, and it was to be based on interviews with the patient, his 
relatives, the Responsible Medical Officer (the consultant psychiatrist in charge of the patient’s 
case), and with others responsible for his care.  
Section 123 of the 1959 Act gave the tribunal a general discretion to discharge a patient, and put a 
duty on it to discharge if satisfied either that (a) the patient was not then suffering from mental 
illness, psychopathic disorder, subnormality or severe subnormality or (b) it was not necessary in 
the interests of the patient’s health or safety or for the protection of other persons that the patient 
should continue to be liable to be detained. 688  
From the outset the burden of proof was on the patient to satisfy the tribunal that the criteria for 
detention were not met, and this would not alter until the Human Rights Act 1998 came into force 
and the case of R (H) v London North and East Region Mental Health Review Tribunal (Secretary of 
State for Health intervening)689 where the Court of Appeal held that the positioning of the burden 
of proof under MHA 1983 ss 72 and 73 on the applicant to satisfy the tribunal of the absence of 
detainable mental disorder was incompatible with Art 5 of the ECHR . 
The Mental Health Act 1959 introduced the concept of the ‘informal patient’, a category which 
included voluntary patients who had consented to admission but also what used to be called ‘non-
volitional’ patients, those who were not capable of consenting to admission but were not resisting 
being in hospital. Non-volitional patients had previously been subject to an admission procedure 
under s 5 of the Mental Treatment Act 1930 which resembles the current procedure for 
compulsory admission under s 3 of the Mental Health Act 1983. Under the 1930 Act, if they did not 
recover their volition sufficient to consent to their placement after six months, they would then 
have to be judicially certified or else released.  
The Mental Health Act 1959 abolished the judicial admission procedures of certification, and formal 
detention was now for those who resisted or objected to admission. They would be detained by a 
non-judicial procedure involving an application to the managers of the detaining hospital made by a 
social worker and supported by two medical recommendations.690 A patient detained for treatment 
would then be entitled to apply to the MHRT for discharge, and could make a fresh application 
during each period for which the detention was renewed.  
The introduction of informal status took the vast majority of patients out of the regulatory system, 
where they would remain until the European Court ruling in HL v United Kingdom691 required the 
Government to (re)introduce procedural safeguards for patients who lack capacity to consent to 
placement in an institution but are not resisting, and who are cared for in circumstances amounting 
to a deprivation of liberty.  
Since eligibility depended on the patient being detained, and only 20 per cent of patients were 
likely to be detained, the Government officials gauging the resources required for the new tribunal 
were confident that the new tribunal could be adequately resourced. There was a strong sense that 
                                                     
688 Mental Health Act 1959, s 123. 
689 [2001] 3 WLR 512 
690 Mental Health Act 1959, s 26 
691 [2004] 40 EHRR 761 
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this system could work effectively because 80 per cent of patients were excluded from its scope. If 
the procedures were applied to all patients the system would not have been workable.  
The officials estimated that by mid 1960 about 80 percent of patients formerly certified under the 
old procedures would have become informal, and the number of detained patients would be about 
20,000.692 They then estimated the likely percentage of these who would be likely to apply. They 
considered that all the 750 offender patients with restrictions on discharge would apply, but after 
that they expected a comparatively low uptake of rights. Using the new statutory categories of 
mental disorder they came up with the following guesstimates: mentally ill after admission 500 
(10%); mentally ill applying on renewal 3,000 (20-25%); subnormal, severely subnormal or 
psychopathic disorder after admission 250 (one sixth) and on renewal 2,750 (one sixth). This gave a 
total of 7,250, plus an expected additional 1,000 applications by relatives.  
In fact in the first thirteen months of the tribunal’s existence it heard only 850 cases,693 and the low 
take up rate of the new right to a tribunal was a major issue from the outset until the debates 
leading to the Mental Health Act 1983. It is important to note at the outset that, in terms of 
workload, the Tribunal in 1960 was a very different institution to its present day counterpart. The 
annual number of hearings in 2015-2016 was 22,000 when Community Treatment Order cases and 
reviews of detention are combined. Cyril Greenland, who carried out the first research on the 
tribunal in the 1960s, wrote in 1970 that there were wide variations in hospitals in the use of 
tribunals, and pinpointed the important role of giving patients information about their rights in 
increasing the rates of use.694  
Considerable debate about the form of the new tribunal took place between the Government and 
the recently formed Council on Tribunals, whose interventions were to have a powerful impact in 
shaping the new tribunal’s procedures, set out in the Mental Health Review Tribunal Rules 1960. In 
October 1960 the Home Office, the Department of Health and the Lord Chancellor’s Department 
convened a meeting of the newly appointed Regional MHRT Chairmen. Its purpose, as described in 
the official minute, was ‘to enable chairmen of all 15 tribunals to meet each other’ but also to 
enable departments to ‘put a number of points to the chairmen.’ These were set out in a document 
distributed at the meeting, which began by expressing the collective departmental view that the 
tribunal should avoid an adversarial atmosphere. The Government view was that the initial ethos of 
the jurisdiction was to be parental rather than adversarial - based on ideas of best interests. “It is 
hoped”, the document began,  
[T]hat neither the Tribunal nor the responsible authority will regard the responsible 
authority as presenting a case ‘against’ the patient. The aim of all concerned is to 
decide what is in the patient’s own best interests, and the tribunal’s function is to 
decide between differing views of where the patient’s own best interests lie, within 
the terms of their powers and duties under s 123 of the Act.695The function of the 
tribunal under s 123 of the 1959 Act was to determine whether the criteria for 
detention were met at the time of the hearing.  
                                                     
692 The Mental Health Review Tribunal Rules 1960 SI 1960 No 1139. National Archive, Kew, File MH140/13 Mental 
Health Act 1959 Pts 1 and 9 Mental Health Review Tribunals Policy Questions. 
693 Annual Report of the Council on Tribunals for 1961, Appendix B.  
694 Greenland, Cyril, Mental Health and Civil Liberties (1970) , p 46. 
695 National Archive, Kew File MH140/23 Minutes of Meeting of Regional Chairmen of MHRTs held 18 October 1960. 
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Several tribunal chairmen expressed doubt at the induction meeting as to whether the tribunal was 
authorized to deal with a case where the patient raised the legality of the original order of 
detention as a preliminary issue. It was suggested that if the tribunal proceeded to hear the 
application this might prejudice the patient if at a later stage he took proceedings to question the 
legality of his detention. The officials answered this by pointing out that, as s 123 of the MHA 1959 
indicated, the tribunal was concerned only with the state of the patient’s health and the desirability 
of his detention at the time of the application and the legality of his original detention was not a 
matter for the tribunal. The tribunal’s decision to hear the application could not prejudice the 
patient’s right to question the legality of the original detention in the courts.696 
This limitation on the role of the tribunal has not changed, although there has recently been some 
debate about whether the tribunal or some similar body should have the power to review the 
merits of decisions to detain.697 
Establishing the process of the hearing 
At their initial meeting, the Chairmen were presented with a document indicating how the 
departmental officials envisaged tribunal hearings would proceed, indicating that when ‘the 
members of the tribunal have assembled they will probably wish to have a short talk among 
themselves on any points arising from the papers which they have received. Also they might wish to 
consider at this stage ‘whether any material from the responsible authority’s report which has been 
withheld under rule 6 should be disclosed to the patient or whether a formal hearing should be 
allowed if the patient has requested one.’ This initial meeting would also enable the tribunal ‘to 
decide how best to handle the patient as they will know whether he is inclined to be garrulous, 
resentful or withdrawn.’698 Gathering the new members together as ‘raw recruits’ enabled the 
departmental officials to shape the modus operandi of the new tribunal. This contrasts with the 
introduction of the CoP, which was staffed by experienced Family Court judges who were already 
accustomed to exercising a ‘parental’ jurisdiction over children, making decisions for them in their 
best interests. There were obvious parallels with the new MCA jurisdiction to determine the 
capacity of adults to make specific decisions, and, if they lacked capacity, to make whatever order 
was in their best interests.  
To the present day the tribunal hearings are held in the hospitals where patients are detained, 
quite often in hospital boardrooms. Since the advent of Community Treatment Orders, tribunals 
are now being held also in community settings. As is discussed further below, the process has 
evolved over the years. Hearings usually begin with the medical member of the tribunal reporting 
to the tribunal on her or his meeting with the patient prior to the hearing. Today, hearings tend to 
                                                     
696 Ibid, para 20. 
697 Department of Health, No Voice Unheard, No Right Ignored - A consultation for people with Learning Disabilities, 
Autism, and Mental Health Conditions (Cm 9007 2015); Department of Health, Government Response to No Voice 
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detention. 
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Explanatory Memorandum on the MHRT Rules, paras 28-48. 
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follow a basic framework described by one roundtable participant with long experience in tribunal 
work as follows: 
The judge normally introduces the panel, reminds the parties of the independence of 
the panel, and suggests an order for the evidence. This will usually be: the 
responsible clinician (RC) first, then whoever is presenting nursing evidence, then the 
social circumstances evidence. The patient will typically give her or his evidence last, 
but is usually offered a choice. The patient is sometimes encouraged to go first, 
especially if either the panel or the patient’s representative considers that there is a 
risk the patient might find the hearing distressing. Patients are reminded that they 
can take a break at any time and that they can address the tribunal alone if they 
wish. 
The panel takes evidence from the professional witnesses who are then cross 
examined by or on behalf of the patient. No evidence is sworn or on affirmation. The 
patient may or may not wish to say anything but if he or she does then typically this 
will be in the form of a dialogue with the representative, followed by questions from 
the panel. This is followed by submissions and then the parties leave while the 
tribunal deliberates. In most cases the patient will return to hear the decision. 
The Tribunal may give its decision orally at the hearing or it may reserve its decision. The rules 
outline the requirement to give written notice of their decision and their reasons to each party in 
any case where the Tribunal has made a ‘decision which finally disposes of all issues’ (England) or in 
Wales has made a ‘final determination’. ‘Decision which disposes of all the issues’ and ‘final 
determination’ each include decisions with recommendations and deferred directions for 
conditional discharge, but do not include decisions about permission to appeal.  
Subject to the rules on withholding information likely to cause serious harm, the Tribunal must, as 
soon as reasonably practicable (and in any event within three working days after the hearing in s 2 
cases, and in all other cases within seven days) provide a decision notice stating the tribunal’s 
decision, and stating written reasons for the decision. In England the decision notice must also 
contain notification of any right of appeal against the decision the manner of exercise of the appeal 
right, and the time limits within which an appeal may be lodged. The MHRT Wales Rules 2008 do 
not contain this last requirement to notify about rights of appeal, but the overriding objective 
would appear to require it.699 
These processes by which the tribunal operates today have their origins in the reforms in the 
tribunals’ powers and procedures introduced with the Mental Health Act 1983. These had a 
dramatic effect on the functioning and the case load of the tribunal. 
The reforms to the Tribunal accompanying the Mental Health Act 1983 
There were two parallel processes of reform in the late 1970s. The first involved reform of primary 
mental health legislation. An Inter-Departmental Committee consisting of representatives of the 
DHSS (Department of Health and Social Security), the Home Office, the Lord Chancellor’s 
Department and the Welsh Office, produced a discussion document in 1976, A Review of the 
                                                     
699 Mental Health Review Tribunal Rules 1983, SI 1983/942, r 23(3) ((First Tier Tribunal HESC Rules 2008, r 41(2); MHRT 
Wales Rules 2008 r 28(2). First Tier Tribunal HESC Rules 2008, r 41(2)(c). 
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Mental Health Act 1959.700 This was followed by a White Paper in 1978 .701 The Government 
already had the benefit of the extensive recommendations on mentally disordered offenders of the 
Butler Committee which had reported in 1975, and had referred to the need to strengthen the 
rights and safeguard the liberties of mentally disordered people whilst retaining a proper regard for 
the rights of the general public and staff.702  
The Inter-Departmental Committee considered proposals for reform of the tribunal. Foremost 
among these was MIND’s proposal that automatic periodic reviews should be undertaken in cases 
where patients had not applied to the tribunal within specified periods. The Committee accepted 
this proposal, as long as the period between hearings was sufficiently long. The White Paper later 
proposed automatic reviews once after the first six months and thereafter once in every three 
years. Despite concerns from the Royal College of Psychiatrists at the resource implications703, 
provision for automatic reviews on this basis was introduced in the Mental Health Act 1983. 704 
MIND also proposed that the frequency of entitlement to a tribunal should effectively be doubled, 
with patients entitled to apply once within the first six months and once within every subsequent 
twelve month period. This too was eventually implemented in s 66 of the MHA 1983. 
Changes to the Tribunal’s Powers 
The scope of the tribunal’s powers was also a major issue of debate, and many saw the ‘all or 
nothing’ options available to the tribunal, discharge or not discharge, as one of the major problems. 
The Royal College of Psychiatrists and the British Association of Social Workers commented on the 
tribunal’s powers. The Review Document states that ‘Some’ (without specifying who) ‘had 
suggested that tribunals should not have the power of discharge against the RMO’s advice.’ This 
was apparently in the light of cases where discharged patients had committed serious criminal 
offences. The Committee rejected this proposal on the grounds that the numbers involved were 
small, and that to remove the power of discharge would deny the ‘prime function of the tribunal’ 
namely to provide an independent assessment of the patient’s liability to detention.705 Having 
scotched the idea that the tribunal’s power of discharge should be removed, which would have 
breached Article 5(4) of the European Convention on Human Rights, the Committee went on to 
consider what changes might be made to the tribunal’s existing powers.  
The 1983 Act transformed the Mental Health Review Tribunals’ powers by introducing more 
possibilities to ensure that discharge was planned with proper after-care support, whilst ensuring 
that the tribunal complied with the requirements of Article 5(4) as set out in X v United Kingdom706 
in that it would have the power to direct discharge of all detained patients except for those 
transferred from prison and still subject to sentence. In addition the Act provided increased access 
to tribunals for patients detained under the 28 day assessment power (again necessary to comply 
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with the ruling in X v United Kingdom), and automatic references for those who had not themselves 
applied within specified periods, as would be required over 20 years later by the Strasbourg Court 
in HL v United Kingdom707.  
Changing the Tribunal Rules 
The second strand of the reform process of the late 1970s took place in another Inter-
Departmental Committee specifically set up to look at the tribunal and possible changes to the 
Tribunal Rules. This Committee was chaired by a Principal Secretary at the Lord Chancellor’s 
Department, and comprising officials from the Home Office and the Department of Health and 
Social Security, two tribunal chairmen, Professor Sir John Wood from the Yorkshire Region and Mr 
James Cooke, a solicitor chair, with strong interest in reforming the tribunal, and Mr Locke, a 
tribunal clerk. The Council on Tribunals was also represented. This Committee issued a discussion 
document in 1978. This Committee’s recommendations would play a crucial role in creating a 
framework whereby patients acquired more due process rights, and hence a greater opportunity to 
participate more effectively in the hearing.  
The Committee proceeded on the basis that some degree of uniformity of procedure was necessary 
in order to counter the tendency, which had developed over the previous 18 years for tribunals to 
develop largely in isolation, ‘adopting different procedures within the framework provided by the 
rules.’708 MIND argued that ‘Uniformity of procedure is essential in preparing a case. The parties 
must be able to predict the pattern that the hearing will follow so that evidence can be presented 
in a coherent and orderly fashion. 709 MIND supported the drive for conformity of procedures 
across the tribunal regions primarily because it facilitated the task of the representative, and 
enhanced the ability of the patient to play a more effective part in the proceedings. 
In order to achieve uniformity, the Committee recommended abolishing the distinction between 
formal and informal hearings on the grounds that it was not clear to the tribunal how these 
hearings should differ in practice and that ‘Tribunals have tended to disregard the distinction and to 
adopt the pattern of hearing which seems to them to best meet the need.’710 However they 
remained undecided about what should be put in its place.  
The Committee canvassed two options. The first they called the ‘Review Body Approach’, based on 
the conception of the tribunal’s role as scrutineer of the justification for detention and examiner of 
the ‘opinions and actions of a wide range of persons’711 If this role were to be accepted the 
Committee envisaged the tribunal discharging its function with ‘a wide and unfettered discretion’ 
and it would have overall responsibility for ensuring that it has all the evidence necessary, ‘and 
flexibility in arranging its procedure which should be provided only in skeleton form in the rules.’712 
The proponents of this ‘less structured’ approach saw no need for many changes to be made to the 
rules provided that ‘Within the broad framework it provides, tribunals are given the flexibility which 
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they require whilst ensuring that all present are given adequate opportunity to give evidence and 
question that of others.713 
The second option was based on the idea of the tribunal as an ‘independent body carrying out a 
thorough inquiry’ which would provide opportunities for the patient to challenge witnesses and be 
governed by a ‘structured system of procedure prescribed by rules.’714 However, the tribunal would 
retain discretion to modify the procedure in the light of the patient’s state of mental health or for 
other good reasons. 715 This approach accords more closely with the case law of the European 
Court of Human Rights on reviewing the lawfulness of detention (discussed at pp above). 
In order to maintain the independent body model, again the existing framework could be 
maintained, but it would be ‘strengthened and elaborated’ in order to spell out the ability of the 
parties to adduce their own evidence and challenge that of others.  
The discussion document indicated that the following would be provided for specifically. First, the 
Tribunal president would have to explain the procedure to be followed to all parties. Second, the 
applicant, the RMO and the responsible authority would be entitled to call witnesses and give 
evidence, and all witnesses would be available for questioning by or on behalf of interested parties, 
with the applicant having the final right of reply. Third, unless the tribunal exercised its power to 
exclude the applicant or decided to conduct a private interview, both the patient and the RMO 
should normally be expected to be present throughout the hearing. Fourth, where there was any 
material challenge to a social circumstances report, the social worker would be examined by the 
tribunal.716 MIND emphasized that ‘definitive procedures’ were required if any substantial change 
was to occur. They felt that it should be regarded as the norm that the patient, the RMO and the all 
the witnesses should be present throughout, and that this should only be departed from in clearly 
specified circumstances, and that the reasons for excluding the patient would be disclosed to the 
representative. 717 These recommendations were reflected in the Mental Health Review Tribunal 
Rules 1983  
The Committee proposed five key principles in steering the tribunal towards ‘the independent body 
carrying out a thorough inquiry’ model of decision-making.  Each of these has a bearing on 
participation.  
1. All cases should be subject to the same procedure 
2. Patients should not have to complete a complicated form to apply to the tribunal. The 
discussion paper proposed that an application should be accepted if made in writing by the 
applicant or on his behalf though there would be a simplified form not laid down in rules, 
the use of which would be optional. The minute taker noted in capitals that there had been 
‘AGREEMENT THAT IT SHOULD NOT BE OBLIGATORY FOR PATIENTS TO USE THE STANDARD 
FORM’.  
3. Patients’ representatives, where legally qualified or approved by the tribunal should have 
the right to see and hear all evidence put to the tribunal 
                                                     
713 Ibid, para 2.68. 
714 Ibid, para 1.10.  
715 Ibid 
716 Ibid, para 2.70. 
717 Gostin L O and Rassaby E Mental Health Review Tribunal Procedures (1978) MIND, 18. 
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4. Hearings should continue to be normally held in private but tribunals should give reasons to 
refuse requests for a public hearing 
5. Tribunals should continue to be able to exclude anyone (except the representative) from 
the hearing but should do so exceptionally and only for good reason.  
The 1983 Act and the reforms accompanying it which extended non-means-tested legal aid to 
representation of patients before the tribunal set the pattern by which the tribunal continues to 
operate today – a pattern that the Interdepartmental Committee would have recognised as the 
‘independent body conducting a thorough review approach.’  
Non-judicial treatment safeguards under the Mental Health Act 1983 
The 1983 Act also introduced important reforms on consent to treatment.  We consider these 
briefly in this section as they represent an important example of a non-judicial procedural 
safeguard that might potentially comply with Article 8 ECHR in some circumstances and could help 
offer an intermediate safeguard under the MCA between the informality of the general defence 
and a requirement for judicial sanction by the CoP.  As we discussed earlier in Section 3.1, a second 
opinion system was suggested by the Law Commission in 1995 as providing an independent check 
where the person could be seen and interviewed by a second opinion doctor, but a court hearing 
would not be necessary.  
Even though patients detained under the MHA 1983 only become eligible for a second opinion for 
psychotropic medicine after three months718, nevertheless they have an entitlement to a second 
opinion for medicine or ECT given without consent. Statistics on the operation of second opinions 
for medicine and ECT are set out in Appendix D.  No equivalent system of safeguards exists for 
people who are deprived of their liberty under the Mental Capacity Act 2005. This is a 
discrimination in that each is detained, each is having the same treatment, given without consent, 
yet one has the opportunity of an independent second opinion to verify that the treatment is 
appropriate, the other does not. One has the sort of independent safeguard which might satisfy the 
requirements of article 8 in relation to physical and psychological integrity where a treatment is 
given against a person’s will, as set out in  X v Finland. 719 The other does not.  
 
The reforms accompanying the Mental Health Act 2007 
The Mental Health Act 2007 amended the Mental Health Act 1983. At the same time the MHRT was 
radically restructured in 2007, one of the key features being a divergence in the arrangements 
between England and Wales. The Tribunals Courts and Enforcement Act (TCEA) 2007 created two 
new tribunals in England: the First Tier Tribunal and the Upper Tribunal. The TCEA provides for the 
establishment of Chambers within the First Tier tribunal and the jurisdiction of the MHRT in 
England was transferred by the Transfer of Tribunal Functions Order 2008 to the Health, Education 
and Social Care Chamber of the tribunal governed by the First-tier Tribunal (Health Education and 
Social Care Chamber) Rules 2008.720 The tribunal is now known in England as the Mental Health 
Tribunal. Wales retained a separate Mental Health Review Tribunal, subject to the Mental Health 
                                                     
718 MHA 1983, s 58. 
719 [2012] ECHR 1371, paras 220-221. 
720 SI 2008 No 2699. 
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Review Tribunal for Wales Rules 2008.721 The Upper Tribunal hears appeals from the First tier 
Tribunal and the MHRT Wales.722 The Mental Health Tribunal and the MHRT are each subject to an 
overriding objective. Each now has extensive powers of case management in the form of wide 
powers to issue directions.  
The caseload has increased dramatically as a result of the various reforms outlined above. In the 
period immediately prior to the 1983 Act very little had changed since 1959 in terms of caseload. 
The Council on Tribunals Annual Reports show that tribunals disposed on 709 cases in 1980, 708 in 
1981 and 858 in 1982. 
With the advent under the 1983 Act of entitlement to MHRT hearings for patients admitted for 28 
days for assessment, the introduction of a power to direct discharge of restricted patients, and the 
halving of the duration of periods of detention of patients admitted for treatment or under hospital 
orders, there was a dramatic increase in tribunal case load. The increase was further fuelled by 
provision for the automatic referral of the cases of patients who have not made an application 
within the first six months of detention, and also of patients whose detention is renewed and 
whose cases have not been considered by a MHRT within the last three years. In the five years 
following the 1983 Act the caseload of the tribunal increased steadily, as Table 1 shows.  
Table 1 Applications received by the Tribunal and cases decided, 1983 - 1988 (Source: Annual Reports of the Council on Tribunals, 
HMSO) 
Year 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 
Applications 
received 
3,868 
 
3,554 4,305 5,046 5,287 5,834 
Cases 
decided 
2,009 2,117 2,516 2,920 3,101 3,327 
 
The first Annual Report of the Council on Tribunals following the coming into force of the 1983 Act 
noted the substantial additional workload created for MHRT's, and that one result was that 
patients had to wait longer for a hearing. In particular the Council noted that there had been 
considerable delays with the handling of the cases of patients subject to restrictions. The causes of 
these delays were attributed in part to difficulties in securing the services of judges with Crown 
Court experience to preside over MHRT's convened to hear these cases, in part to delays by 
advocates in the preparation of the patient's case, and in part to failure by doctors in special 
hospitals to observe the three week time limit for providing medical reports for the MHRT.  
Delays between application and hearing were a regular feature of the Council's Reports. In 1986 the 
Council reported a case of delay referred to them by the Mental Health Act Commission where, due 
to difficulties in securing the services of a judge president, a MHRT hearing originally listed for 
November 1985 did not take place until May 1986 over a year after the patient's original 
                                                     
721 SI 2008 No 2705. 
722 Section 32 of the TCEA 2007 allows the Lord Chancellor by order to provide for an appeal against a decision of a 
scheduled tribunal to be made to the Upper Tribunal, instead of to the court to which an appeal would otherwise fall to 
be made, where the decision is made by the tribunal in exercising a function in relation to Wales.  
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application. In 1988, the Council Annual Report contains a trenchant reference to the problem and 
expresses its firm opinion that this was largely due to understaffing in the MHRT offices. The 
Council on Tribunals was abolished and replaced by the Administrative justice and Tribunals 
Council, which has itself since been abolished. 
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Statistics on the caseload of the Mental Health Tribunals are now found in the Reports of the Care 
Quality Commission and Health inspectorate Wales. The CQC figures for detained patients since 
2000 are set out in Table 2 on the next page. Figures are also given for Community Treatment 
Order cases in England (Table 3). 
There are several striking features of the figures in Tables 1 - 3. The discharge rate for detained 
patients remains as it has done throughout the period since 1959 at around 10 -12%. The discharge 
rate for Community Treatment Order patients is even lower, at around 4-5%. In a very high number 
of detained patient cases – not far off one third - the person is discharged by their responsible 
clinician prior to the tribunal hearing. High numbers of cases are withdrawn by the patient, so that 
only about 60% of cases actually go to a hearing. Even so, given this very high level of caseload, the 
tribunal struggles to meet requirements for speedy review. One of the strategies being suggested 
to address this is the removal of the medical and lay members from the three person tribunal panel 
and transferring the jurisdiction to a single judge, with the power to bring in medical expertise if 
necessary and appropriate.  
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Table 2 Applications, hearings and discharges before Mental Health tribunals (Source: CQC) 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2013-
2014 
2014-
2015 
2015-
2016 
Total 
Applications 
     16, 
155 
15,367 17,648  15,605 23,959 23,533  25,074  29,605  30,320 27,380  28,892  29,808 
Total 
hearings 
           16,048  19,320  17,130 18,751  17,635  17,844  
Total 
Discharge  
1,336  1,351  1,362  1, 
897  
1,351  1,587  1,361 
 
1,402  967  1,458  1, 374  1,590   1,457  1,676  1,773  1,863  
No 
Discharge 
10,199 10,229  8,637  9,906 10,546 7,935 7,417 7,158  6,328  10,664  9,982  10,498   10,991  12,383  12,422  13,205  
%age 
discharge to 
hearings 
12%  12% 14% 16% 11%  17%  16% 16%  13%  12%  12%  10%   8.5% 9% 10% 10% 
Withdrawn 
applications 
     1,843  1,960 2,744  3,799  3,779   4,431   4,392 4,971  5,560  6,051 
Discharged 
by clinician 
prior to 
hearing 
     4,790  4,629 6,344 5,862 8,056 7,631 7,559  5188 7,990 7,862  7,887 
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Table 3 Appeals to MHT England against Community Treatment Orders (Source: CQC) 
Year 2010-2011 2011-2012 2012-2013 2014-2015 2015-2016 
Applications 3,284 4,317  4,211  4,349  4,317  
Withdrawn Applications 0 713 814 834  873 
Full hearings with patient present 2,457 3,272 2,801 3,629  3,942 
Paper hearings without patient present 0 0 368 486 521 
Discharges by Tribunal 112  161  132 165 132 
No discharge 2,048  3,196  3,040 3,238 3,196 
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The Transforming our Justice System proposals 
The 2016 Ministry of Justice Consultation Document Transforming our justice System: Summary of 
Reforms and Consultation723 on ‘simplifying panel composition’ had the potential to affect the 
Mental Health Tribunal in England and the Mental Health Review Tribunal in Wales. The document 
advocated a ‘balanced, tailored approach … making sure the panels that make decisions in tribunals 
are designed to best suit the circumstances of the case. Most tribunals currently reflect historic 
arrangements that may be out of date and do not tailor the expertise of the panel according to the 
case.’724  
The initial consultation proposed that a single judge would exercise the tribunal’s jurisdiction 
instead of the current three person panel including a judge, a psychiatrist and a lay member. The 
composition of the original Mental Health Review Tribunal was intended to reflect the philosophy 
of the Mental Health Act 1959 that the issue of detention on grounds of mental disorder was not 
simply a legal issue or a medical issue but also a social issue. A balance of all perspectives was to be 
achieved. Detention was on application to the managers of the detaining hospital by a social 
worker supported by medical recommendations. The tribunal would have on its panel a medical 
member to form an opinion on the state of mind of the detained person and to report her or his 
view to the tribunal. The lay members (or specialist category member as some preferred to be 
called), were initially drawn from those with experience of health and social services for mental 
disorder. In recent years the importance of recognizing the vital contribution to decision-making of 
those who are ‘experts by experience’, has come to the fore, with the appointment of people with 
experience of receiving psychiatric services being appointed as lay members.  
The belief at the time was that the three person panel was not only there to provide expertise, but 
to ensure that each of these perspectives on mental disorder the medical, the social and the legal, 
were adequately reflected. Given that the decision to discharge a patient detained under the 
Mental Health Act involves a risk that a patient may self harm or harm others, the fact that the 
decision is taken by a three person panel provides a greater security for those making the decision 
than if the decision fell on one person’s shoulders. That security comes from having ensured that all 
the issues are fully deliberated and relevant perspectives are brought to bear. By placing the onus 
of responsibility on one person, an incentive may be created to err on the side of caution and 
decide not to discharge. As we have seen, the discharge rate by the tribunal never exceeds 12% of 
cases which go to a hearing. 
Mental Health Tribunals perform a key role in determining the need for continued detention, and 
whether there is objective medical evidence of a true mental disorder of a kind or degree 
warranting confinement, as required by Article 5 ECHR. A tribunal without a medical member also 
risked breaching the requirements for psychiatric opinion independent of the detaining hospital725 
as the only medical expertise available to the tribunal is likely to be contained in the responsible 
clinician’s report. It is rare these days for a patient to be able to get legal aid for an independent 
psychiatrist’s report, so the medical member’s input is likely to be essential in providing a 
psychiatric opinion independent of the hospital. A single judge may not have the confidence of 
professional expertise to offer a contrary opinion to that of the detaining psychiatrist. There is a 
                                                     
723 Transforming our justice system, consultation, n 524, paras 5.1 and para 7.3 
724 Ibid, at paras 5.1 and para 7.3 
725 X v Finland (App no 34806/04) [2012] ECHR 1371 
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need at the bare minimum to provide medical expertise independent of the hospital in connection 
with tribunal proceedings. The detained patient will be unlikely to obtain legal funding to 
commission a psychiatric report.   
The proposed change, which would have completely altered the basis of the tribunal system 
established by the Franks Committee in 1957, caused considerable alarm among consultation 
respondents and the government appears to have backed down.726  Whilst denying that the 
proposals ‘would result in decisions being made without the appropriate expertise being drawn on 
where required, or users being left without the support that they need’, they concluded ‘We 
therefore do not intend to proceed with the proposal to introduce a single member panel as the 
default position in the unified tribunals’.727  There will, however, be the potential for the Tribunal 
chair to decide that the presence of expert members is not required.  The presence of the medical 
and lay members on the tribunal panel appears to have been protected; for now at least. 
                                                     
726 Transforming our justice system, government’s consultation response, n 524, 
727 Ibid, para 78 
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4.2 PARTICIPATION IN MENTAL HEALTH TRIBUNALS 
Having outlined the background to the tribunals’ current powers and procedures in England and 
Wales, the changes in the workload of the tribunal, and some of the proposals to address these, we 
now turn to the issue of participation in relation to the same subject areas listed above in relation 
to the CoP, and in the light of the European Court of Human Rights threefold rationale of the right 
to participate and the rule of personal presence. The first element is the overarching dignity 
principle that as the subject of proceedings the person should be entitled to be present when 
matters affecting their fundamental rights are being decided. The second rationale is that as the 
‘object of the proceedings’ their participation is necessary ‘to allow the judge to form his personal 
opinion about the applicant’s mental capacity’ 728 Finally participation is necessary to enable a 
person to present her or his case729 and to refute expert evidence or arguments recommending 
measures s/he opposes.730  
4.3 NOTIFICATION AND INFORMATION  
Information about the right to apply was a sine qua non of participation in proceedings which could 
only be begun by application from the patient or the nearest relative. 731 Effective processes for 
automatic referrals to the tribunal were not introduced until 1983. The whole question of how 
patients were to be given information about their right to apply to the tribunal was fraught with 
controversy from the very beginnings of the tribunal in 1960. Throughout the period 1959-1983 the 
application rate was comparatively low - between 10 and 15 per cent of the eligible population of 
detained patients actually applied to the tribunal. A significant cause of the very low uptake of 
rights was undoubtedly that there was no statutory duty to give patients information about their 
right to apply to the tribunal.732  
The MHA 1959 gave the Secretary of State for Health the power to make regulations requiring 
hospital managers to provide patients and relatives with statements of their rights and powers 
under the Act.733 However, knowing the issue to be controversial, the Secretary of State took the 
                                                     
728Shtukaturov v Russia (App no 44009/05) [2008] ECHR 223, para 72 
729 Ibid, para. 72-3 
730 Salontaji-Drobnjak v Serbia (App no 36500/05) [2009] ECHR 1526, para.127 
731 Offenders subject to Home Office restrictions (under ss 60 and 65 of the MHA 1959) did not have a right to apply but 
had the right to request that their case be referred to the tribunal by the Home Secretary. The Home Secretary always 
complied with requests. 
732 There were other reasons for the low uptake. Larry Gostin noted in A Human Condition Volume 1 The Mental Health 
Act from 1959-1975 Observations, Analysis and Proposals for Reform: A MIND Special Report 1975, 71 ‘It has been 
alleged that some RMOs (Responsible Medical Officer The psychiatrist in charge of treatment of a detained patient) 
object to a MHRT on the ground that it presents a challenge to their clinical judgment. Some RMOs will discharge a 
patient rather than defend their clinical judgment before an appeals bpdy; others will promise the patient imminent 
release if he does not make an application or withdraws an exiting one. If the patient is not discharged, he will have lost 
his right to appeal to the tribunal until his order is renewed. The patient may not be aware of this consequence. Finally 
there are RMOs who directly discourage the application by means of the express or implied threat of punitive action, 
such as a longer hospital stay, if the patient continues with the application. These doctors may rationalize the decision 
by saying that the patient, if he applies to the tribunal, has not accepted his treatment programme and, therefore, must 
remain in hospital longer for the treatment to be effective.’ These allegations were based on complaints received by 
MIND from patients in Special Hospitals.  
733 Mental Health Act 1959, s 56(2)(c)  
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decision early on not to use this power as he considered it appropriate to rely on administrative 
arrangements for this purpose and not to make regulations unless experience showed them to be 
necessary.734  
Leaflets explaining rights were prepared by the Department of Health and distributed to hospitals, 
and the Minister’s view that he wished hospitals and mental nursing homes to distribute these to 
patients and their relatives was communicated by Ministerial Circular in 1960.735 It soon became 
apparent that this system was unreliable and the Department of Health suggested that hospitals 
should post notices on wards informing patients of their rights. This met with considerable 
opposition, a typical response being that of Newcastle Regional Health Board, whose group clerks 
considered  
any possible benefit which might be derived from displaying of a notice for the 
relatively few patients who are compulsorily detained would not offset the 
considerable disadvantages of constantly reminding the far greater number of 
voluntary or informal patients of the custodial aspect of the hospital. The general 
feeling appears to be that the displaying of such a notice would be a retrograde step 
reminiscent of the old ‘lunatic asylum’ days when it was the custom to display a 
variety of notices relating to the rights of patients in writing to the Board of 
Control.736  
In the light of this general reluctance to inform patients of their rights, in case it would upset their 
fellow patients who were informal and undermine the ethos of the new legislation, it is scarcely 
surprising that the uptake of tribunal rights was around 12 per cent. 
Cyril Greenland conducted a study in 1967-68 of four London Tribunal Regions showing that just 
over 10 per cent of patients who were eligible to apply actually did so.737 Larry Gostin and MIND 
replicated the survey in the mid 1970s for the whole of England and found that 12 per cent of those 
eligible to apply actually did so.738 This was considerably less that the Government estimates when 
resourcing the tribunal where they thought that over one third of detained patients would apply – 
7,500 out of a projected 20,000. Greenland found that from the available data there were: 
wide variations in hospitals in the use of tribunals. This was particularly to be 
observed in the subnormality739 hospitals … This is not to say that the mentally 
handicapped do not wish to exercise their rights. When informed of their rights and 
encouraged to apply for tribunals 10% of the detained patients in one subnormality 
hospital , including severely subnormal persons, made applications.740  
                                                     
734 Gostin, n 717, p 70.  
735 HM(60)69 
736 National Archive, Kew, File MH140/13 Mental Health Act 1959 Pts 1 and 9 Mental Health Review Tribunals Policy 
Questions.  
737 Greenland, Cyril, Mental Health and Civil Liberties (1970), p 34. 
738 Gostin, L. O., A Human Condition Part One (1975) MIND London 
739 ‘Subnormality’ and ‘Severe subnormality’ were the terms used by the MHA 1959.  
740 Greenland, Cyril, Mental Health and Civil Liberties (1970) , p 46.  
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Greenland’s research highlighted the need for effective support to enable people to exercise their 
rights to challenge detention. 
Lobbying by MIND and the NCCL, and the increasing awareness of the Government of the need to 
comply with the rulings of the European Court of Human Rights in Winterwerp v the Netherlands741 
and X v United Kingdom742 led to the introduction under the MHA 1983 of statutory duties on 
hospital managers not only to give patients information about their rights (and take all practicable 
steps to ensure that they understood that information), but also to refer cases to the tribunal of 
patients who had not themselves made an application within the first six months of detention or in 
any subsequent three year period.743 These provisions recognized that patients whose detention 
might not be warranted were not applying for discharge, possibly because they did not know they 
had the right to do so, and possibly because of the effects of their illness or their medication, or 
perhaps because they lacked mental capacity to make an application. 
Participation is now a strong principle in mental health legislation. Sections 130A-L of the MHA 
1983, introduced by the Mental Health Act 2007, confer duties on local authorities to provide 
Independent Mental Health Advocates (IMHAs) for patients subject to detention or community 
compulsion. The help to be given by IMHAs is to include (a) help in obtaining information about and 
understanding any rights which may be exercised under this Act by or in relation to him; and (b) 
help (by way of representation or otherwise) in exercising those rights.  
The Care Quality Commission has the task, formerly discharged by the Mental Health Act 
Commission of monitoring the MHA 1983. The monitoring process entails ensuring that the 
principles in the Mental Health Act Code of Practice are adhered to. In their 2011/2012 report the 
CQC included a chapter headed Participation and Respect, where it commented that Government 
mental health strategy enshrines the principle of ‘no decision about me without me’ and promotes 
patient involvement at an individual and collective level.’744 
The 2012/2013 Report emphasised that detaining authorities should ensure that patients who may 
have difficulty in exercising their legal right to appeal are supported to do so and have timely access 
to Independent Mental Health Advocacy services. Consideration may also be given to requesting 
the Secretary of State to exercise their referral powers for any patient who lacks capacity to initiate 
their legal appeal.745 
The CQC devotes considerable energy to ensuring that patients have access to IMHAs. No 
equivalent monitoring exists in relation to advocacy provision under the MCA 2005. 
                                                     
741 [1979] 2 EHRR 387. 
742 [2001] 4 EHRR 144. 
743 Section 68 of the Mental Health Act 1983 introduced a duty on the hospital managers to refer the case to a tribunal 
of a patient who had not appealed within specified periods. The Secretary of State was given a power and a more 
limited duty to refer under s 67. Section 132 imposes a duty on the hospital managers to take such steps as are 
practicable to ensure that the patient understands – (a) under what provisions of the act he is for the time being 
detained, and the effect of that provision; and (b) what rights of applying to a tribunal are available to him in respect of 
his detention under that provision.  
744 Care Quality Commission, Monitoring the Mental Health Act 1983 2011/2012, p 19. 
745 Ibid, p 25 
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4.4 ACCESS 
Given that applicants were persons believed to be suffering from mental disorder, there were 
initially considerable formalities surrounding the process of application under the 1959 Act. 
Application to the tribunal had to be on a form set out in the First Schedule to the Tribunal Rules. 
Rule 3 put a duty on the responsible authority and the tribunal to supply the appropriate form of 
application to an applicant on request. If a patient wrote direct to the tribunal, purportedly 
applying without using the statutory form, rather than supply them with an application form. 
Regional Chairmen were given the following standard form letter to use in their reply to the 
patient: 
Dear Sir, 
Thank you for your letter in which you ask whether you can apply to the Mental 
Health Review Tribunal. 
It is not clear from the information in your letter whether you have rights to apply or 
not. If you have rights to apply, you should have received from the hospital a leaflet 
explaining what your rights are. If you have not received a leaflet, it may mean that 
at present at least you are not entitled to apply to the tribunal. If you are in any 
doubt about the position you are advised to consult the staff of the hospital. 
The hospital are in the best position to advise you because they will have particulars 
of the authority for your detention. But if you care to supply fuller particulars, the 
Tribunal staff will give you any help they can, or if you wish you can fill in the 
enclosed form and the tribunal will then consider formally your right to make an 
application.746 
It is not difficult to imagine the spirit-dampening effect of such a letter on the addressee. The 
delays occasioned by this approach would nowadays be viewed as inimical to the right under Article 
5(4) of the ECHR to speedy review of the lawfulness of detention. 
The application form was set out in the first schedule to the Rules. It required the patient to give 
name and address and name and address of the detaining hospital. The applicant could give 
reasons for the application, but was not required to do so. There were two types of hearing, formal 
and informal, and if the patient wanted a formal hearing this had to be stated on the form.  
There is no longer a statutory form, but both the English and Welsh tribunals provide forms, 
available on line, whose use is encouraged as they help to ensure that the necessary information is 
provided.747 The simplification of the application process was a key achievement of the 1983 
Reforms. We have already discussed at the complexities of the forms used to initiate proceedings in 
the CoP, and how these represent a significant barrier to participation.  
Tribunals usually take place in hospitals, either the hospital where the patient is detained, or the 
responsible hospital where the patient is subject to a Community Treatment Order. 
                                                     
746 National Archive, Kew File MH140/23 Meeting of Regional Chairmen of MHRTs held 18 October 1960. 
747 For a full discussion of the current application process, see Fennell, P., Letts, P. and Wilson, J. Mental Health 
Tribunals, Law, Policy, and Practice The Law Society London 2014, 169-170. 
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4.5 PARTY STATUS 
The MHRT Rules 1960 did not mention parties, but gave rights to the applicant, the responsible 
authority, and any person to whom notice of the application had been given, to be represented by 
any person authorized in that behalf as long as the representative was not liable to be detained or 
subject to guardianship under the Act or a patient in the same hospital.748 The MHRT Rules 1983 
introduced a definition of party to mean ‘the applicant, the patient, the responsible authority, any 
other person to whom a notice of the proceedings is sent (as an interested party) or who is added 
as a party by direction of the tribunal.’749 Parties were entitled to representation under r 10 of the 
1983 Rules. Parties had a right to receive the decision and written reasons within seven days of the 
decision.750 
Parties are defined under the current 2008 Rules for England and for Wales as meaning the patient, 
the Secretary of State, the responsible authority, and any other person who makes an 
application.751 The respective Rules each set out an overriding objective for their respective 
tribunals. They must deal with cases fairly, justly, efficiently and expeditiously. 752 The tribunals 
must seek to give effect to the overriding objective when they: 
a) exercise any power under the Rules; or  
b) interpret any rule.753  
In England the rules then specify that dealing with a case in accordance with the overriding objective 
includes 
a) dealing with the case in ways which are proportionate to the importance of the case, the complexity 
of the issues, the anticipated costs and the resources of the parties  
b) avoiding unnecessary formality and seeking flexibility in the proceedings; 
c) ensuring, so far as practicable, that the parties are able to participate fully in the proceedings;  
d) using any special expertise of the Tribunal effectively; and 
e) avoiding delay, so far as compatible with proper consideration of the issues. 754  
In Wales, para (a) above is omitted. In England, parties are under an obligation to (a) help the tribunal to 
further the overriding objective; and (b) co-operate with the tribunal generally. 755 This obligation does not 
appear in the Welsh Rules as it was felt that placing such an obligation on a detained patient to co-operate 
                                                     
748 Mental Health Review Tribunal Rules 1960 SI 1960 No 1139, r 10(1). 
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with the tribunal was undesirable.756 Parties have various rights to notice of the proceedings, to appoint a 
representative, to apply for directions and witness summonses, and to attend the hearing.757 
4.6 ATTENDING THE TRIBUNAL AND PERSONAL CONTACT WITH JUDGES 
From the beginning, the 1960 Tribunal Rules provided a right to for the patient to be interviewed, 
to be given an opportunity to state his views, and to draw the attention of the tribunal to any 
evidence or information relevant to the application. Rule 12 of the 1960 Rules conferred a 
discretion on the Tribunal ‘at any time before making its determination’ to interview the patient, 
and a duty to do so if the patient requested it. In addition, the tribunal could authorize any one or 
more of its members to visit and interview the patient in private.  
The Rules also required the tribunal to give to the applicant, the responsible authority and any 
other person to whom notice has been given of the hearing the opportunity of an interview with 
the Tribunal at a time and a place of at which at least seven days notice has been given. This right 
to be interviewed would later be reaffirmed as being of key importance by the Interdepartmental 
Committee, which reviewed MHRT procedures in 1978. That Committee was unanimous that the 
rules should continue to provide without doubt that the patient should have the right to be 
interviewed by the Tribunal.758 Hence, the rule of personal presence in these Article 5(4) reviews 
has been respected from the outset. 
From 1960 until 2014 the Tribunal rules required that, where practicable, prior to the hearing, the 
patient be interviewed by the medical member of the Tribunal panel in order to form an opinion of 
his mental condition. The new rules have made the pre-hearing examination voluntary, unless the 
patient is detained under section 2 for assessment.  
The prehearing examination is by ‘an appropriate member of the Tribunal’ and is still for the 
purpose of forming an opinion of the patient’s mental condition. If the patient is detained for 
assessment under s 2, the patient must be examined prior to the hearing, unless the Tribunal is 
satisfied that the patient does not want such an examination. If the patient is detained under any 
other provision there is a duty to carry out a pre-hearing examination if the patient or the patient’s 
representative has informed the Tribunal in writing, not less than 14 days before the hearing, that 
the patient; or if the patient lacks the capacity to make such a decision, the patient’s 
representative, wishes there to be such an examination, The Tribunal may direct in any case that 
there be such an examination. 759 
Subject to one exception, the tribunal must hold a hearing before making a decision that disposes 
of proceedings. The exception is where a patient subject to a community treatment order has had 
her or his case referred to the tribunal, and either the patient has stated in writing that s/he does 
not wish to attend or be represented at a hearing of the reference and the Tribunal is satisfied that 
the patient has the capacity to decide whether or not to make that decision. Alternatively the 
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patient’s representative may state in writing that the patient does not wish to attend or be 
represented at the hearing of the reference.760  
Rule 39 of the HESC Rules sets out the very limited circumstances where the tribunal may proceed 
with a hearing in the patient’s absence. If the patient fails to attend, the tribunal may proceed in 
her or his absence if satisfied that the party has been notified of the hearing or that reasonable 
steps have been taken to notify the party of the hearing; and the tribunal considers that it is in the 
interests of justice to proceed with the hearing. The Tribunal may not proceed with a hearing that 
the patient has failed to attend unless the Tribunal is satisfied that—  
a) the patient— 
(i) has decided not to attend the hearing; or 
(ii) is unable to attend the hearing for reasons of ill health; and  
b) an examination under rule 34 (medical examination of the patient)— (i) has been carried 
out; or 
(ii) is impractical or unnecessary.  
A participant in the round table with great experience of tribunals said that ‘the presence of the 
patient is the norm, whether or not the patient is represented. In cases where there is an oral 
hearing and the patient is unlikely to attend, the usual course of events is that the Tribunal’s 
medical member will interview the patient before the hearing.’ 
The pre-hearing examination can be seen as a reflection of the rationale that the patient is the 
object of the proceedings in terms of the Shtukaturov principles. We now turn to address more 
directly the principle that the patient is the subject of the proceedings and should have the right to 
present his case and contest the proposed restrictions on her or his liberty. The two key issues here 
are the ability to know and challenge effectively the case being made in favour of detention or 
compulsion, and the availability of representation.  
4.7 THE RIGHT OF THE PATIENT TO HAVE ACCESS TO THE RESPONSIBLE AUTHORITY’S 
REPORT 
Respect for the rules of natural justice, particularly the audi alteram partem principle, is a key 
component of participation in the sense of ability to defend one’s rights. Both sides should have the 
right to be heard and this applies also to the right of each person know the case being made out 
against them. The tribunal under the 1959 Act was based on a norm of non-disclosure to the 
patient of the report supporting detention. The rules on non-disclosure have undergone significant 
amendment in 1983 and again in 2008 so that the circumstances in which information may be 
withheld from the patient are now much more circumscribed. The key source of written 
information about the patient is the Responsible Authority’s Statement, which includes a statement 
of the authority’s reasons why the patient should not be discharged, a report on the patient’s 
mental condition and the facilities available if s/he were to be discharged. Before the tribunal panel 
sees the patient the members will have had the responsible authority’s report, and possibly a 
report from their own medical member.  
Gostin and Rassaby, in their guide to tribunal representation written in 1980, describe the pivotal 
role of the RMO in the process, and how reports on after care arrangements were prepared by 
‘hospital social workers’ an indication of the tendency at the time for the entire system of 
                                                     
760 Ibid, r 35. 
 161 
 
psychiatric care to be hospital based, in the sense that psychiatric hospitals often served as the 
base for community care professionals. 761 The authors warned that ‘These reports must be 
examined very carefully because of considerable variation in their quality. The representative 
should bring to the attention of the tribunal any failure to provide clear and accurate information in 
the form required.’  
A major problem for those detained under the 1959 Act was that they were unlikely to have access 
to these reports, a serious obstacle to participation in the sense of being able to challenge the 
accuracy and veracity of the case being made for their detention. Under the rules, the responsible 
authority, in effect the RMO, could in preparing the statement, set aside certain information to be 
withheld from the applicant on the grounds that its disclosure would be undesirable in the interests 
of the patient or for other special reason. The rules required the RMO to specify the reasons for 
non-disclosure.  
Although the rules provided for the tribunal to examine the sufficiency of the authority’s reasons, 
Gostin and Rassaby noted that RMOs and the MHRT ‘seldom’ complied with the rules in that RMOs 
did not identify specific material which would be harmful but there was a widespread practice of 
designating the whole report to be withheld, and although the rules appeared to envisage each 
case being considered on its merits, for a standard generalized ground to be typed on top of each 
report that ‘disclosure would damage the doctor-patient relationship.’762 Clearly participation in the 
sense of the right to know and test the evidential basis of the case for continued detention was 
severely constrained by this medically paternalist interpretation and practice.  
This practice also made representation even more important, since the representative was entitled 
to all the information made available to the applicant, and the tribunal was empowered to provide 
the withheld information to the representative provided that s/he did not disclose it to the 
patient.763 Hence representatives could, if they trod carefully, obliquely obtain information from 
the patient as to the accuracy of the report and hence provide a sort of participation by proxy that, 
although imperfect, would be far superior to the position of unrepresented patients.  
The 1983 Rules continued to allow the responsible authority to set aside parts of its statement 
which it considered should not be disclosed, but placed a presumption in favour of disclosure to the 
patient by giving the final decision to the tribunal, and by providing that information could only be 
withheld if its disclosure would adversely affect the health or welfare of the patient or others. Case-
specific reasons for seeking non-disclosure had to be given by the responsible authority. The MHRT 
then had to consider if disclosure would have adverse effect claimed and, if satisfied that it would, 
record in writing its decision not to disclose, giving reasons.  
When new tribunal rules were introduced in 2008, the presumption was still in favour of disclosure 
unless the Tribunal was satisfied (a) that such disclosure would be likely to cause that person or 
some other person serious harm; and (b) having regard to the interests of justice, that it is 
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proportionate to give such a direction. In England the Tribunal has a discretion to order non-
disclosure if the tests are met. In Wales it has a duty not to disclose in such cases.764  
In both jurisdictions the current rules require the responsible authority to send a statement 
containing specified information and specified reports to the Tribunal as soon as practicable and in 
any event within 3 weeks after the responsible authority received a copy of the application or 
request from the Tribunal for a statement. In England the required reports are specified in a 
Practice Direction issued in 2013765, and include biographical information, an up to date medical 
report, an up to date Social Circumstances Report (SCR) and a nursing report. In Wales, the same 
information is required, but there is no express duty to provide a nursing report and the duty to 
provide a SCR is not absolute, but the information provided for the tribunal must, ‘where 
reasonably practicable’, include a SCR.766  
Since a SCR will provide crucial information about the support which would be available for the 
patient, if discharged, and the tribunal is more likely to discharge if adequate support is available, 
these reports can play a crucial role in the proceedings. The SCR should provide evidence of 
planned aftercare, in line with the guidance in the MHA Codes of Practice for England and Wales on 
the duty to provide aftercare under s 117 of the MHA 1983 and the English and Welsh policy 
guidance on the Care Programme Approach (CPA). 
The overriding objective includes ensuring so far as practicable that the parties are able to 
participate in the proceedings, which of course entails the patient having access to the evidence on 
which the case for detention is based. Under the 2008 Rules, as under the 1983 Rules, the 
presumption is in favour of disclosure of the responsible authority’s report. The test to be applied 
in deciding whether any of the report should be withheld has been strengthened so that the 
tribunal must be satisfied that disclosure would be likely to cause that person or some other person 
serious harm; and (b) having regard to the interests of justice, that it is proportionate to give such a 
direction. In England the Tribunal has a discretion to order non-disclosure if the tests are met. In 
Wales it has a duty. 767 In Dorset Healthcare NHS Foundation Trust v MH the Upper Tribunal held 
the starting point to be that ‘full disclosure of all relevant material should generally be given.’768 In 
RM v St Andrews Healthcare769 Judge Jacobs held that the tribunal judge had been wrong to order 
non-disclosure of the fact that the applicant had been covertly medicated and laid great emphasis 
on full participation: 
The overriding objective in rule 2 requires that the rules of procedure be applied so 
that cases are dealt with fairly and justly. This includes ensuring full participation, so 
far as practicable. Rule 14(2) requires the tribunal to have regard to the interests of 
justice. Justice and fairness generally require openness. Sometimes, they are not 
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compatible and a compromise is possible. It may, for example, be possible and 
necessary to conduct proceedings while concealing that the true prognosis is worse 
than the patient realises. In this case, I have set out the full implications of the 
tribunal’s order. They involve more than a compromise between justice and 
openness. They involve the sacrifice of the patient’s right to challenge his detention 
effectively.770 
In the St Andrews case Judge Jacobs recommended a form of words for non disclosure directions 
and stressed that the paragraph dealing with the key issue of the information that must not be 
disclosed. It needs to be precise, clear and exhaustive. Knowledge of the case against one and the 
opportunity to challenge it, as reflected in the common law audi alteram partem rule are 
prerequisites of full participation in legal proceedings affecting individual rights771, all the more so 
when liberty is at stake. The new tribunal rules have resulted in a tightening of the criteria for non-
disclosure, and this has been accompanied by a more robust attitude to scrutiny of reasons by the 
Upper Tribunal.  
Since the patients’ representative can have access to any material withheld from the applicant, 
representation assumes a central position in securing the right of the patient to participate as a 
subject of the proceedings. 
4.8 REPRESENTATION 
At the initial meeting of tribunal Chairmen in 1960 the main concern appears to have been whether 
the responsible authority would need legal representation. Chairmen were told that the Minister 
had suggested ‘to responsible authorities that they might usually be represented by the RMO, and 
that legal representation is not likely to be necessary, except perhaps if it is known that there is to 
be a formal hearing and that the patient is likely to be legally represented.’772 
The applicant was entitled to be represented by a person of her or his choosing, provided that 
person was not a detained patient or subject to guardianship, or receiving treatment for mental 
disorder as an informal patient in the hospital. Unless the tribunal otherwise directed, the patient 
or any other person appearing before the tribunal could also be accompanied by a person of their 
choosing. Hence the initial tribunal rules provided for participation and support for a patient 
challenging detention. Whether such support was available was left to others.  
Representation of patients was an issue from the very beginning. Martin Ennals of the National 
Council for Civil Liberties (NCCL) wrote to Enoch Powell, then Minister of Health, stating that the 
NCCL was establishing a panel of people willing to help patients and their relatives in conducting 
appeals before MHRTs, and asking the ministry ‘to take steps in the direction of encouraging 
suitable people who might be willing to act as patients’ friends and that patients should be so 
advised when they discuss the possibility of an appeal with the hospital authorities. The Minister 
replied that ‘it would not be appropriate for him to establish a panel of the kind suggested, though 
the method of working of tribunals will be kept under review in the light of experience. ‘  
The concerns of the officials in 1960 betrayed a certain stereotyping: that patients might well 
blame a nominated representative if the decision were adverse; and there was also a perceived 
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‘risk that any volunteer panel would include a number of unbalanced people who might well be of 
no help either to the tribunal or the patient.’773  
The NCCL persisted with its inquiries, and wrote on 4 July 1961 asking the Ministry about the 
number of appeals allowed or rejected, and in how many was the person represented, and in how 
many were patients’ friends present. After initially stalling, the Ministry provided the answers 
sought, in fact admitting that ‘As it happens, the figures do show a significantly greater success rate 
for represented compared with the unrepresented patient - 12 per cent as opposed to 10 per cent.’ 
The discharge rate of patients by Tribunals today remains at around 10%. 
The source of their data was the principal regional officers (PROs) who claimed to have additional 
evidence that patients who were represented were much more likely to succeed than those who 
were not. Officials asked PROs if they would in their records distinguish patients who were 
represented, ‘so that later we could see what proportion had been successful and compare it with 
the success of unrepresented patients.’ The Principal Secretary at the Ministry of Health revealed in 
a memo what he intended to do with the information requested suggesting that ‘We could then 
show the figures to the Lord Chancellor’s Department, who could if necessary point out to 
Chairmen that Tribunals should be careful not to be over-impressed by solicitors etc. representing 
patients.’774 
The NCCL continued to run a volunteer representation scheme, from 1959 until the MHA 1983. 
Some solicitors’ firms had also developed a specialism in tribunal work, usually because they were 
based in towns adjacent to the ‘Special Hospitals’ – the High Security Hospitals (Broadmoor, 
Rampton, and Moss Side (now Ashworth) where every in-patient was detained. When the legal aid 
‘green form scheme’ was introduced to allow a solicitor to give advice and assistance worth up to 
£25, this was used to provide assistance to patients, but it could not cover the solicitors’ costs of 
attending the hearing.  
The need for representation of patients was a key feature of MIND’s campaign for reform of the 
tribunal in the 1970s and 1980s. MIND’s new director, Tony Smythe, had come from the 
directorship of the NCCL in 1974, and brought in a young civil liberties lawyer from the US, Larry 
Gostin as legal director, and under their leadership MIND not only provided information and 
training on patients’ rights and advocacy before tribunals, but also brought test cases, and 
spearheaded the reform campaign which led to the introduction of the Mental Health Act 1983 and 
the Mental Health Review Tribunal Rules 1983.  
In October 1979 MIND’s Legal Director, Larry Gostin, submitted MIND’s evidence to the 
Interdepartmental Committee on MHRT Procedures advocating full legal aid for representation 
before MHRTs to overcome the funding limitations of the Green Form Scheme. The Committee 
accepted the view that skilled representatives should be available for those who needed them, 
pointing to the increase in recent years of the proportion of patients represented. The Committee 
noted that most of the solicitors who carried out this work were using the legal aid ‘green form’ 
scheme, which allowed advice and assistance to be reimbursed, but not court or tribunal 
appearances. Solicitors would obtain a £25 extension and use any residue left over to reimburse 
their costs of attending the hearing. This was not a satisfactory system, and the Committee 
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proposed a mental health duty solicitor scheme, and had already secured agreement in principle 
from the Law Society that they would provide exemption for participating solicitors from the 
practising rules which prohibit advertising. This idea would later be partially implemented with the 
Law Society Panel List of accredited Mental Health Tribunal advocates.  
The Committee was concerned about accountability of representatives, because the representative 
would be in a position to see and hear all the evidence put before the tribunal, and felt that some 
controls on the flow of information were necessary in order to ensure the security of confidential 
information. They accepted that members of the legal profession were bound by professional 
codes. Although the Committee felt that people outside the profession should be given the 
possibility of acting as representatives, they felt that such people should be subject to strict control. 
The Departmental officials were well aware that everyone is bound by s 12 of the Administration of 
Justice Act 1960 not to disclose any information about proceedings held in private. 
The Committee suggested that solicitor and barrister representatives should be automatically 
accorded rights to be present throughout and to see all the evidence, whereas others would be 
granted audience at the discretion of the tribunal. The sort of criteria which the tribunal was 
expected to use in granting such rights were relevant professional background, experience of 
tribunal work, attendance at a training course. Other persons’ lacking relevant professional status 
‘unknown to the tribunal’ or personally involved in the case should in the committee’s view be 
known as friends, not representatives, and the tribunal would retain the discretion to exclude a 
friend from any part of the hearing.  
Following the decision in X v United Kingdom in 1981 there was significant concern in the 
Department of Health and Social Security that the reference in the judgment to the necessity for 
‘sufficient procedural safeguards appropriate to the category of deprivation of liberty dealt with’775 
could be taken to include legal representation in such cases but the hope was expressed that they 
‘do not necessarily imply a system of state funded legal aid’. The concern was that X v United 
Kingdom, read in conjunction with the ruling in Airey v Ireland might imply a need for state funded 
legal aid. 776 There was support for legal aid among some Ministers in the newly elected 
Conservative Government of Margaret Thatcher. Norman Fowler wrote to Lord Hailsham the Lord 
Chancellor on April 7 1982 as follows 
I completely share your view that MHRTs are unique among tribunals in that they 
are concerned with individual liberty. It is very difficult for the mentally disordered 
to make their case, especially without sight of medical reports. As you say, we have 
been pressed very strongly on legal aid during the Lords stages of the Mental Health 
(Amendment) Bill and it was a theme in the second reading debate in the Commons. 
The subject will certainly come up again in the special Standing Committee which the 
Government decided will apply to the Bill. I believe we shall be given a great deal of 
credit if we are able to agree to this extension of legal aid while the Bill is being 
discussed in the Commons.777  
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Leon Brittan, then Chief Secretary to the Treasury, was in no doubt that ‘we would, if anything, be 
under very strong pressure indeed in the Commons stages if we were unable to make any move in 
this area.’  
Non-means tested legal aid was extended to MHRT representation to coincide with the coming into 
force of the Mental Health Act 1983. The Law Society maintains a panel of solicitors who are 
accredited to carry out this work. It is now a requirement of contracts with the Legal Services 
Agency that solicitors are members of the Law Society’s Mental Health Tribunal Panel. There have 
been strong signs for several years now that legal aid cutbacks and reductions in the rate of 
remuneration are leading to a retreat from this work on the part of legal aid solicitors.  
The current rules provide that a party may appoint a representative (whether legally qualified or 
not) to represent that party in the proceedings, not being a person liable to be detained or subject 
to guardianship or a community patient under the Act or a person receiving treatment for mental 
disorder at the same hospital or registered establishment as the patient.778 
The representative or party must notify tribunal in writing of the representative’s name and 
address. The representative may do anything required in relation to the hearing on behalf of the 
party other than sign a witness statement. If there is a representative, the tribunal must provide to 
the representative any document which is required to be sent to the represented party, and need 
not provide that document to the represented party. 
The Tribunal may appoint a legal representative for the patient if the patient has not appointed a 
representative; and either (i) the patient has stated that they do not wish to conduct their own case 
but have indicated that they wish to be represented; or (ii) the patient lacks the capacity to appoint 
a representative but the Tribunal believes that it is in the patient’s best interests for the patient to 
be represented. The rules also provide that a party may be accompanied in the hearing by another 
person, who may assist in presenting the party’s case.  
The 1983 Rules had simply allowed the tribunal to appoint an authorised person to act as a 
representative, and made no mention of capacity, and the ethical guidance from the Law Society 
was to the effect that representatives should follow their client’s instructions and argue for 
discharge when this was what the client wanted. 779 The advent of the concept of capacity into the 
tribunal rules raised the prospect that a patient might lack capacity to give instructions, and that 
the advocate’s duty would be to act in their best interests, rather than necessarily advancing the 
case for discharge. In MH (by her litigation friend the Official Solicitor) v Secretary of State for 
Health Baroness Hale made reference to the low level of capacity required to make an application 
to the tribunal when she said: 
Most of the patients who are admitted under the formal procedures in the Mental 
Health Act 1983 do have the very limited capacity required to make an application to 
a mental health review tribunal or have someone else who can help them to make 
it.780 
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In AA v Cheshire and Wirral Partnership NHS Foundation Trust 781 Judge Rowlands likened the role 
of the representative in a case where the client lacks capacity to give valid instructions to that of a 
litigation friend when he said 
The rule must also anticipate that the solicitor will exercise her or his judgment and 
advance any argument s/he considers to be in the patient’s ‘best interests’ which 
will … not necessarily involve arguing for the patient’s discharge. In those 
circumstances it seems to me that the solicitor has the same freedom of action as a 
litigation friend.  
As a roundtable participant put it, ‘The current Practice Note issued by the Law Society draws an 
important distinction between a litigation friend and a representative.’ It says this: 
An appointment by the tribunal does not mean that you are also appointed to act as 
the patient’s litigation friend. You should not assume that guidance prepared for a 
litigation friend in other court proceedings applies to you as a representative.’ 782 
The Practice Note acknowledges the heightened duty of a tribunal appointed advocate to identify 
and act in the best interests of the client, but then says that  
In our view the client’s interest in a fair hearing to determine the lawfulness of their 
detention is paramount. There are likely to be few cases where a client who is able 
to express their wish to be discharged by a tribunal will be assessed as lacking 
capacity to instruct you. Similarly, where a client without litigation capacity tells you 
they wish to be discharged from hospital, there will be few cases where it will not be 
appropriate to argue for their discharge. 783  
This is because of the overriding importance of the client’s right under Article 5(4) to challenge the 
lawfulness of their detention.’ This right exists without the detained patient needing to show that 
they have any particular chance of success in obtaining their release.784 The Practice Note 
concludes on this point by saying that where the client lacks the ability to express their wishes the 
solicitor should 
- Ensure that the tribunal receives all relevant material so that it can determine whether the 
criteria for continued detention are met 
- Test the criteria for continued detention 
- Remember the clients right to treatment in the least restrictive setting 
In addition to his role as Vice-President of the CoP, Charles J is the President of the Administrative 
Appeals Chamber of the Upper Tribunal. In the latter capacity, in YA v Central and NW London NHS 
Trust and Others785 he held that ‘To have capacity to appoint a representative a patient has to have 
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more than simply an understanding that they can make an application to a mental health review 
tribunal or have someone else make it for them and thus the limited capacity referred to [by Lady 
Hale in MH}.’786 Charles J considered the central goal of the process was that the grounds for the 
detention and its continuation should be tested and reviewed as effectively as is practicable. In 
many cases he considered this could be done effectively by reference to the relevant statutory 
provisions and existing reports (and evidence from their authors and others). 
Charles J offered this guidance where a solicitor is appointed for a client who lacks capacity to 
appoint. First, the representative should not concede points if the client lacks capacity to consent 
to a concession, but should tell the tribunal s/he is only advancing arguable points. Solicitors have a 
general duty to advance only arguable points on behalf of capable patients as set out in the Court 
of Appeal ruling in Buxton v Mills Owen 787 
The representative should then inform the patient and the tribunal that he intends to act as the 
patient’s appointed representative in the following way: 
a) He will provide the tribunal with an account of the patient’s views, wishes, feelings, beliefs 
and values (including any wish that the representative should act in a different way to the 
course proposed by the representative). 
b) He will invite the tribunal to hear evidence from the patient and allow the patient to 
address the tribunal 
c) He will draw the tribunal’s attention to such matters and advance such arguments as he 
properly can in support of the patient’s expressed views, wishes, feelings, beliefs and 
values; and 
d) He will not advance any other arguments. 788 
The YA ruling applies to the appointment of representatives where the patient has not already 
appointed one and lacks capacity to give instructions.  
Charles J’s guidance from YA is reproduced in the Law Society’s revised Practice Note on 
representation before Mental Health Tribunals.789 The Practice Note also deals with the solicitor’s 
duty in representing a client who has capacity to give instructions. Solicitors are to assume that the 
client ‘has capacity unless the contrary is established. The note informs advocates of the test of 
litigation capacity from Masterman-Lister v. Brutton & Co 790, namely 'whether the party to legal 
proceedings is capable of understanding, with the assistance of proper explanation from legal 
advisers and experts in other disciplines as the case may require, the issues on which his consent or 
decision is likely to be necessary in the course of those proceedings'. The Note goes on to say that 
the information which a patient needs to understand to instruct a solicitor regarding Mental Health 
Tribunal proceedings is not complex. The Law Society Practice Note states ‘that people severely 
affected by a mental disorder may still be able to provide instructions if you explain matters simply 
and clearly.’ 
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As to the question of whether the person is able to provide instructions, this, says the Practice 
Note, ‘is a judgment that in many cases an experienced mental health advocate will be able to 
make themselves.’ The Note anticipates that it will only be in ‘rare cases’ that the advocate will be 
‘unable to form an opinion’ about capacity to instruct and that in such cases the advocate should 
‘obtain the opinion of the responsible clinician (RC) - either directly or via the mental health act 
administrator - as to the client's litigation capacity. You should also ask the RC for his or her opinion 
of the client’s capacity to appoint you’.791 The fact that this will arise in ‘rare cases’ should not 
deflect attention from the fact that the advocate is being advised to ask for an opinion on his clients 
capacity from the very person who is on the other side of the dispute about the client’s detention.  
If the client has capacity to give instructions, the Note goes on to outline the solicitor’s duty, which 
is to ‘act in accordance with those instructions, even where they are inconsistent, unhelpful to the 
case or vary during the preparation of the case, or during the hearing itself.’792 However, the Note 
then cautions that ‘the fact that the client's instructions are contrary to their best interests may be 
evidence that they lack capacity.’793 This seems a dangerously wide statement. What if the 
advocate thinks that it is not in the patient’s best interests to be discharged? This should surely not 
be a ground to conclude that the patient lacks capacity to instruct, and the passages, which follow 
in the Practice Note suggest that it would only be in very rare circumstances that such a conclusion 
would be reached.  
In accordance with the ruling in Buxton v Mills-Owen advocates are told that they must ‘refuse to 
advance an argument which is not 'properly arguable', despite instructions to do so.794 However, 
the note goes on to say that a submission may be 'properly arguable' even if it has few, if any, 
prospects of success.795 It will depend upon the context and your judgment. The Note concludes on 
this point by saying that ‘It is highly unlikely that to seek a client's discharge in accordance with his 
or her express wishes would not be 'properly arguable', even if it is unlikely to succeed.’ 
Where the argument that the client instructs the advocate to advance is properly arguable, it must 
be advanced ‘without reservation.’ Advocates are told not ‘to advance a submission at the same 
time as signalling to the judge that they may think it is weak or hopeless, for example by using 
coded language such as 'I am instructed that'. Such coded language is well understood as conveying 
that the advocate expects it to be rejected.’ 796 
Where advocates believe that the client's instructions are unrealistic or contrary to their interests 
they should ‘discuss with the client an alternative and more realistic line of challenge’, which may 
be pursued ‘only if the client agrees.’ Your duty to act in accordance with the client's instructions 
takes precedence over your duty to act in what you perceive to be their best clinical interests. 
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Therefore if your client wishes you to argue for their discharge you should do this, even if in your 
view your client needs hospital treatment.’  
The YA ruling and the Law Society’s Practice Notes issued in the wake of the ruling show a strong 
emphasis on the patient’s capacity to instruct a solicitor. The Note emphasises that it is unethical 
for a solicitor to take instructions from a client who lacks capacity, that the test of capacity to bring 
a case is not difficult to satisfy, and that it can be applied by an experience mental health tribunal 
advocate. The notion that the solicitor in a case of doubt should seek the opinion of the 
representative of the detaining authority as to his client’s capacity to challenge detention is difficult 
to square with the human rights due process model of how Article 5(4) should work. 
It is vitally important to acknowledge the overriding purpose of the tribunal process, as set out in 
Charles J’s judgment in YA and in the Law Society’s Practice Note, which is to test the criteria for 
detention and to enable the views and arguments expressed by the patient to be heard. This was 
the choice made by the Interdepartmental Committee in 1979 when they rejected an unstructured, 
review body approach in favour of the model of the tribunal as an ‘independent body carrying out a 
thorough inquiry’ which would provide opportunities for the patient to challenge witnesses and be 
governed by a ‘structured system of procedure prescribed by rules.’797  
The threefold rationale of the principle of personal presence is reflected in the model of 
participation evolved over time by the Mental Health Tribunals. The dignity principle has always 
been there, although not articulated as such in the early years, that the person should be seen in 
person, rather than through the lens of written reports. The notion that the patient should be seen 
to assess her or his condition, has also been there throughout. The real struggles have come about 
in recognising the patient as a ‘subject’, as an active participant who should be placed in a position 
to refute the case made against him and who should enjoy equality of arms with the authorities 
who are seeking to justify detention. It is not too much of a generalization to say that the client 
group eligible for Mental Health Tribunals is generally able to articulate opposition to mental health 
detention and be clear that they wish to challenge. The proportion of this population who are 
unable to express a clear opposition to their placement is probably low by comparison with those 
lacking capacity to decide where to live and deprived of their liberty under the DOLS. The 
availability of automatic reviews to a certain degree obviates the need for the level of guidance set 
out in Re RD and Others 798 in relation to the CoP as to when there is a duty to bring a challenge 
before the Tribunal on a patient’s behalf.  
4.9 BROADER ISSUES OF ACCESSIBILITY AND TRAINING 
In 2001 the Care Quality Commission and the Administrative Justice and Tribunals Council 
published a joint report Patients’ Experiences in the First-Tier Tribunal which reported on a survey 
of service users who had experience of tribunal hearings. One participant pointed to the annual 
training course for tribunal members organised by the Judicial College entitled ‘The Patient’s 
Perspective: Taking Forward the AJTC Report.’ The course contains a panel of service users, ‘experts 
by experience’, who all have experience of tribunals. As the roundtable participant put it, ‘Most of 
the course consists of guided discussions with them as they describe their experiences of pre-
hearing examinations, the hearing itself and getting the decision.’ This is an important development 
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in the training of tribunal members, and in our opinion is an initiative which should be included in 
training for judges in the CoP.  
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5. DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This concluding section summarizes the key themes arising from this report and sets out the 
essential elements of a human rights-based model of participation. We have argued that 
participation is itself a human right. It permeates Articles 5, 6 and 8 of the ECHR, and Council of 
Europe Recommendation 99(4) on Mental Incapacity. It is the driving concept of the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UN CRPD). Support for, and participation in, 
decision making are also central principles of the MCA, which bind the CoP and those representing 
or supporting P in the litigation. 
We have put forward what we see as the three essential principles of a human rights-based 
approach to participation, modeled primarily around the case law of the European Court of Human 
Rights, but also drawing on the UNCRPD. They are:  
1. The overarching dignity principle: a person should be entitled to be present when decisions 
are taken which impose serious restrictions on her or his rights and freedoms. This was 
fundamental to the decision in Shtukaturov and is also evident in X and Y v Croatia, 799 
another case concerning deprivation of legal capacity, where the ECtHR held that ‘judges 
adopting decisions with serious consequences for a person’s private life, such as those 
entailed by divesting someone of legal capacity, should in principle also have personal 
contact with those persons.’800 This principle has been reiterated in subsequent cases, with 
a particular emphasis on cases where the person opposed the measure in question.801 A 
similar approach can be found under the common law in the case of Osborn v The Parole 
Board802. 
2. The evidential principle: the relevant person her or himself is an important source of 
evidence for judicial decisions about their legal capacity and liberty. As the Court put it in 
Shtukaturov, they are the ‘object of the proceedings’ and their participation is therefore 
necessary ‘to allow the judge to form his personal opinion about the applicant’s mental 
capacity’.803 It is also necessary for the judge to consider the proportionality of the measure 
in question. 
3. The adversarial principle: Participation – including directly and through effective 
representation - may be necessary to help a person to present his case804 and to refute 
expert evidence or arguments recommending measures that a person opposes.805 
This threefold right to participate and the ‘rule of personal presence’ have profound and far-
reaching implications. It is based on the fundamental ideals of the rule of law; the idea of 
procedural fairness in dealing with the rights of those deemed incapable of managing their own 
affairs. It radically recasts the idea of how courts and tribunals that adjudicate on matters relating 
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to legal capacity and liberty for disabled adults should function. It is not clear that the CoP system 
can survive this test. From basic questions of accessibility through to the unresolved question of 
what is actually happening, in legal terms, when a judge meets with P, it is clear that the CoP 
system was not set up with the participation of P at its heart, and rapid adaptations are having to 
be made. The model is more akin to the old system for the participation of children in the family 
courts.  
5.1 WHAT FUNCTIONS DO WE WANT THE COP TO PERFORM? 
At the outset, we need to ask what are the functions and purpose of the CoP, and in what type of 
decisions is P supposed to be participating? What is the purpose of a court hearing, and of P’s 
participation?   
Historically the court’s role has been viewed as, as Lord Goff described it in Re F , to provide ‘an 
independent, objective and authoritative view on the lawfulness of the procedure in the particular 
circumstances of the relevant case, after a hearing at which it can be ensured that there is 
independent representation on behalf of the person upon whom it is proposed to perform the 
operation.’806 Providing a view on the lawfulness of a procedure is not the same as conferring 
authority which the defence of necessity (now codified in the MCA) could not confer, but there is 
here the seed of recognition of the importance of P’s participation in decisions with major 
consequences for a person’s life.   
The human rights view that we have outlined above differs from this approach.  It suggests that the 
court is an essential guarantor of fairness in decisions that have serious implications for people’s 
human rights.  That means that some decisions cannot be made without first seeking the court’s 
authority, particularly those that the person or their family objects to.  The boundaries around this 
obligation are not, however, clear cut.  Viewed through the lens of the ECHR, the CoP also offers an 
important review function for decisions that have a significant impact on an individual’s legal 
capacity, or for deprivation of liberty.  The ECtHR guarantees unqualified direct rights of access to a 
court for these functions. 
The CoP’s jurisdiction in relation to health and welfare only partially reflects these approaches.  It is 
true that those providing care and treatment may seek the court’s sanction for contested or 
potentially controversial acts, but the extent to which they are legally required to do so outside the 
context of detention is far from clear.  Meanwhile as we have shown, the forms and procedures of 
the CoP are not set up to guarantee P with a realistic prospect of asserting his capacity or otherwise 
contesting best interests decisions with a serious impact on his human rights.  This is reflected in 
the extremely low numbers of applications from P himself, asserting his capacity. 
One of the central criticisms of guardianship systems, that has prompted the ‘revolutionary new 
norms’807 of the CRPD, is that they do not comply with the basic requirements of the rule of law 
because they confer arbitrary power on substitute decision makers.808  The response of the ‘new 
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paradigm’ under Article 12 CRPD is that therefore guardianship systems should be abolished.809  
The response of the ‘old paradigm’, captured in instruments such as Recommendation 99 and the 
ECtHR case law described in this report, is to overlay guardianship laws with procedural safeguards, 
to ensure there are systems of checks and balances over the power exercised by guardians.  The 
threefold adversarial, evidential and dignity principles of the ECtHR’s right to participate and the 
rule of personal presence can be viewed as a legalistic exercise to shore up the overall legitimacy of 
systems of substituted decision making in light of a rising tide of concern and criticism at an 
international level.   
As we have already outlined, the MCA does not adopt a formal substitute decision making model 
for health and welfare matters, comparable to the guardianship systems of Central and Eastern 
Europe that have shaped the development of the ECtHR right to participate.  Instead it operates a 
highly informal system of substitute decision making and deprivation of legal capacity for health 
and welfare matters based around ss 5 and 6, which provide statutory defences in respect of acts of 
care, treatment and restraint, provided certain conditions are met. The CoP exercises ultimate 
jurisdiction over this system of clinical authority.  
The CoP’s model of participation is undergoing a quiet revolution; from a low participation model 
that one might express as being ‘seen (by experts) but not heard (by the court)’, to a model where 
judges and representatives are increasingly involving P directly in the proceedings.  This high 
participation model however has run up against significant conceptual and practical challenges.  It 
is very difficult to see how the ECtHR vision of participation – with judges routinely meeting with P, 
and P given full and active legal representation to advance his claims in all proceedings with 
significant implications for his legal capacity and his human rights – could be reconciled to the 
current CoP system.  High participation is only possible within the current system if there is a low 
volume of litigation; yet the participatory vision of the ECtHR suggests that all those wishing to 
assert their capacity in matters with serious implications for their human rights should have access 
to a court.  We can only guess at the scale of this, but we suggest that the problems this may cause 
for the CoP system may exceed the scale of the difficulties created for the CoP by Cheshire West. 
This prompts the questions ‘How do we select the kinds of cases that we want the CoP to 
adjudicate? and Can we specify those types of case in general rules? The answers to these 
questions are not clear cut. ‘We are not sure.’ Capacity questions tend to be raised where a person 
is in conflict with those providing care and treatment for them.810 The ECtHR authorities, in 
particular DD v Lithuania, suggest access to a court is vital where a person is in conflict with those 
making decisions on their behalf where it will have serious consequences for their lives. Yet how far 
should this principle go? One answer is that adjudication by a court is required in any situations 
where a person objects to a best interests decision made about them that has serious 
consequences for their human rights.  Examples would be decisions about where they live, or with 
whom they are permitted to have contact, or medical treatments that might be given without their 
consent. There are indications that this was the original intention of the Law Commission in their 
proposals that went on to form the basis of the MCA 2005, although as we argued in Section 3.1 of 
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this report, this approach seems to have been lost in translation. Yet considering the potential scale 
of litigation that might ensue from this position, it is difficult to see how the legal system – or 
indeed the health and social care system – could cope with the administrative weight of such an 
approach. As Lord Brandon put it in Re F  ‘if every operation to be performed, or other treatment to 
be given, required the approval or sanction of the court, the whole process of medical care for such 
patients would grind to a halt.811 
If it is not to be the approach that any non-consensual health or social care intervention to which a 
person objects and which interferes with their rights should be brought to court, then where do we 
draw the line? Are we content to allow medical and social care professionals to decide, on an 
informal and often unscrutinised basis, about matters such as forced treatment or restrictions on 
contact with loved ones?  Unsupervised powers of this nature would be regarded with great 
suspicion if exercised in relation to the general population, so why are they acceptable for disabled 
people?  This also raises constitutional questions, since these ‘powers’ to interfere with 
fundamental human rights against a person’s will are in fact statutory defences and not, in a 
technical sense, even formal powers that were specifically considered, debated and granted by 
Parliament at all. For this reason we argued in Section 3.1 that there should be a public consultation 
on when decisions taken under the MCA need to go to court, rather than the piecemeal accrual of 
duties under the common law. Such a consultation could also consider whether non-judicial 
safeguards, such as an expansion of the role of advocates or second opinion schemes like that 
proposed by the Law Commission in 1995 and in use under the Mental Health Act 1983 (see Section 
4 above) that might suffice in some circumstances. 
The approach we have advocated, for considering how far the public is content for substituted 
decisions with significant consequences for disabled people and their families to operate without 
formal scrutiny by the court or another procedural safeguard, clearly lies within the ‘old paradigm’ 
tradition of overlaying guardianship with legalism to assuage our anxieties about the powers they 
exercise.  Quinn, a strong advocate of the approach to legal capacity connected to the UN CRPD, 
argues that ‘When you burn away the legalese’ this approach simply ‘provides for an ever more 
perfect and safeguarded process of loss’ of legal capacity812; it is an approach based on addressing 
our fears of abuse of power, not a positive vision of support and empowerment.   
To the advocates of the new paradigm, the answer is to seek more radical constraints on the 
powers of substitute decision makers, and a greater emphasis on supports for the exercise of legal 
capacity in accordance with the person’s rights, will and preferences.  Yet we believe that our 
proposals for enhancing the participation of P would still have a bearing on any judicial forum 
under a ‘new paradigm’ approach.  Even under the ‘support paradigm’, there is still tremendous 
power vested in supporters and in those situations where a person’s will and preferences are 
unclear or contested, that will doubtless be justiciable.  Questions will also arise as to the extent to 
which a person’s apparent decisions are subject to ‘undue influence’; a growing number of CoP 
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cases address this issue already.813  Many proponents of the support paradigm do envisage some 
limited powers of intervention, provided they do not discriminate against disabled people.814   
We cannot escape these questions of how much power we are content for those supporting, 
treating and caring for adults with mental disabilities to exercise without judicial oversight. This 
prompts us to consider what are the limits and limitations of judicial oversight of medical and social 
care decision-making, which has an impact on individual human rights? Once caseload exceeds a 
certain volume there will be a direct trade off in terms of a fall in the level of scrutiny.  In an 
important sense, the right of access to a court, insofar as it may increase the volume of litigation, 
sits in tension with rights to participate in the proceedings.  We need to look to other participatory 
models than the CoP for answers, such as the mental health tribunals. 
5.2 MODELS OF REPRESENTING P 
There is a tension between the ‘best interests’ model of representation that is dominant in the CoP 
and MCA system and the ‘active representation’ of P’s own wishes and feelings that is increasingly 
endorsed in international human rights law. This plays out in the confusing and sometimes 
contradictory guidance for the conduct of IMCAs, RPRs, litigation friends and Rule 3A 
representatives (and, doubtless, ALRs, when they commence practice).   
The problem with ‘best interests’ representation is that it potentially neutralizes P’s ability to 
contest decisions purportedly taken in her or his own best interests. It also violates the ‘dignity 
principle’ since P may very well, with good reason, feel that the interests of justice have not been 
served, and P’s voice not heard. It is notable that RP, in the ECtHR case of RP v UK (discussed under 
Section 3.5, above) complained that she did not feel that her voice had been heard under a best 
interests model of representation.815  
A human rights focus concentrates on ideals of due process and natural justice, and the UN CRPD 
notion of decisions based on will and preference (the nearest MCA equivalent ‘being wishes and 
feelings, values and beliefs’). If representation is to mean anything it must entail putting Ps in the 
best possible position to advance their own views to the bodies making decisions about them. 
‘Nothing about us without us’. It is the role of others to advance best interests arguments to the 
decision-making body. 
Seen through a human rights lens the role of the CoP is to enable P to test the lawfulness of 
decisions that s/he lacks capacity, or should be deprived of liberty, or should suffer interference 
with physical and psychological integrity. A best interests approach to access allows P’s own 
representative to give away the right of access to a court because to exercise it would not be in P’s 
best interests. Access to a court simply becomes a theoretical right, if P’s own representative, or 
the person appointed to represent P can argue those very rights away. 
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5.3 MEETING THE JUDGE: WHAT IS HAPPENING WHEN P MEETS A JUDGE? 
The ECtHR’s rule of personal presence requires that the judge meet the person, but what is 
happening when a meeting between a CoP judge and P takes place is a key issue, and one that 
remains unresolved. The approach of the Family Court to judges meeting children is that this is 
essentially tokenistic, based on courtesy, and cannot have an impact on the decision. In the Mental 
Health Tribunal the patient has the right to address the tribunal. That may serve the dignity 
principle that the person has the right to be seen by the body responsible for limiting their rights. 
Yet it can also serve an evidential purpose, in that the tribunal can assess the person’s mental state. 
It may also serve an adversarial purpose in that the patient may seek to use the opportunity to put 
forward their case and seek to refute the case for detention. Whilst the practice of CoP judges 
meeting P is happening more frequently, it is not yet the norm. It remains to be seen where the 
Court will take the statement by Judge Rogers in A County Council v AB & Ors (Participation of P in 
Proceedings)816 that Rule 90 of the CoP Rules ‘provides or establishes the entitlement of P to attend 
proceedings’. The word 'entitlement' or 'entitled' is clear.’817  
The danger is that this process may become patronizing to P in the CoP. The Report of the Children 
and Vulnerable Witnesses Working Group reflects the oddity in saying to the child you effectively 
can’t listen to what they say.818 The person is being invited to be present and possibly to put 
forward their view, but those views cannot form part of the basis of the decision. However, 
meeting the judge raises a number of questions if the meeting were to be used for evidence 
gathering purposes or adversarial purposes. Is the CoP judge expected to assess capacity in the 
course of meeting P? Issues of P’s capacity are usually addressed by expert evidence and there is 
very often consensus between expert witnesses that P lacks capacity. A courtroom setting is clearly 
not optimal for assessing capacity. If judges meet P alone, they will be rightly wary of being accused 
of evidence gathering in the absence of the parties.  
Because our report has focused on questions of participation and the rights of P – rather than 
questions of evidence and the rights of the other parties – we are not able to make 
recommendations resolving these questions.  This is why we have recommended the establishment 
of a working group to consider how best to respond to the ECtHR’s rule of personal presence 
(Recommendations 8 and 9).  This working group should have involvement from legal experts, who 
can help resolve concerns about potentially taking evidence in the absence of other parties, or the 
thorny question of what elements of capacity assessment are properly for the court and what lies 
within the domain of expert evidence.  Yet this working group should also reflect the same 
participatory spirit that animates the human rights approach advocated for in this report, and the 
CRPD’s specific requirement that disabled people through their representative organisations are 
properly involved and consulted upon for policy decisions concerning them.819  The working group’s 
approach should also reflect the CoP’s broader commitment to transparency of process. 
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5.4 SHORTAGE OF RESOURCES 
Clearly facilitating effective participation by P in cases where P lacks capacity can be a resource 
intensive exercise, and shortage of resources is a recurring theme at all levels of participation. 
There is a shortage of resources for IMCAs to support P in putting forward wishes and feelings in 
the decision-making process. Similarly resources for paid RPRs are short, which could restrict their 
ability to support P in upholding Article 5 rights. Non-means tested legal aid is available only for 
deprivation of liberty cases, and people may find themselves using their own resources to defend 
their human rights against a health or social care organization. Again Rule 3A representatives may 
need to be paid for if they are not family members, and there is no obvious source of funding for 
this. Clearly, providing special measures of the kind required to enable AB to participate in A County 
Council v AB & Ors (Participation of P in Proceedings)820can be a costly exercise. Shortage of 
resources throughout the MCA and CoP system thus presents a very real threat to access to justice 
and rights to participate in decisions with serious consequences for a person’s rights.  
Inaction over funding for Re X deprivation of liberty cases could constitute discrimination against 
people with mental disabilities, and there has been no access to justice for the cases stayed after Re 
JM. It is important that we recognise the tension between participation and funding. The simple 
solution would be for the government to fund the justice system so that the human rights goal of 
participation may be effectively realized. The other possibility is to look at less expensive ways of 
doing what the CoP does, such as using the tribunal model of decision-making. 
5.5 THE COURT V TRIBUNAL ISSUE 
The question of whether a tribunal instead of a court should deal with issues arising under the 
Mental Capacity Act has been an issue from the outset. The status of a court was preferred to a 
tribunal by the Law Commission.821 Yet the question of whether a tribunal would be more 
appropriate has continued to be raised and the Law Commission is currently considering which 
forum is most appropriate for the review of deprivation of liberty. All the signs are that they will opt 
for the tribunal. We have explained the evolution of the tribunal model of participation since the 
inception of the tribunal in 1959.  
There are signs of cross-fertilisation of ideas from the MCA 2005 into tribunal decision-making, and 
a growing convergence in the conceptual apparatus of the MCA and MHA regimes. We have 
discussed the emergence and growing relevance of issues of capacity to instruct a tribunal 
advocate, and the development of Practice Notes by the Law Society providing detailed guidance 
on this issue. Determinations of incapacity to instruct are a potential barrier to participation and 
the guidelines in such cases offer encouragement towards a best interests approach to advocacy.  
The tribunal too is under pressure from an ever increasing caseload and there are proposals which 
are driven primarily by ‘efficiency savings’. Yet in many ways the tribunal offers a model of 
participation that is better suited to fulfilling the requirements of human rights law in facilitating 
the participation of P in the three senses we have identified.  
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As far as participation is concerned, there are many aspects of the tribunal model which 
recommend it over that currently available in the CoP. There are better systems for accessing 
information about rights, easier formalities to apply for review, legal aid is available without means 
test, the cost are less for the parties, legal representatives (in the main) base their case on what the 
patient wants, not what the representative believes is in their best interests, the proceedings are 
generally shorter, and case management is less protracted. Just as medical and social services 
reports with standardized headings may be required by the mental health tribunals, so too could 
similar templates be devised for other issues such as treatment without consent, decisions about 
residence and other issues.822 Last but most certainly not least, the tribunal goes to the person 
which overcomes in one sweep many (albeit not all) of the numerous practical hurdles to 
participation faced by the CoP.  
We make these points in favour of a tribunal model whilst at the same time paying full tribute to 
the strong commitment to justice for P of CoP judges and those working within the system, as well 
as to their immense expertise. One possible option would be to replace the CoP – or at least its 
welfare jurisdiction - with a tailor made tribunal, or by transferring jurisdiction to the existing 
mental health tribunals.  Another option would be a radical revision of the CoP rules and practices 
to adopt many of the procedures of the tribunal model that enhance P’s ability to participate.  One 
advantage of incorporating a tribunal model into the existing CoP, would be the retention of the 
expertise of the existing CoP judiciary.   
As to the appropriate judicial forum for hearing Article 5 appeals, the subject of the Law 
Commission’s current consultation, a strong argument in favour of incorporating a tribunal-like 
model of participation within the existing CoP system is the sheer difficulty – if not impossibility – of 
distinguishing which matters under the MCA are ‘pure’ questions of detention, and when they stray 
into other areas that might be connected with detention but which are not appropriate for a 
tribunal to decide.  For example, cases such as Briggs highlight that a person may be deprived of 
liberty in order to administer a particular medical treatment, and the treatment (not the detention 
per se) is the ‘true’ subject of the dispute.  A tribunal empowered only to address questions of 
detention, but not of medical treatments, would experience considerable difficulty arriving at a 
decision if the purpose of the detention is the particular treatment.  Similar issues may apply where 
a person is deprived of their liberty because it is considered that they lack the mental capacity to 
consent to sex, or because of concerns about neglect or abuse by third parties.  These kinds of 
cases may require fact-finding hearings or independent expert evidence in areas not represented 
on the Tribunal panel to be obtained, or flexible hearing to explore the available options.   
Many DoLS cases are not analogous to the cases that the Mental Health Tribunals hear.  If a tribunal 
system for detention were to sit alongside the CoP, rather than within it, there is considerable 
potential for satellite litigation over which jurisdiction should hear an appeal; the thought of 
another set of ‘interface’ issues for the courts to decide is deeply unattractive.  Adopting elements 
of the tribunal model of participation within the CoP system will bring the advantage that it can be 
adapted for use for cases about other matters than detention – including the kinds of health and 
welfare issues discussed above, or even some property and affairs cases. 
We quickly acknowledge that we have not considered in detail here the kinds of cases that may not 
be suitable for the tribunal model of evidence gathering and legal argument, as our focus here has 
                                                     
822 The CoP has taken some steps towards this approach with the case management pilot. 
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been on participation. What really matters is not the name of the adjudicative forum – court or 
tribunal – but the detail of the processes and practices that facilitate P’s participation and 
recognition of his status at the heart of the case. However it is achieved, we suggest that the 
tribunal offers a promising model to advance the participation of P in the three senses underlying 
the right to participate and the rule of personal presence.  
Whatever jurisdiction is created or adapted following the Law Commission’s proposals on DoLS, 
considerable difficulties will remain in reconciling rights to participate with the growing volume of 
litigation on legal capacity and deprivation of liberty.  In connection with detention, the Law 
Commission’s work will remove from the CoP the non-contentious deprivation of liberty 
authorisation cases that are currently dealt with under the ‘streamlined’ procedure.  However, if 
the Commission’s proposals succeed in overcoming the numerous difficulties those detained under 
the MCA have in exercising Article 5(4) rights of appeal, discussed in Section 3.1, it seems likely that 
there will be a steep rise in the number of cases to be heard.  If the Commission’s initial proposal of 
an automatic court review for those who have not exercised any right of appeal within a particular 
timeframe823 is taken forward, this could result in over one hundred thousand Article 5(4) appeals 
each year824, far exceeding even the number of Mental Health Tribunal hearings.  It is difficult to 
see how meaningful participation would be possible on this scale.   
In our view it would be preferable to restrict tribunal hearings to those situations where either P or 
those close to P object to their detention, or where professionals have concerns about the 
restrictions (for example, an advocate representing P).  On the available evidence it is difficult to 
draw any conclusions about how widely such a jurisdiction would be used, but it seems likely to see 
far greater use than the CoP’s current jurisdiction over deprivation of liberty.  Thus, the shadow 
looming over any future jurisdiction in this area is the difficult ‘Procedural Balance’ so aptly 
summed up by Charles J in Re NRA and others ,825 between satisfying the procedural and 
substantive requirements of Article 5 and the common law, without a procedure so costly it diverts 
resources away from care provision, causes unnecessary intrusions into private lives, and incurs 
such delays that it does not provide an effective procedural safeguard. We have returned to the 
difficult procedural balance between volume and participation throughout this report. Its 
resolution will be critical to the success of any future court or tribunal jurisdiction for the MCA. 
Our overarching conclusion is that the Law Commission’s review of the DoLS presents an 
opportunity to introduce a new approach to jurisdiction over people alleged to lack decision-
making capacity based on a human rights approach to participation. We outline the key elements in 
a human rights approach, and set out several important respects in which the CoP’s processes 
require reconsideration, both in the context of detention but also wider issues of health and 
welfare. We have also highlighted the important steps that need to be taken by government to 
ensure the entire system operates in a way that respects, protects and upholds the rights of those 
subject to substitute decision making under the MCA. Our report is intended to contribute to the 
policy debate about the appropriate forum for disputes about deprivation of liberty, and we hope 
                                                     
823 Law Commission Number 222, n 94. Provisional proposal 11-4 
824 The Law Commission estimate that 70% of the estimated 149,810 who would be subject to their restrictive care and 
treatment scheme would have a tribunal hearing on this scheme, totalling 104,867 hearings per year (if hearings are 
restricted to one per year). Law Commission, ‘Impact Assessment: Mental Capacity and Detention (LAWCOM0044 
2015). 
825 Re: NRA and others [2015] EWCOP 59 
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that it may inspire policy makers and those responsible for review of the CoP’s processes for health 
and welfare, to consider a new approach.  
 182 
 
APPENDIX A: RULE 3A OF THE COURT OF PROTECTION 
RULES 2007, AS AMENDED 
 
(1) The court shall in each case, on its own initiative or on the application of any person, consider 
whether it should make one or more of the directions in paragraph (2), having regard to – 
(a) the nature and extent of the information before the court; 
(b) the issues raised in the case; 
(c) whether a matter is contentious; and 
(d) whether P has been notified in accordance with the provisions of Part 7 and what, if 
anything, P has said or done in response to such notification. 
(2) The directions are that –  
(a) P should be joined as a party;  
(b) P’s participation should be secured by the appointment of an accredited legal 
representative to represent P in the proceedings and to discharge such other functions as 
the court may direct; 
(c) P’s participation should be secured by the appointment of a representative whose 
function shall be to provide the court with information as to the matters set out in section 
4(6) of the Act and to discharge such other functions as the court may direct;  
(d) P should have the opportunity to address (directly or indirectly) the judge determining 
the application and, if so directed, the circumstances in which that should occur; 
(e) P’s interests and position can properly be secured without any direction under 
subparagraphs (a) to (d) being made or by the making of an alternative direction meeting 
the overriding objective. 
(3) Any appointment or directions made pursuant to paragraph (2)(b) to (e) may be made for 
such period or periods as the court thinks fit. 
(4) Unless P has capacity to conduct the proceedings, an order joining P as a party shall only take 
effect –  
(a) on the appointment of a litigation friend on P’s behalf; or 
(b) if the court so directs, on or after the appointment of an accredited legal representative. 
(5) If the court has directed that P should be joined as a party but such joinder does not occur 
because no litigation friend or accredited legal representative is appointed, the court shall 
record in a judgment or order –  
(a) the fact that no such appointment was made; and 
(b) the reasons given for that appointment not being made. 
(6) A practice direction may make additional or supplementary provision in respect of any of the 
matters set out in this rule. 
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APPENDIX B: MENTAL HEALTH TRIBUNAL FORMS 
First-tier Tribunal 
Health, Education and Social Care Chamber  
(Mental Health) 
 
Application to First-tier Tribunal (Mental Health) 
Mental Health Act 1983 (as amended) 
The Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (HESC) Rules 2008 
 
Please tick the relevant application type 
 
(Please use special form for an application where the patient is subject to guardianship) 
Application by or on behalf of a patient 
detained for assessment (S.2)  
 Application by or on behalf of a 
patient subject to a CTO 
 
Application by or on behalf of a non-
restricted patient detained for treatment 
 Application by or on behalf of a 
RESTRICTED patient 
 
Application by the patient’s Nearest 
Relative (specify below *) 
 Other application by a non-restricted 
patient (specify below *) 
 
*  *  
 
Please complete all information requested in this part of the application form. 
 An application must, if possible, contain all the information requested. 
 If you cannot provide the information required below, please give reasons. 
 The tribunal may return an incomplete application form. 
 
Patients full name826  
Date of Birth1  
Provision or Section under 
which the patient is detained, 
liable to be detained, or subject 
to an Order under the Act1 
 
Date(s) of relevant Section, 
Admission, and/or Order1 
 
Hospital (where patient is, or is 
liable to be, detained)1 
 
Responsible Authority1 
(See Guidance) 
 
                                                     
826 Parties must cooperate with the tribunal and this information is required to enable the tribunal to deal with the case 
effectively and to avoid delay. An incomplete application form may be returned. 
Office stamp 
(date received) 
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For patients in the community 
please give 
1) patient’s address and 
 
2) name and address of 
Community Supervisor or 
Care Coordinator1 
1) 
 
 
 
2) 
 
 
Nearest Relative details if known 
(Non-restricted cases only) 
Name  
 
 
Address 
 
 
 
 
Relationship to patient 
 
Does the patient object to the 
Nearest Relative being 
informed about the case? 
 
 
Solicitor’s details if known 
Name of solicitor 
 
 
Name & address of solicitor’s 
firm 
 
 
 
 
Telephone number  
 
Secure email address 
 
 
Unrepresented: 
*Delete as appropriate 
 I intend to appoint a solicitor myself* 
 I would like a solicitor to be appointed on my behalf* 
 I do not wish to appoint a solicitor as I intend to 
represent myself at the hearing* 
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Is an interpreter is required? 
If so, please enter the 
language and dialect required  
 
Please tell us of any other 
special requirements  
 
 
 
 
 
Declaration (*Delete as appropriate) 
 
This application is submitted by the patient or nearest relative. 
 
Or 
 
This application is submitted on behalf of the patient or nearest relative, who has personally 
authorised me to submit this application on their behalf. 
 
 
Signature 
 
  
Date 
 
 
Print name 
 
 
 
Completed forms should be sent by secure email to: tsmhapplications@hmcts.gsi.gov.uk 
 
If you have a CJSM account, please send to tsmhapplications@hmcts.gsi.gov.uk.cjsm.net 
 
 
Or send by DX to: 
 
HM Courts & Tribunals Service, 
First-tier Tribunal (Mental Health)  
DX: 743090 Leicester 35 
 
Or send by first class post to:  
 
HM Courts & Tribunals Service,  
First-tier Tribunal (Mental Health),  
PO Box 8793,  
5th Floor,  
Leicester  
LE1 8BN.  
 
Please do not submit the form more than once. 
 
  
 
 186 
 
APPENDIX C: EXPLANATORY NOTE FOR A FAMILY MEMBER 
OR FRIEND APPOINTED AS A RULE 3A REPRESENTATIVE 
Issued by Mr Justice Charles in Re VE [2016] EWCOP 16 (10 March 2016)  
General 
The Supreme Court has decided that the package of care and support provided to P in this case 
means that P is being deprived of his liberty. If, as is asserted by the applicant authority, P does not 
have the capacity to give consent to that package of care and support, it needs to be authorised by 
the Court. 
The Court will consider whether that package of care and support is the least restrictive available 
option to best promote the best interests of P and the application is made on the basis that the 
applicant authority is of the view that it is. 
The Court has appointed you as a Rule 3A representative for P because of your relationship with 
and knowledge of P and because the Court is satisfied that without causing P any or any 
unnecessary distress you can assist the Court in reaching its decision by examining what is 
proposed and being done by the applicant authority from the perspective of P's best interests 
(rather than your own or those of others). 
What you need to do is to consider and decide from that perspective whether P's package of care 
and support is the least restrictive available option that best promotes P's best interests and then 
inform the Court what you have decided and what P's wishes and feelings about the package of 
care and support are 
In short, the Court is asking you, as someone who knows the position on the ground, to consider 
whether from the perspective of P's best interests you agree or do not agree that the Court 
should authorise P's package of care and support. 
This will involve you weighing the pros and cons of that package of care and support, comparing it 
with other available options and (if appropriate) proposing changes to the applicant authority. For 
example, if you consider that some of the restrictions it puts in place are unnecessary or 
inappropriate and should be changed, you should raise this with the applicant authority and, if they 
do not agree with what you propose, the Court. 
If you consider that P has capacity to consent to the package of care and support, or parts of it, you 
should raise this with the applicant authority and the Court. 
In any event, you should inform the Court about what P has said about, and P's attitude towards, 
the package of care and support. 
You should also check from time to time that the package of care and support is being properly 
implemented and whether it needs to be changed because P's condition has changed, or for any 
other reason. If you conclude that its implementation or terms should be changed you should raise 
this with the applicant authority and the Court if the changes are not made. 
The Court Documentation 
You will receive the application form (COPDOL10) with Annexes A, B and C. These include details of 
how the package of care and support is said to deprive P of his liberty and details of the 
consultations that have occurred with P and others about it. 
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You will also receive a formal assessment of P's mental capacity (COP3), a mental health 
assessment, a care plan, best interests assessment forms, risk assessments and a placement plan. 
These set out why the applicant authority has reached the view that the package of care and 
support is the least restrictive available option to best promote the best interests of P. 
Steps you should take 
These will include the following: 
o examining the Court documentation to check that it is accurate and whether you 
agree with what it sets out 
o discussing any points that you think need to be clarified or changed with the 
applicant authority 
o discussing the package of care and support and the application to the Court with P in 
so far as P is able to understand them. In particular, if you do not know this already, 
and it will not cause unnecessary distress you should ask P what he thinks about the 
package of care and support 
o considering whether you support the application and so think that the Court should 
make the order sought by the applicant authority 
o if you support the application and so think that the Court should make the order 
sought by the applicant authority the Court could deal with the case without a 
hearing but you should discuss with P whether P wants to play a direct part in the 
proceedings (e.g. by attending a court hearing or by communicating directly with the 
judge) and if P wants to do this you should raise this with the applicant authority and 
include it in your statement to the Court. 
Section 4(6) of the Mental Capacity Act 
The order of the Court refers to this section. It provides that a person determining what is in a 
person's best interests must consider so far as is reasonably ascertainable: 
(a) the person's past and present wishes and feelings (and, in particular, any relevant written 
statement made by him when he had capacity), 
(b) the beliefs and values that would be likely to influence his decision if he had capacity, and 
(c) the other factors that he would be likely to consider if he were able to do so 
Your statement 
This should be in form COP24 and it can be downloaded from the Courts website 
(http://hmctsformfinder.justice.gov.uk/courtfinder/forms/cop024-eng.pdf). 
You should complete the details on page 1 as follows: 
o Statement given by (name of witness) – [your name] 
o Statement – [tick 1st box] 
o Filed on behalf of (name of party) – [your name (Rule 3A Representative)] 
o Date statement was made – [date of completing your witness statement] 
o Case no. – [Case number] 
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o Full name of person to whom the application relates – [P's full name] 
On page 2 you should include your name at (1), occupation at (2) and address at (3). You should not 
tick either of the boxes below (3). 
Your statement begins at (4) and should be formatted in numbered paragraphs. It need not contain 
long explanations and if you agree with what others have set out in the court documentation you 
can simply say so. 
Your statement should generally include the following: 
o An explanation of who you are i.e. P's relation or friend 
o So far as is possible the matters covered in section 4 (6), which is set out above 
o If you do support the application your reasons for doing so 
o Whether an oral hearing may be required because P wishes to see the judge or take 
a direct part in a hearing; setting out what P wants to happen 
o Whether an oral hearing is required because matters are disputed because, for 
example, you do not support the arrangements proposed by the applicant authority 
or they are opposed by P or someone else (such as a friend or a family member); 
setting out the reasons for that lack of support or opposition 
o Any comments you wish to make on P's capacity to make decisions about P's care 
arrangements 
o Any other comments you wish to make and in particular any that are directed to 
assisting the Court to determine whether P's package of care and support is the least 
restrictive available option that best promote P's best interests 
At the bottom of page four you should sign your statement to confirm that its contents are correct. 
You should also include your name and the date where indicated. 
Legal advice 
You may wish to seek independent advice from a solicitor who may be able to provide it to you free 
of charge under the legal aid regulations relating to "legal help". 
The applicant authority may be able to provide you with a list of solicitors who do this work. 
Queries 
The applicant local authority may be able to answer any queries you have and will be able to give 
you details of how you can contact the Court, if you wish to do so. 
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APPENDIX D: SECOND OPINIONS UNDER THE MENTAL 
HEALTH ACT 1983 
 
Table 4 Second opinions for Electro Convulsive Therapy (ECT) and medicines under the Mental Health Act 
1983 from 1983-2015 
Year (Biennial 1983 – 2009; 
annual 2009 – 2015) 
ECT Medicine CTO 
(Introduced in 
2009) 
1983-1985 2,146 1,886  
1985-1987 2,483 2,363  
1987-1989  4,203 3,138  
1989-1991  3,978 3,023  
1991-1993 4,067 4,627  
1993-1995 4,456 6,195  
1995-1997  3,611 6,528  
1997-1999 4,426 10,848  
1999-2001  4,274 11,974  
2001-2003  4,280 14,112  
2003-2005  3,811 16,931  
2005-2007  3,773 18,831  
2007-2009  3,481 21,551  
Annual reports    
2009-2010 1,407 11,606 3406 
2010-2011  1,217 11,709 3,667 
2011-2012  1,215 11,944 3,721 
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2012-2013827 1,306 10,365 1,713 
2013-2014  1,521 10,821 1,306 
2014-2015  1,631 11,610 1,391 
Sources: Mental Health Act Commission Risk, Rights and Recovery: Twelfth Biennial Report, 2005-
2007 TSO 2008 pp 195, 218; Mental Health Act Commission, Coercion and Consent: Thirteenth 
Biennial Report 2007-2009 TSO 2009 p 139. 
After 2009 the Mental Health Act Commission (MHAC) was subsumed into the Care Quality 
Commission (CQC), which assumed responsibility for running the second opinion service and 
monitoring the Mental Health Act 1983. Since 2009 the CQC publishes reports on an annual rather 
than a biennial basis. From 2009, following the introduction of community treatment orders (CTOs) 
the figures include the numbers of second opinions for CTO patients.  
  
 
 
 
                                                     
827 The sharp fall in numbers of CTO second opinions was due to  s 299 of the Health and Social Care Act 2012 which 
provided that if the patients responsible clinician certified that the patient had capacity and consented to the 
treatment, no second opinion certificate was required.   
